Agursky, Mikhail. "Soviet Disinformation and Forgeries." International Journal of World Peace 6, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1989): 13-30.
Atkinson, James. The Politics of Struggle: The Communist Front and Political Warfare. Chicago: Regnery, 1966. [Petersen]
Barghoorn, Frederick C.
1. The Soviet Cultural Offensive. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960.
2. Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964.
3. Soviet Image of the United States: A Study in Distortion. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950.
Binyon, Michael. "US Was Main Target of Dirty Tricks." Times (London), 13 Sep. 1999. [http://www.the-times.co.uk]
"America was the top target for most KGB operations, but most were dirty tricks that were often as crude as they were farcical.... Among the more successful was an attempt to throw suspicion on the CIA for involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy, the allegation that Martin Luther King was in the pay of President Johnson and the assiduous cultivation of rumours that J. Edgar Hoover ... was a closet homosexual and cross-dresser. But there were also numerous attempts to smear American politicians, operations to stir up racial hatred by disseminating forged pamphlets denouncing black people as 'race monkeys' and attempts to recruit Zbigniew Brzezinski ... as a Soviet agent."
1. The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Research Corp., 1972. New York: Ballantine, 1981. [pb]
Pforzheimer sees this "one of the best available books on Communist peacetime deception operations." Constantinides believes the work "could have been even more thorough had the author written less on the events of 1968 ... and more on such matters as agent of influence operations."
2. The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View. McLean, VA: Permagon-Brassey's, 1985.
Unsinger, IJI&C 1.2, identifies Bittman as a member of Czech intelligence from 1954 to 1968. "At times his examination is superficial, and for depth into some specific events, the reader will have to look at Bittman's earlier work." Phillips, IJI&C 1.3, notes that "Chez Espionage regulars consider" this "an excellent study," and they consider Bittman "the top authority on disinformation in the U.S."
3.The New Image-Makers: Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation Today. Washington, DC: Permagon-Brassey's, 1988. [Petersen]
Bittman, Ladislav, ed. "The Messages from Moscow 1989." Propaganda- Disinformation-Persuasion 3, no. 1 (Summer 1990). [Published by Boston University, College of Communication, Program for the Study of Disinformation Papers.]
1. Jiri Hochman, "Soviet Media in 1989: The Party and the Independence of the Press," 1-13;
2. Stanislav Levchenko, "Soviet Active Measures in 1989," 14-30;
3. Branka Lapajne, "Soviet Messages in Canada in 1989," 31-51;
4. Pierre Rigoulot, "Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation in France in 1989," 52-70;
5. Todd Leventhal, "U.S.- Soviet Talks on Disinformation," 71-84.
Bittman, Ladislav, and John Ost, eds. "Thievery, Deception, and Disinformation in International Affairs--Scientific, Technological, and Commercial." Propaganda-Disinformation-Persuasion 4 (Spring 1991). [Published by Boston University, College of Communication, Program for the Study of Disinformation Papers.]
1. Ladislav Bittman, "Scientific, Technological, and Economic Thievery and Deception in International Affairs," 1-19;
2. Stanislav Levchenko, "Deception in High-Technology Acquisitions by the USSR," 20-58;
3. Paul Anastasi, "Soviet Theft of Technology in Greece and Disinformation Cover-Ups," 59-82;
4. Yuri Maltsev and Gregory Katsenelinboigen, "Reliability of Soviet Statistical Data in the Era of Peristroika," 83-93;
5. Evgueni Novikov, "The Use of Soviet Scientists, Scholars, and Educators for Propaganda and Disinformation," 94-112;
6. Liviu Turcu, "The Communist Deception Machine in Romania," 113-134;
7. Michael Lenker, "The Third World Perpetrators: The Libyan Connection," 135-149.
Boghardt, Thomas. "Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign." Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 4 (Dec. 2009): 1-19.
"[A]ctive measures were well integrated into Soviet policy and involved virtually every element of the Soviet party and state structure, not just the KGB." The author traces the AIDS disinformation campaign from its earliest appearance in 1983 through its continued prevalence in the present. "Having effectively harnessed the dynamics of rumors and conspiracy theories, Soviet bloc intelligence had created a monster that has outlived its creators." (Footnote omitted)
Bukharin, Oleg A.
1. "From the Russian Perspective: The Cold War Atomic Intelligence Game, 1945-70." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 2 (2004).
This article examines "the Soviet nuclear denial and deception (D&D) campaign from 1945 until 1970" designed to prevent the West from learning about its nuclear program. "To thwart foreign intelligence operations, the Soviet Union built an elaborate, multi-layered system of denial and deception, the main elements of which included the restriction of access to nuclear facilities and personnel, strict information protection measures, an enhanced counterintelligence posture, and technical countermeasures....
"[L]ong-range, stand-off technical systems proved to be the best collection sources for the United States, allowing for successful tracking of many aspects of the Soviet nuclear program. Overhead imagery enabled the detection and analysis of critical elements of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure. The USAEDS system, designed to monitor radioactive effluents from nuclear explosions and nuclear material processing, yielded important data on the development of Soviet nuclear weapons science and technology. Because of denial and deception countermeasures, however, the USSR's nuclear program was an exceptionally hard target. The lack of reliable on-the-ground intelligence made it difficult for the West to understand important developments inside the Soviet nuclear complex, which resulted in significant intelligence gaps."
2. "US Atomic Energy Intelligence against the Soviet Target, 1945-1970." Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 655-679.
Similar to Studies in Intelligence 48.2 (2004) article above.
Bukovsky, Vladimir. "The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union." Commentary 73, no. 5 (1982): 1-36. [Petersen]
Campbell, Kenneth J. Moscow's Words, Western Voices. Washington, DC: Accuracy in Media, 1995.
Surveillant 4.2: Campbell "traces how four prominent journalists -- I.F. Stone, Alexander Cockburn, Walter Duranty, and Wilfred Burchett -- repeated Soviet propaganda themes consistently during their careers." The author "systematically analyzes their major writings and shows how political orientation skewed the reliability of what was passed off to readers as 'objective reporting.'"
Casey, William J. "Soviet Use of Active Measures." Current Policy 761 (Nov. 1985).
Address by DCI Casey to the Dallas Council on World Affairs, Dallas, Texas, 18 September 1985.
Click for text of Casey's remarks.
Cathala, Henri-Pierre. Le Temps De La Désinformation. Paris: Stock, 1986.
Curtis and Nichol, Annotated Bibliography of Psychological Operations (1989), say this work emphasizes "the United States and Western Europe, also treatment of disinformation used in Warsaw Pact countries."
Charters, David A., and Maurice A.J. Tugwell, eds. Deception Operations: Studies in the East-West Conflict. New York: Macmillan, 1989. London: Brassey's (UK), 1990.
Clark comment: The text is divided into two parts: "Part I: Studies in Eastern Deception Operations"; "Part II: Studies in Western Deception Operations." Surveillant 1.1 comments that the two Canadian authors have presented "a fine analysis of deception." For Campbell, I&NS 6.1, "[o]ne of the many attractions of the collection is that the contributors, while scholarly, are not at all squeamish about being judgemental."
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