Tabachnick, Stephen E. "Defining Reality." American Book Review, Jan.-Feb. 1987, 9-10.
Gunter, IJI&C 11.2/138/fn.1, calls this "an insightful critique" of Henze, Herman and Brodhead, and Sterling's books on Agca's assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II on 13 May 1981.
Treml, Vladimir G. "Western Analysis and the Soviet Policymaking Process." In Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, eds. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003.
From "Introduction": The author "assesses whether government officials in the former Soviet Union read Western studies of the USSR and, if so, the degree to which the studies influenced policymaking in the Kremlin. Treml focuses his analysis almost exclusively on economic issues.... [I]n what appears to be the clearest example of the impact of Western analysis on Soviet policy, Treml found references in the Central Committee's archives to two still-classified documents that reference CIA studies in the late 1970s. The CIA reports concluded that the Soviet petroleum industry was beset by serious problems. He notes that, following the release of the CIA study, the Kremlin directed a major shift in investment spending in favor of the oil and gas industries and that Soviet extraction and exploration policies changed in the late 1970s."
Tsybov, C.I., and N.F. Chistyakov. Front Taynoy Voyny [The Front of Invisible War]. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1964.
Cited in Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World (1992).
Tuck, Jay. High-Tech Espionage: How the KGB Smuggles NATO's Strategic Secrets to Moscow. New York: St. Martin's, 1986. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986.
Milivojevic, I&NS 2.2, calls High-Tech Espionage "a useful, though not definitive, survey." It is somewhat strange, however, that Tuck has chosen to focus on the KGB when the GRU's budget for foreign-technology acquisition is "many times larger" than the KGB's. For Macpherson. I&NS 3.1, "Tuck lays the groundwork for a fuller understanding of the crucial role of economic intelligence and counter-intelligence in modern strategic assessments."
van de Aart, D. Aerial Espionage: Secret Intelligence Flights by East and West. New York: Prentice Hall, 1985.
Watts, Larry L.
1. With Friends Like These: The Soviet Bloc's Clandestine War Against Romania. Vol. I. Bucharest: Editura Militara/Military Publishing House, 2010.
Van Bebber, Parameters 41.3 (Autumn 2011), finds that the author "demonstrates that Romania never enthusiastically embraced its inclusion in the Soviet bloc and that its relationships with its nominal allies deteriorated from the early 1950s onward. Watts documents the clandestine disinformation campaign (beginning in the 1950s and heightening after the events of 1968) orchestrated by Moscow to discredit and isolate Bucharest.... Although it is poorly edited and somewhat lengthy ... it is nonetheless a worthwhile read for those who wish to understand contemporary Romania."
For Gordon, AIJ 29.2 (2011), this work is neither clearly focused nor well written. "Rather, the author presents an array of information, apparently assuming that the reader will make implicit connections related to the theme of the book." The "last chapter ends so abruptly" in 1978 that "one could surmise that it lays the groundwork for a second study that would cover the last ten years of the Ceausescu regime."
2. Extorting Peace: Romania, The Clash Within the Warsaw Pact and The End of the Cold War. Vol. II. Bucharest: RAO Publishing House, 2013.
Jones, Studies 58.2 (Jun. 2014), reviews these volumes in a single review. He concludes that Watts provides "a fair, balanced, accurate, and compelling revisionist history of Soviet bloc policy based on a meticulous study of the creation and collapse of communist Romania."
Weeks, Albert L. "The KGB: A Key Player in Kremlin Politics?" Journal of Defense and Diplomacy 7, no. 10 (Oct. 1989): 68-74.
White, John Baker.
1. Pattern for Conquest. London: Hale, 1956.
Pforzheimer, Studies 6.2 (Spring 1962), finds that this work surveys Communist postwar efforts in "espionage, sabotage, coups d'état, and the infiltration of foreign governments and organizations."
2. The Soviet Spy System. London: Falcon Press, 1948. [Chambers]
Zubok, Vladislav M. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
Goulden, Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), finds that this "work is an absolutely fascinating study of Moscow's view of the long-running confrontation." The author "makes a strong case that the collapse came about because of a series of strategic blunders by the USSR's 'own leadership,' and that the Soviets have only themselves to blame." Although there is "a residual pro-Soviet bias," Zubok "makes his material exciting, and he depicts brilliantly the last days of the fading Soviet empire."
Zubok, Vladislav M.
1. Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The "Small" Committee of Information, 1952-53. Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #4. Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1992. [Surveillant 3.4/5]
2. "Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The 'Small' Committee of Information, 1952." Diplomatic History, 19, no.3 (1995): 453-472.
Zubok, Vladislav M. "Spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA, 1960-1962." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994): 22-33
This article is well worth reading. The author's thesis is that "in the years of Cold War tension the intelligence services were more than just 'eyes,' they were powerful weapons in propaganda warfare between the ideological blocs." The focus of the article is on a group of documents sent by the KGB to the Secretariat and the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Nevertheless, Zubok urges that these documents should "be treated with a great deal of caution," because much within the documents is uncorroborated and needs to be cross-checked. Also, "readers should recall the tendency of bureaucrats in any government to exaggerate capabilities or accomplishments to a superior."
The article includes a 7 June 1960 document with Shelepin's extensive plan to discredit Allen Dulles and the CIA and a 29 July 1961 strategic deception plan. Zubok concludes that "the games of deception, disinformation, and distraction designed by the KGB masterminds had a deleterious effect on global stability." In an excess of zeal, to be even-handed, he suggests without elaboration or documentation that the effect of similar activities by the U.S. side was probably equally negative.
Zubok, Vladislav M., and Constantine Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
For Legvold, FA 75.4 (Jul.-Aug. 1996), this book is "the most significant addition to the literature on Soviet foreign policy to have appeared since the end of the Cold War." It is "not a complete history of events but concentrates instead on the calculations of Stalin and the other principals at critical turning points." The authors' central thesis is that, beyond their "aggressive, power-seeking" side, the Soviet leaders "were also genuinely captured by the lingering revolutionary urges of the past, which the West never quite fathomed."
Good, WPNWE, 24-30 Jun. 1996, believes that "Cold War veterans could benefit from this first inside look at the personalities of the men who directed Soviet strategies." To Kelley, Parameters, Summer 1998, "this fine book presents a revealing interpretation of the struggle through Russian eyes.... Zubok and Pleshakov offer pointed, profoundly Russian insights, some of which will startle Western readers with their simplicity and cynicism.... The caliber of this work and the authors' willingness to confront their recent history so directly provide optimism for future Russian analyses of the Cold War."
Although Shryock, History 26.3, finds this work "thought provoking and in many respects enlightening," he also sees it as suffering "from a number of serious weaknesses, including ... a variety of inconsistencies regarding the origins of Soviet conduct and policy and excessive reliance on sources of doubtful or questionable authority." The reviewer is particularly bothered by the authors' "excessive sympathy for Soviet leaders -- including Joseph Stalin -- and for Soviet positions on Cold War issues."
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