IC21
is a major review of the roles, function and structure of the U.S. Intelligence
Community (IC). U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6415
What is IC21?
IC21
is a major review of the roles, function and structure of the U.S. Intelligence
Community (IC).
One
of the major premises of IC21 is that the IC has been largely, and perhaps
inevitably, shaped by the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. This
struggle gave shape to a specific set of "intelligence norms,"
i.e., forms, organizations, products, practices, relationships and ways
of doing business that extend throughout the IC. Some of these intelligence
norms are likely to be fairly stable, regardless of U.S. national security
policy or the international political environment. Others may be outdated
and no longer responsive to U.S. national security requirements as we enter
the 21st century. IC21 seeks to determine which of these intelligence norms
are still relevant, which need to be either revised or replaced, and what
alternatives there are to be added.
IC21 - Guiding Concepts
IC21
has been guided by the following broad concepts:
The
United States continues to need a strong, highly capable Intelligence Community.
This need has not diminished with the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the current
international setting is, in many ways more complex and more difficult to
deal with than was the relatively stable bi-polar Cold War. Thus, although
we find our national security less threatened, the United States will need
a highly flexible IC capable of responding to increasingly diverse national
security concerns. The focus of our national security has changed, but the
mission of the IC has not changed: providing timely, assessed intelligence
to civil and military policy-makers, supporting military operations and
carrying out certain operations - including covert action - as tasked by
legally responsible officials.
A
key issue is opportunity, not reform. As noted, U.S. national security interests
are less threatened than at any time since 1940. This is a propitious moment
in which to review major aspects of our national security apparatus and
to update them in an atmosphere relatively free from crises. Although Congress
and the Executive continue to deal with issues of the propriety of certain
operations, oversight and - occasionally - legality, these are not the main
driving issues as they were in the mid-1970s.
Everything
is on the table. There are no sacred cows in terms of organizations, missions
or functions. Neither are there any preconceptions as to the "right
answer" for the future of the IC.
IC21
is not an exercise designed to reduce, or even to shape the intelligence
budget. The goal is to define the type of Intelligence Community that will
best meet U.S. national security needs into the next century. The question
of whether the price for this type of Intelligence Community is acceptable
can only be decided by Congress and the Executive during their budget deliberations.
IC21
is not simply an effort to reorganize the Intelligence Community. Any major
recommendation for organizational change must come only from well-defined
intelligence or policy-maker needs.
Although
the Committee's purview over the Intelligence Community is fairly broad,
it is important to keep its primary focus on those issues that might require
legislative remedies. Changes that can be carried out by or within the Executive
should also be noted, as should findings for which no specific recommendations
are made.
Any
changes must result in improved processes or products to be worth the cost
of short-lived dislocations.
To
the greatest extent possible, the IC21 process should be public and unclassified[.]
One of the goals of IC21 is to renew a national consensus to support a strong
and capable Intelligence Community. Such a consensus must rely on an easily
accessible body of information. This is an especially important function
for, as several witnesses have told the Committee, beyond Congress and the
Executive, there is no natural constituency for intelligence in the United
States.
Finally,
the focus must be on where the Intelligence Community needs to be in the
next 10-15 years, not a snapshot of where we are today.
IC21 - Corporateness
The
current IC is an ad hoc structure. Each agency or organization makes sense
individually, but the IC does not function as a well- integrated whole,
working towards an agreed end.
The
IC would benefit from a more corporate approach to its basic functions.
Central management should be strengthened; core competencies (collection,
analysis, covert action) should be reinforced; and infrastructure should
be consolidated wherever possible.
Major Proposals
Role of the DCI
The DCI should continue to serve at the pleasure of the President, and should continue to have direct control over IC all-source analysis (CIA), clandestine operations (Clandestine Service) and the Community Management Staff.
In
appointing the directors of NFIP Defense agencies, the Secretary of Defense
should obtain the advice and concurrence (vice "consultation")
of the DCI.
The
DCI should have the authority to transfer limited amounts of money within
the NFIP without program managers' approval.
The
DCI should have expanded authority over all NFIP agencies' personnel, including
the right to detail as needed.
NSC Supervision: Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI)
The
DCI remains the President's principal adviser on intelligence, working under
the direction of the NSC. Within the NSC, the CFI should be re-established,
to provide the DCI with necessary guidance and feedback. The Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs will chair the CFI; other members
are the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the
Attorney General (for counter-intelligence issues), or their deputies.
DDCIs
Create
an additional DDCI.
One
DDCI will direct the CIA and, to promote IC corporateness, be responsible
for managing all IC production and analysis.
To
further promote IC corporateness, create a DDCI for Community Management
(DDCI/CM), who will oversee the Community Management Staff and be responsible
for IC-wide collection management, consolidated infrastructure management
and acquisition. To address the issues of infrastructure and services of
common concern, an Infrastructure Support Office (ISO) will be created under
the DDCI/CM.
The
DCI will designate which DDCI will be Acting DCI in his absence.
Both DDCls will be confirmed by the Senate. At no time may more than one of these three officials (DCI, 2 DDCls) be an active duty military officer.
Director of Military Intelligence (DMI)
The
Director of DIA is to be designated as DMI, the Secretary of Defense's senior
military intelligence officer.
The
DMI, as a senior member of the IC, will be accountable to the DCI in all
matters relative to the IC.
The
DMI is to be program manager for the JMIP and program coordinator for TIARA.
Community All-Source Analysis
CIA
CIA
is the premier all-source analytical agency in the IC. It will house both
analysts and 2nd- and 3rd-tier exploiters of the various collection disciplines.
DIA
DIA's
role as the focal point for management of Defense all-source analysis and
production should be reinforced. (No legislative change.)
INR, DOE/INT, Treasury/OIS
INR,
DOE/INT and Treasury/OIS serve a useful role as the principal intelligence
producers for their departmental consumers, and as contributors to IC-wide
analyses. (No legislative change.)
Community Collection
Clandestine Service
The
Clandestine Service will be responsible for all clandestine human collection
(current CIA/DO and DHS).
The
Clandestine Service to be separate from the CIA, reporting directly to the
DCI.
The
Director of Clandestine Service to be selected by the DCI from among intelligence
professionals.
There will be a Deputy Director, who is a two-star professional military intelligence officer, responsible for coordination between the Clandestine Service and various military and Defense components.
Technical Collection Agency (TCA)
SIGINT,
IMINT and MASINT will be consolidated in a single agency, the TCA.
The
TCA will be designated a Combat Support Agency (Type 3), as NSA currently
is.
The
director of TCA will be either a senior defense or intelligence civilian
or a military officer.
Technology Development Office (TDO)
The
TDO will be responsible for IC research & development and procurement
of intelligence systems. TDO will comprise portions of the current NRO,
DARO, DDS&T et al.
National Intelligence Evaluation Council (NIEC)
The
NIEC is responsible for evaluating IC-wide collection and production --
making sure that means and ends are correlated, working closely with the
Community Management Staff.
The
Head of the NIEC to be appointed by the DCI and will report directly to
him; NIOs will be part of the CIA.
Congressional Oversight
Extend
or eliminate tenure limits for Members on HPSCI.
Consider
making HPSCI a standing committee.
Return to Reform 1996 HPSCI