INTELLIGENCE REFORM

Material from the 1990s

L - R

Lee, William T. "What Intelligence Edge?" Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 1-7 Aug. 1994, 29.

"Odom's ... piece [see William E. Odom, "The Ames Case: A Symptom of Crisis," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 25-31 Jul. 1994, 29.] ... is symptomatic of the real crisis in U.S. intelligence: refusal to learn from past mistakes.... [The] presidential commission ... could be a step in the right direction."

Macartney, John. "Reform: Bonanza for Scholars." Intelligencer 7, no 2 (Summer 1996): 3-5.

Brief review of recent reform studies and proposals: Aspin/Brown Commission Report, House IC21 staff study, SSCI Report, National Performance Review (Phase II), Working Group on Intelligence Reform, and Council on Foreign Relations.

May, Ernest. "Intelligence: Backing into the Future." Foreign Affairs 71, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 63-72.

This is an excellent article for anyone interested the state of the reform discussion at the end of 1991. Many of the themes examined here continue to be discussed today.

McNamara, Francis J. "Let's Keep Our Old-Fashioned 'National Security.'" National Security Law Report 15, no. 3 (Mar. 1993): 1, 3-4.

"Counterpoint" to Gregory D. Foster, NSLR 15.1:1-2. "[Foster's] arguments betray misconceptions about the beliefs of our forbears, constitutional objectives, and national security."

McNeil, Frank. "Post Cold War Intelligence: Meeting the Need for Reform." Foreign Service Journal (Feb. 1992): 20-23.

National Institute for Public Policy. Modernizing Intelligence. Fairfax, VA: NIPP 1997.

Odom, William E. "The Ames Case: A Symptom of Crisis." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 25-31 Jul. 1994, 29.

The author argues that "[h]ad intelligence been a private business corporation, it would have restructured at least two or three times by now." He supports the idea of a presidential commission to study the role and capabilities of U.S. intelligence.

One point made by Odom (that the "public tarnishing of the [intelligence] community's image ... is unfair to the professionals who gave the United States a remarkable intelligence edge throughout the Cold War") is treated derisively by a responding writer: William T. Lee, "What Intelligence Edge?" Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 1- 7 Aug. 1994, 29. "Odom's ... piece ... is symptomatic of the real crisis in U.S. intelligence: refusal to learn from past mistakes."

Orton, J. Douglas, and Jamie L. Callahan. "Important 'Folk Theories' in Intelligence Reorganization." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 411-429.

The authors seek to apply organizational theory to intelligence reorganization. Their focus is on "folk theories" -- "organizational theories as adopted by organizational members" -- which they argue "illustrate inbred views or agency cultures." They present "a variety of viewpoints now having an effect on the future structure" of U.S. intelligence.

Periscope. Editors. "Joint Security Commission." 19, no. 2 (1994): 3-4.

Excerpts from the Executive Summary of Report of Joint Security Commission, submitted 28 Feb. 1994 to Secretary of Defense Perry and DCI Woolsey. The report identifies a need to "balance the risk of loss or damage against the costs of countermeasures...," that is, to use a risk management approach. It recommends the "creation of a uniform cost-accounting methodology and tracking system for security resources expended..., common standards for adjudications [in personnel security] and a joint investigative service to standardize background investigations..., [and] formation of a single organization ... responsible for the creation of security policies and overseeing the coherent implementation of those policies across the Defense and Intelligence Communities." See brief comment on classification review in Cryptolog 15.3:1.

Pincus, Walter.

1. "Getting Smarter About Intelligence." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 20-26 Jun. 1994, 32-33.

Pincus reports that, in the wake of the Ames furor, sentiment is building in Congress and at the White House for a broad study of the roles and missions of the major components of the U.S. intelligence community. As part of the transition from Bush to Clinton, a panel created by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recommended that a presidential study be undertaken. Sen. John Warner has also called on the president to set up a task force to study the community. In this connection, Pincus provides this view of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: "The PFIAB, which was formalized as an advisory and oversight panel by President John F. Kennedy after the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, has had an up-and-down history. It frequently has been used as a prestige appointment for presidential friends." (p. 33)

2. "Taking Intelligence into the 21st Century." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 27 Feb.-5 Mar. 1995, 32.

HPSCI chairman Larry Combest "is determined that his committee play a major role in reshaping U.S. intelligence for the 21st century."

3. "Untangling the Spy Network's Webs: Rep. Combest Wants CIA Clandestine Operations Separate and NRO Split." Washington Post, 5 Mar. 1996, A13.

"One difference between the DO of today and the proposed clandestine service is that a new emphasis would be placed on creating two types of clandestine officers: those who want to go on to management and those who want to remain as operators overseas. In that sense it would be more like the British MI6, which is much smaller than CIA's Directorate of Operations."

4. "Intelligence Battleground: Reform Bill." Washington Post, 30 May 1996, A29.

5. "Curtain Is Falling on Another Intelligence Drama: Reform Bill." Washington Post, 8 Jul. 1996, A13.

6. "Panel Rejects Intelligence Shift: House Committee Sides with Pentagon in Turf Battle." Washington Post, 18 Jul. 1996, A25.

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