M - Z

"How do I feel about the centralization of intelligence under one guy? I'm not crazy about it. I believe in what they call competitive analysis.... Of course, we used to have arguments, but those are good too." [Herman C. Cohen,] "Speech by Ambassador Herman C. Cohen (Ret.), 2 February 2005," CIRA Newsletter 30, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 5-6.

"From the 9-11 Commission perspective the major issue that has not been addressed is Congressional reform. Congressional reform is critical.... In the words of the 9-11 Commission: 'The other reforms recommended by the 9-11 Commission ... will not work if congressional oversight does not change too.'" [Lloyd Salvetti] [9/11 Commission Staff], "Speech by Lloyd Salvetti, 4 May 2005," CIRA Newsletter 30, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 10.

Marshall, C. Kevin. "Memorandum Opinion: Status of the Director of Central Intelligence Under the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004." Washington, DC: Justice Department, Office of Legal Counsel, 12 Jan. 2005. [Available at:]

"[W]hen the Intelligence Reform Act takes effect the then-current DCI would not require a new appointment to serve as DCIA."

Nolte, William M. "Intelligence Reform after the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004." Defense Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (2005): 7-13.

Text of address given by Nolte, Acting Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis, at Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) Foundation luncheon, Mount Vernon, VA, 24 March 2005. He states: "Our changes over the next decade or so will be, in many cases, iterative and incremental, as we react to the environment around us."

Polgar, Tom. "Some Observations for the New Year." CIRA Newsletter 30, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 9-11.

"Multiplying echelons in Washington, more staffers on the congressional intelligence committees, and molding intelligence to fit the policy are going to lead to more grief. If human source collection cannot be strengthened, there can be no improved end product."

Posner, Richard A. "The Danger in 'Fixing' the CIA." Hoover Digest 2005 No. 3 (Summer). ["This essay appeared in the Los Angeles Times on May 24, 2005."] []

"[T]he intelligence system cannot be fixed like a broken watch (although it can be improved) because the conditions that cause it to fail are inherent in the nature of intelligence.... To think that changes in organization, practices, and personnel can make intelligence a fail-safe enterprise is a dangerous illusion, encouraging under-investment in other, often more costly, means of defense."

Posner, Richard A. 

1. Remaking Domestic Intelligence. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2005.

From publisher: The author "reveals all the dangerous weaknesses undermining our domestic intelligence in the United States and offers a new solution: a domestic intelligence agency modeled on the ... Canadian Security Intelligence Service.... He also shows how a new U.S. domestic intelligence agency might offer additional advantages over our current structure even in terms of civil liberties."

2. Remaking Domestic Intelligence. Hoover Institution Weekly Essays. 16 Jun. 2005. [Downloadable PDF file at: -- no longer an active link 8/22/12]

"This is a special web-only essay that takes up where Posner's Hoover Studies book, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11, leaves off."

From Abstract: "The magnitude of the terrorist threat..., coupled with the lack of coordination among our domestic intelligence agencies and the failure of the lead agency, the FBI, to develop an adequate domestic intelligence capability, argues compellingly for reform. Because the FBI's failure is systemic, being rooted in the incompatibility of criminal law enforcement (the FBI's principal mission) with national-security intelligence, the reform must have a structural dimension. The WMD (Robb-Silberman) Commission's proposal ... is to create a domestic intelligence agency within the FBI by fusion of its three units that at present share intelligence responsibility. Such a fusion may or not be a good idea; but clearly it is not enough. The Director of National Intelligence should take the coordination and command of domestic intelligence firmly into his hands by appointing a deputy for domestic intelligence, while the President should by executive order create outside of (but not in derogation of) the FBI a domestic intelligence agency, modeled on such foreign agencies as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, that would have no law enforcement functions. The agency could be lodged in the Department of Homeland Security."

Clark comment: As much as I admire the clarity of Judge Posner's reasoning (especially his critique of the 9/11 Commission's work), the very thought of lodging another agency in the DHS gives me cold shivers.

Rovner, Joshua, and Austin Long. "The Perils of Shallow Theory: Intelligence Reform and the 9/11 Commission." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006): 609-637.

Clark comment: This is an interesting critique of the "reform" recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Although the "theories" of failure are more assumed by the authors than articulated by the Commission, the criticisms are well reasoned and supported. The conclusion that the Commission "got it wrong" is inescapable.

The authors present "two principal arguments...: First, the proposed reforms are mostly unrelated to the postulated causes of failure. Second, the theories are underdeveloped, contradictory, and basically unsatisfying on their own."

Russell, Richard L. "A Weak Pillar for American National Security: The CIA's Dismal Performance against WMD Threats" Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 466-485.

The author argues that "the CIA has habitually failed to accurately gauge WMD programs.... These intelligence failings were due in large measure to poor human intelligence collection and shoddy analysis, areas that cannot be remedied [simply] by the creation of the DNI.... The establishment of the DNI ... unconstructively adds to the already bureaucratically bloated intelligence community." In addition, the creation of new intelligence centers for terrorism and proliferation further "bloats the intelligence community's bureaucracy and does nothing to increase competency in human intelligence collection or analysis."

[Salvetti, Lloyd.] "Speech by Lloyd Salvetti, 4 May 2005," CIRA Newsletter30, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 3-11.

In an overall positive assessment of the work of the 9/11 Commission, the former Commission staffer notes that "[f]rom the 9-11 Commission perspective the major issue that has not been addressed is Congressional reform. Congressional reform is critical.... In the words of the 9-11 Commission: 'The other reforms recommended by the 9-11 Commission ... will not work if congressional oversight does not change too.'"

Schake, Kori, and Bruce Berkowitz. "National Security: A Better Approach." Hoover Digest 4 (Fall 2005). []

"The United States lacks the organization required for effective national security. We need a structure that enables the president to implement the policies he has been elected to carry out. We also need a process that allows the government to focus all its resources on a strategic objective, no matter where in the executive branch those resources reside.... Until we create presidential directors with command authority to produce results, the nation will lack the means needed for effective security."

Treverton, Gregory F., and Peter A. Wilson. "True Intelligence Reform Is Cultural, Not Just Organizational Chart Shift." Christian Science Monitor, 13 Jan. 2005. []

"The intelligence reform bill should be viewed as the necessary first step, but hardly as sufficient. This next phase will require leaders in the intelligence, national security, and law enforcement communities willing to take risks. Most important, Congress needs to be convinced that what it has done so far is just the beginning."

Turner, Michael A. "Intelligence Reform and the Politics of Entrenchment." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 383-397.

"[T]he Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, passed in December 2004, does not significantly alter the U.S. Intelligence Community.... The Department of Defense, its advocates in congressional oversight committees, and the White House ... [worked] to blunt [the] effects [of the 9/11 Commission report] and produce legislation that mollified the proponents of reform but did nothing more than reshuffle America's intelligence leadership."

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