INTELLIGENCE REFORM

2005

A - L

"How do I feel about the centralization of intelligence under one guy? I'm not crazy about it. I believe in what they call competitive analysis.... Of course, we used to have arguments, but those are good too." [Herman C. Cohen,] "Speech by Ambassador Herman C. Cohen (Ret.), 2 February 2005," CIRA Newsletter 30, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 5-6.

"From the 9-11 Commission perspective the major issue that has not been addressed is Congressional reform. Congressional reform is critical.... In the words of the 9-11 Commission: 'The other reforms recommended by the 9-11 Commission ... will not work if congressional oversight does not change too.'" [Lloyd Salvetti] [9/11 Commission Staff], "Speech by Lloyd Salvetti, 4 May 2005," CIRA Newsletter 30, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 10.

AFCEA [Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association] Intelligence Committee. "'Action This Day' -- Strengthening Our Nation's Intelligence Community." Defense Intelligence Journal 14, no. 2 (2005): 63-77.

Harrison, "Which Action This Day?" DIJ 14.2 (2005), calls this article "a comprehensive and compelling outline of urgent actions that need to be taken to strengthen the U.S. Intelligence Community." However, a strategy is needed "to mitigate transitional difficulties," given that many of the changes need to be made simultaneously.

Best, Richard A., Jr. The National Intelligence Director and Intelligence Analysis. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 11 Feb. 2005. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS21948.pdf.

Blechman, Barry M. "Lessons in Intelligence Reform." Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 6, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 139-145.

Chambliss, Saxby [Sen. (R.-GA)].

1. "We Have Not Correctly Framed the Debate on Intelligence Reform." Parameters 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 5-13.

"Our country is in the midst of a national debate on intelligence reform.... [W]e have not done a good or complete job of framing th[is] debate.... Creating the DNI is an extremely important decision.... However, it is the beginning of a long process, not the end.... [W]e need to frame our debate on intelligence reform so it includes getting the right information, at the right time, to the right person, from the US President to the newest US Army private in harm's way."

2. "Re-Forming Intelligence." National Interest 79 (Spring 2005): 79-83.

[Cohen, Herman C.] "Speech by Ambassador Herman C. Cohen (Ret.), 2 February 2005." CIRA Newsletter 30, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 3-7.

"How do I feel about the centralization of intelligence under one guy? I'm not crazy about it. I believe in what they call competitive analysis.... Of course, we used to have arguments, but those are good too."

Cooper, Jeffrey R. Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Dec. 2005.

The author argues that "serious shortcomings" in U.S. intelligence "stem from dysfunctional behaviors and practices within [emphasis in original] the individual agencies and are not likely to be remedied either by structural changes in the organization of the community as a whole or by increased authorities for centralized community managers."

Cumming, Alfred, and Todd Masse. Intelligence Reform Implementation at the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Issues and Options for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 16 Aug. 2005. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33033.pdf.

"This report analyzes the FBI's overall intelligence reform effort, focusing on the implementation of intelligence reform initiatives in the field. Reform policies designed at FBI Headquarters, with field input, may be of marginal utility unless they are fully and effectively implemented across the 56 FBI field offices.... While areas of promise exist, field research indicates that the FBI's ability to formally harness intelligence collection (including systemic accountability mechanisms) to analytically identified intelligence gaps, remains nascent." (Italics in original)

Fessenden, Helen. "The Limits of Intelligence Reform." Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 2005): 106-120.

"As with any legislation, the success of the intelligence bill depends largely on its implementation. But in this case, the political momentum to build on initial gains is running out of steam just at the critical point... The streamlining of authority under the purview of the DNI was not matched ... in the legislative branch.... Virtually none of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations for Congress itself have been adopted.... [C]oncern is growing that Negroponte's office is simply another layer of bureaucracy over all agencies rather than a force that can push through necessary structural changes to streamline the intelligence community and foster more accountability."

Hitz, Frederick P. "The Myths and Current Reality of Espionage." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006): 730-733.

In October 2004, President Bush directed DCI Porter J. Goss "to hire 50 percent more spy-runners and increase the study of hard languages such as Arabic." These instructions represent "a much more realistic and practical approach to fixing the HUMINT problem and the intelligence agencies ... than did the creation of the new position of Director of National Intelligence."

Hulnick, Arthur S. "Does the U.S. Intelligence Community Need a DNI?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 710-730.

Writing prior to enactment of the legislation creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the author stated "whether the President's proposals would give the new DNI sufficient authority to institute other changes that would make the system function according to the needs of the new era in national and homeland security is not clear."

Johnson, Loch K. "A Centralized Intelligence System: Truman's Dream Deferred." American Intelligence Journal 23 (2005): 6-15.

What Truman was shooting for in 1947 and did not get -- a centralized intelligence system -- again became the target (as it had multiple times in the interim) for the 9/11 Commission. The author believes that it will take more than the 2004 intelligence reform act to turn the DNI into a leader with full authority to manage the Intelligence Community.

Lee, Ronald D., and Paul M. Schwartz. "Beyond the 'War' on Terrorism: Towards the New Intelligence Network." Michigan Law Review 103, no. 6 (May 2005): 1446-1482.

Lehman, John. "Getting Spy Reform Wrong: Sept. 11 Commission's Proposals Were Turned Into Bureaucratic Bloat." Washington Post, 16 Nov. 2005, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Clark comment: Although I will often disagree with the views of the former Secretary of the Navy and 9/11 commission member, Lehman's basic thrust here is on the mark.

"The [9/11] commission had a straightforward vision: We wanted a strong national intelligence director to smash bureaucratic layers, tear down information 'stovepipes' and rewrite personnel policy to bring in the best people ... to act quickly and decisively on the president's priorities.... [I]nstead of the lean structure recommended by the commission, with a small but powerful staff based on just three deputies (one each for foreign, domestic and military intelligence), the administration reached all the way back to the McNamara years to create a huge new staff to sit on top of the old and still bloated bureaucracies. The result is that little has changed -- except that a new bureaucracy has been created."

Lever, Paul. "If it's Broke, Fix it: The Reform of Two Intelligence Services." RUSI Journal, Feb. 2005. [www.rusi.org/intelligence]

"Last summer it was a tale of two reports. The Senate Intelligence Committee produced a scathing condemnation of the US intelligence community's assessment of Iraq's capability ... to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Lord Butler and his team published a more measured, but no less critical, review of the parallel failures in Britain. In both cases reforms were promised.... [T]hese reforms are [now] in place or at any rate in early prospect. As with the reports which provided the impetus for them their styles are very different."

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