INTELLIGENCE REFORM

2004

General

Allen, Michael. Blinking Red: Crisis and Compromise in American Intelligence after 9/11. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2013.

George, Studies 58.1 (Mar. 2014), finds that the author's "very readable legislative history of the 2004 intelligence reforms focuses more on the personalities than the organizations.... This eyewitness account" benefits "from extensive interviews of the players, complete with citations.... [T]he narrative is really a story of the clash of personal perspectives and less strictly an executive-legislative struggle." For Hulnick, IJI&C 27.3 (Fall 2014), this is "a splendid explanation about how the reform legislation was derailed, in spite of enormous pressure to get it right." Unfortunately, Allen leaves out the legislation's reform of the FBI and DHS.

Barger, Deborah G. "It Is Time to Transform, Not Reform, U.S. Intelligence." SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 23-31. [Marlatt]

Berkowitz, Bruce. "Intelligence Reform: Less Is More." Hoover Digest 2004, no. 2 (30 Apr. 2004). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6809]

Over the past decade there have been several commissions to investigate U.S. intelligence. "[C]ommissions often have the opposite of their intended effect -- they stall reforms rather than facilitate them.... The problem is not that U.S. intelligence is poorly organized; the problem is that it lacks the specific capabilities it needs to deal with new threats such as terrorism, rogue states, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.... Intelligence reform ought to concentrate on creating new capabilities and removing obstacles that keep us from using our existing capabilities effectively."

Best, Richard A., Jr. Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 24 Sep. 2004. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf.

"Proposals for the reorganization of the United States Intelligence Community have repeatedly emerged from commissions and committees created by either the executive or legislative branches. The heretofore limited authority of Directors of Central Intelligence and the great influence of the Departments of State and Defense have inhibited the emergence of major reorganization plans from within the Intelligence Community itself."

Betts, Richard K. "The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work This Time?" Foreign Affairs 83, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2004): 2-8.

Clark comment: This is a concise, rational, and clear-sighted view of this season's calls for intelligence "reform." It should be required reading for anyone wanting to discuss the issue.

Betts argues that all the attention now being paid to intelligence matters "creates both an opportunity and a danger. The opportunity stems from the consensus that major reforms are necessary.... The danger stems from the gap between the urge to do something and the uncertainty about just what that something should be -- as well as from the entanglement of intelligence and policy issues involved with the Iraq question in particular.... The basic problem is that there is no dramatic reform of the intelligence system that everyone agrees will yield a net benefit.... What all sides in the current debates should want is to restore public confidence in the competence and integrity of the nation's intelligence system."

Corera, Gordon. "Radical Reform Required in US Intelligence Community." Jane's Intelligence Review, Apr. 2004, 42-47.

Cumming, Alfred, and Todd Masse. FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 6 Apr. 2004. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32336.html.

In response to criticism from the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, the FBI is "attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as crimes. The major component of this effort is restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology."

Duffy, Michael. "How To Fix Our Intelligence." Time, 18 Apr. 2004. [http://www.time.com]

Most of the members of the 9/11 commission have "come to think that a thorough overhaul of the way the nation organizes, collects and distributes intelligence [is] necessary.... Perhaps because it was the most dysfunctional agency of all, the FBI has done the most to try to heal itself since 9/11.... Under Director Robert Mueller,... the bureau has made counterterrorism one of its top three priorities." Acording to FBI experts, "Mueller has the right idea but ... the layers of agents and bureaucracy beneath him are reluctant to follow his direction.... Despite Mueller's focus on terrorism, agents are sometimes pulled away to handle traditional criminal cases. A long-awaited and badly needed computer overhaul is overbudget and behind schedule....

"The commission [has] found that the CIA shares some of the FBI's recessive genes." For example, "Tenet told his top managers in 1998 that the CIA was 'at war' with bin Laden, but the word never really filtered down through the agency, much less to other arms of the intelligence community....

"[S]ome changes are certain, particularly at the FBI." Legislation is being prepared in the House "that would create ... a 'service within the service' at the FBI to focus on intelligence gathering, not law enforcement." In addition, "support is growing on the Hill for a plan drafted by two-time National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft that would create a new intelligence czar with budget and program authority over the CIA and nearly a score of other intelligence units now under the Pentagon's control."

Graham, Bob, with Jeff Nussbaum. Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of American's War on Terror. New York: Random House, 2004. With a New Preface and Postscript. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008.

According to Studies 49.1 (2005), this work summarizes Senator Graham's role in the House-Senate Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community's performance prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, "his views on the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his recommendations for reform of the Intelligence Community.... Graham has shared some interesting insights on how things work in Washington, and, although some of his views are controversial, he more than justifies the conclusion that intelligence matters."

Jehl, Douglas. "Administration Considers a Post for National Intelligence Director." New York Times, 16 Apr. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 15 April 2004, administration officials said that "[t]he White House is weighing whether to pre-empt the Sept. 11 commission's final report this summer by embracing a proposal to create a powerful new post of director of national intelligence.... Also being discussed within the White House, the officials said, were possible changes within the F.B.I., including the creation of a new directorate within the bureau responsible for domestic intelligence-gathering and analysis. The alternative of creating a new domestic intelligence agency was also being discussed but was seen as less likely to be embraced, the officials said."

Milbank, Dana, and Mike Allen. "Bush Weighs Overhaul of Intelligence Services; Aides Say He Will Await 9/11 Panel's Suggestions." Washington Post, 13 Apr. 2004. A3. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

President Bush said on 12 April 2004 "that he is contemplating a major overhaul of the nation's intelligence services.... Bush ... said that 'now may be a time to revamp and reform our intelligence services.' Aides said he is likely to wait for recommendations, scheduled for this summer, from the independent commission investigating the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001."

Nolte, William. "Preserving Central Intelligence: Assessment and Evaluation in Support of the DCI." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004): 21-25.

Before we abandon the office of the DCI, "we should at least explore options to strengthen and preserve it." This article focuses on "suggestions for correcting two related deficiencies in the intelligence establishment, the absence of an effective internal assessment mechanism in service of the DCI and the absence of an equivalent to the US military's 'combatant command' structure, which has proven invaluable to the defense establishment over the past half-century."

Pincus, Walter. "Intelligence Reform Will Not Be Quick; Many Groups to Weigh In on Changes." Washington Post, 4 May 2004, A23. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The White House, Congress and two independent commissions are discussing wholesale reform of the nation's intelligence community.... None of the panels has completed its work, and any recommendations for substantial change will be politically controversial, particularly if they involve control of the Pentagon's intelligence programs."

Pincus, Walter. "Legislators Seek U.S. Intelligence Director." Washington Post, 2 Apr. 2004, A9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 1 April 2004, the Democratic members of the HPSCI "recommended the establishment of a director of national intelligence who would have both budgetary and operational control over the CIA and the much larger collection of Pentagon and other agencies that collect and analyze intelligence."

Russell, Richard L. "Intelligence Failures: The Wrong Model for the War on Terror." Policy Review 123 (Feb.-Mar. 2004): 61-72.

Sangillo, Gregg, and Siobhan Gorman. "Smarter Intelligence A Post-9/11 Priority." National Journal 36 (22 May 2004): 1572-1578.

Provides profiles of individuals associated in various ways with intelligence reform: Maureen Baginski, executive assistant director of the FBI's Office of Intelligence; Bruce Berkowitz, research fellow at the Hoover Institution; Jamie Gorelick, 9/11 Commission member; and Michael Hayden, NSA director.

Steele, Robert David. "Information Peacekeeping and the Future of Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 265-285.

In the 21st century, "the lines among the various intelligence constituencies ... are blurring. Very slowly, a very large, informal, global network of professionals is developing."

Taylor, Stan A., and David Goldman. "Intelligence Reform: Will More Agencies, Money, and Personnel Help?" Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 416-435.

"Virtually every past 'intelligence failure' has led to reforms that have resulted in more, not fewer, sub-organizations to coordinate.... [T]he allure of restructuring is always greater than the reality.... [T]he history of intelligence suggests that neither size nor money correlate with success.... It is unlikely that vast amount of new money, more personnel, and newly created intelligence agencies will help significantly."

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