Berkowitz, Bruce. "The Information War." Hoover Digest 2003, no. 2 (30 Apr. 2003). []

"September 11 suggests that, unless we develop new ideas about how intelligence organizations are supposed to work, we will likely see additional intelligence failures. Indeed, abandoning many traditional ideas will be as important as formulating and adopting new ones." During the Cold War, most of the questions for intelligence "were evolutionary"; therefore, "the intelligence community could change incrementally, too. Most new threats, on the other hand, are much more dynamic."

Berkowitz, Bruce. "Spying in the Post-September 11 World." Hoover Digest 2003, no. 4 (30 Oct. 2003). []

"[T]he September 11 intelligence failure was really a new problem, reflecting the emergence of a new kind of threat. Solving this new problem requires a new kind of solution. Most of the proposals offered so far would not provide this new solution and likely would not have prevented the September 11 intelligence failure.... Threats such as Al Qaeda -- and rogue states that use terrorist tactics -- present a new problem for intelligence organizations, as do narco-traffickers and states that use covert networks to develop weapons of mass destruction.... [W]here the old intelligence problem required organizations to focus in order to separate signal from noise, the new intelligence problem depends more on intelligence organizations' agility, their ability to adapt and deal effectively with a changing threat."

Kindsvater, Larry C. "The Need to Reorganize the Intelligence Community: A Senior Officer's Perspective." Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003): 33-37.

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) "is not managed or organized to directly address national security missions and threats. The Community continues to have a 'stovepipe' collection focus.... No IC-wide operational organization exists to direct the collective activities of those stovepipe capabilities against specific national security missions.... To implement a new substantive mission focus, the IC needs to create Community-wide substantive analytic/collection centers."

Masse, Todd. Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 19 May 2003. Available at:

Clark comment: This CRS report is recommended for anyone wanting to discuss the issue of how to organize U.S. domestic security. It does not answer the question (which is not CRS' job), but does offer a well-thought out perspective.

"While there may be lessons to be learned from the British experience with domestic intelligence, there are also important differences between U.S. and British governmental, legal, cultural and political norms.... This paper summarizes pending legislation relating to domestic intelligence, briefly explains the jurisdiction and functions of MI-5, and describes some of the factors that may be relevant to a discussion regarding the applicability of the MI-5 domestic intelligence model to the United States."

Turner, Stansfield. "Reforming Intelligence." Christian Science Monitor, 19 Feb. 2003, 9.

The former DCI endorses the concept of a newly empowered DCI/DNI, noting that "it is only common sense that when intelligence activities ... are spread across 14 semiautonomous agencies, some single individual ought to be placed in charge." He adds, however, that "subordinating military intelligence requirements to those of the DNI will not be an easy task."

Turner also believes that the U.S. Intelligence Community "is unnecessarily large and unwieldy. It should be drastically reduced in size so as to encourage greater exchange of highly sensitive data and close teamwork. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard ... do not need to be part of the larger, strategic intelligence community -- nor do the Treasury Department and the Drug Enforcement Agency."

Van Natta, Don. "Intelligence Critics Urge U.S. to Look to British Spy Agency." New York Times, 26 Jul. 2003. []

The joint House-Senate committee report on the 9/11 terrorist attacks "have caused some critics to renew demands" for creation of "a domestic intelligence agency whose primary mission would be countering the terrorist threat at home." Sen. John Edwards (D-NC) and others "have said such an agency should be modeled after MI5.... The movement ... to create an organization like MI5 gained momentum in November [2002] after an advisory group led by [former Virginia governor] James S. Gilmore III ... recommended that a new agency should take over domestic intelligence gathering."

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