INTELLIGENCE REFORM

2000s

Generally

A - F

Bansemer, John D. [LTCOL/USAF] Intelligence Reform: A Question of Balance. Cambridge, MA: Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, 2005. Walker Paper No. 5. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2006.

"This study explores three topics relevant to IC reform: (1) the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and its applicability to the IC, (2) the common findings and recommendations of past attempts to reform the IC, and (3) the competing tensions in the IC that influence the pace and character of actual reform."

Bean, Hamilton. "Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 4 (Aug. 2009): 479-498.

"[D]efining post-9/11 intelligence reform as a 'cultural' problem reifies culture, leading to top-down prescriptions for 'strengthening,' 'unifying,' or 'transforming culture -- the ultimate benefits and consequences of which are still not well understood by scholars."

Berkowitz, Bruce. "Better Ways to Fix U.S. Intelligence." Orbis 45, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 609-619.

The author argues that while investing in communications capacity may seem more like a logistical detail than a major policy reform, such a strategy is essential to improving intelligence operations.

Berkowitz, Bruce D., and Allan E. Goodman. Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. New York: Free Press, 2002. [pb]

According to Jonkers, AFIO WIN 19-00 (12 May 2000), the authors focus on the need for "a fundamental re-thinking of what intelligence and an intelligence organization is supposed to do." The book "is written in explanatory fashion for the general public, contributing to understanding of national intelligence issues and challenges."

Robert David Steele provides the following comments: "This book dedicates itself entirely to fixing the underlying process of intelligence. The authors place intelligence in the larger context of information, and draw a plethora of useful comparisons with emerging private sector capabilities and standards. They place strong emphasis on the emerging issues (not necessarily threats) related to ethnic, religious, and geopolitical confrontation, and are acutely sensitive to the new power of non-governmental organizations and non-state actors. The heart of their book is captured in three guidelines for the new process: focus on understanding the consumer's priorities; minimize the investment in fixed hardware and personnel; and create a system that can draw freely on commercial capabilities where applicable (as they often will be). Their chapter on the failure of the bureaucratic model for intelligence, and the need to adopt the virtual model -- one that permits analysts to draw at will on diverse open sources -- is well presented and compelling. Their concluding three chapters on analysis, covert action, and secrecy are solid professional-level discussions of where we must go in the future."

Bath, NIPQ, Summer 2001, calls this work "a thought-provoking discussion of how the intelligence community needs to reform to operate in the atmosphere of ... the asymmetric threat." For Russell, Studies, Winter-Spring 2001, "[t]he authors, while sympathetic to the demands of intelligence, [have] marshal[ed] a critical analysis of the IC in the hopes of sparking reform, which they persuasively argue is essential to the future efficacy of the IC in supporting American statecraft."

Bruneau, Thomas C., and Steven C. Boraz, eds. Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007.

According to Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), this book's 13 chapters include "studies that discuss democratic control and effectiveness in three Western nations -- the United States, the United Kingdom, and France -- and seven new democracies -- Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, Romania, South Africa, Russia, and the Philippines." Reforming Intelligence "is well documented, well written, and should serve as a foundation for studying this persistent problem."

Reddig, NIPQ 23.4 (Sep. 2007), calls this a "useful and thought provoking compendium of case studies," dealing with "the challenge of maintaining an intelligence establishment in a democratic framework." For Skarstedt, NIJ 1.1 (2009), "[a]ll of the authors provide outstanding analysis of their various subjects, and this book is a comprehensive study of intelligence reform and its problems. The commoin theme shared by all of the authors is that intelligence must be closely controlled."

Carter, Ashton B. "The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism." International Security 26 (Winter 2001-2002): 5-23.

The author is a former Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy (1993-1997).

Clarke, Richard A. Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Defense Disasters. New York: HarperCollins, 2008.

For Peake, Studies 52.4 (Dec. 2008) and Intelligencer 17.1 (Winter-Spring 2009), the author's "impressive 30-year career in government gives him a perspective that journalists and academics can never achieve and thus should be carefully considered." Clarke "clearly articulate[s] his view of the problems," and he "makes specific suggestions for correcting problems."

Brooks, NIPQ 25.2 (Apr. 2009), says that this book "presents a very negative picture of the national security and counter-terrorism workings of the government." It "is a recitation of failures with few examples of ... successes.... [The author] provides numerous recommendations for fixing the problems he cites.... While the reader might not concur with all of these recommendations, they are thought-provoking and worthy of serious contemplation."

Eisendrath, Craig, ed. National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2000.

Robert David Steele provides the following comments: "[T]his book brings together a series of chapters that are largely anecdotal (but reasoned) pieces from former foreign service officers recalling all the terrible things CIA did or did not do while they were in service.... The chapter by Richard A. Stubbing on 'Improving the Output of Intelligence: Priorities, Managerial Changes, and Funding' is quite interesting. There is a great deal of truth in all that is presented here."

Immerman, Choice, Sep. 2000, finds that this work's "diagnoses and prescriptions are predictable. American intelligence efforts historically did more harm than good.... [I]ntelligence collection ... targets should be limited and precise. The US should rely almost exclusively on technical intelligence and the reports of foreign-service officers..., covert operations should be abandoned, and the intelligence budget should be reduced.... The recommendations, while useful, add almost nothing new to the national debate."

For Pincus, Washington Monthly, Oct. 2000, this work is a mixed bag. He finds it difficult to imagine how, in the real world, intelligence activities might be based on "law and cooperation," as suggested in Sen. Tom Harkin's "Foreword." Similarly, it seems doubtful that the "politicization" of intelligence can be solved through making Congress an active partner in developing clandestine programs. On the other hand, some restructuring of intelligence along the line of the British system seems to be "a route worth pursuing." Broadly, however, this work can "make you think about the good and the bad [of intelligence] all over again."

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