INTELLIGENCE REFORM

2000 - 2002

Barlow, John Perry. "Why Spy?" Forbes, 7 Oct. 2002, 42-46.

The author proposes the establishment of an "Open Intelligence Office," with a goal of creating a "process of information digestion in which inexpensive data are gathered from largely open sources and condensed, through an open process, into knowledge terse and insightful enough to inspire wisdom in our leaders. The entity … would be small, highly networked, and generally visible…. It would rely heavily on the Internet, public media, the academic press, and an informal worldwide network of volunteers -- a kind of global Neighborhood Watch -- that would submit on-the-ground reports."

Clark comment: The author's "global Neighborhood Watch" sounds like a good way to get people thrown into jail for spying, if they are lucky enough not to live under one of the more repressive regimes.

Berkowitz, Bruce. "Deep Cover." Hoover Digest 2002, no. 4 (30 Oct. 2002). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6520]

"In the new wars against terrorist organizations and rogue states, the United States often needs effective 'cover' -- the ability to send military forces and intelligence officers overseas without our adversaries knowing who they are. Unfortunately, this has rarely been a particular strength for the United States, and the approaches we have used in the past are poorly suited for today."

Betts, Richard K. "Fixing Intelligence." Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2002): 43-59.

"Paradoxically, the news is worse than the angriest critics think, because the intelligence community has worked much better than they assume.... U.S. intelligence and associated services have generally done very well at protecting the country....

"The community has undergone several major reorganizations and innumerable lesser ones over the past half-century. No one ever stays satisfied with reorganization because it never seems to do the trick -- if the trick is to prevent intelligence failure. There is little reason to believe, therefore, that the next reform will do much better than previous ones.... The underlying cause of mistakes in performance ... does not lie in the structure and process of the intelligence system. It is intrinsic to the issues and targets with which intelligence has to cope: the crafty opponents who strategize against it, and the alien cultures that are not transparent to American minds."

Economist. Editors. "Time for a Rethink." 20 Apr. 2002, 23-25.

"What should be done [to reform the U.S. intelligence services]?... Two big jobs ... stick out. The first is that the intelligence community needs a proper chief executive -- ... one with real budgetary power over the technical military agencies.... The other priority is to break down the artificial barrier between intelligence-gathering at home and abroad."

Gannon, John C. "Restructuring Intelligence: Let Form Follow Function." Intelligencer 13, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002): 17-23.

The former DDI gives his views of the impact of 9/11 on the Intelligence Community, and offers "seven objectives for reform." Gannon's first objective would have the Executive Branch take charge and develop a strategic plan for intelligence. He would also have the DCI functioning, under the President, as the CEO of the Intelligence Community.

Pappas, Aris A., and James M. Simon, Jr. "The Intelligence Community: 2001-2015." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 1 (2002): 39-47.

Two insiders (senior officers on the Intelligence Community Management Staff) take their shot at where reform should take the Intelligence Community. Clark comment: See the reference to Pappas and his involvement with the Kuklinski materials in Weiser, A Secret Life (2004), 242-245.

Pincus, Walter.

1. "Congress to Postpone Revamping of FBI, CIA; Homeland Security Agency Becomes Legislative Focus." Washington Post, 2 Jul. 2002, A1. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

"Congress will put off a reorganization of the FBI and CIA ... until it establishes a Department of Homeland Security, according to Bush administration and congressional sources.... The delay underscored the increasing awareness on Capitol Hill that reorganizing the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency and other intelligence bodies is an extraordinarily complex undertaking about which there is little agreement on what needs to be fixed or, indeed, whether any changes are even required."

2. "House, Senate Intelligence Panels Set Joint Sept. 11 Probe."Washington Post, 15 Feb. 2002, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 14 February 2002, "[t]he leaders of the Senate and House intelligence committees ... announced a joint investigation" into the 9/11 attacks.

3. "Intelligence Shakeup Would Boost CIA: Panel Urges Transfer of NSA, Satellites, Imagery from Pentagon." Washington Post, 8 Nov. 2001, A1. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

According to sources familiar with the panel's findings, a presidential commission headed by PFIAB chairman retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft plans to recommend that the NRO, NIMA, and NSA "be transferred" to the DCI. The House and Senate intelligence committees "are expected to support the plan.... Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld ... is expected to strongly oppose the recommendations.... Strong opposition is also expected from the Senate and House Armed Services Committees."

4. "Rumsfeld Casts Doubt on Intelligence Reform Changes Suggested by Presidential Panel." Washington Post, 9 Apr. 2002, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 8 April 2002, "Defense Secretary Donald F. Rumsfeld ... said he believes multiple sources for intelligence information are needed and cast doubt that any major reorganization to centralize U.S. intelligence collection will emerge from studies ordered last year by President Bush."

Riebling, Mark. "The Real Intelligence Failure: Congress's Role." National Review, 28 May 2002. [http://www.nationalreview.com]

"The furor over what our government knew before September 11 has spurred calls for a broad congressional inquiry. But if lawmakers really seek to repair our vulnerabilities ... they must consider their own roles in thwarting the timely collation of vital intelligence."

Risen, James, and David Johnston. "Lawmakers Want Cabinet Post for an Intelligence Director." New York Times, 8 Dec. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Rustmann, Frederick W., Jr. "Debunking the CIA Case Officer Myth." Periscope 25, nos. 1 & 2 (2002): 1, 30.

The author debunks those reformers who call for case officers who can operate with native ease and cover in foreign environments: "[M]ost people simply don't understand the intelligence business -- in particular the difference between case officers and agents.... [O]n the one hand we have the case officer, who must fit into the U.S. diplomatic environment at home and abroad and who has total loyalty to the U.S., and on the other hand we have the principal agent, who is a trusted native of a particular foreign country who can be trained and vetted to the extent that he can be given the responsibilty to perform specific compartmented tasks within an operational and cultural environment totally familiar to him."

Steele, Robert David.

1. "Crafting Intelligence in the Aftermath of Disaster." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 161-178.

"Today's complex reality is not amenable to ... the narrowly focused intelligence production process that tailors its daily production for consumption by only the President and a few others, while creating massive generic databases of classified information that do little to address the specific needs of action officers across all of the departments and agencies of government."

2. "The New Craft of Intelligence." Open Source Solutions White Paper. Jul. 2001. [http://www.oss.net]

Written by Steele for Presidential Intelligence Review of 19 May 2001 and released on 6 July 2001. According to the author, "the article provides an internationalist vision for a new alternative form of global intelligence community."

3. "The New Craft of Intelligence: Making the Most of Open Private Sector Knowledge." Time, 3 Mar. 2002. [http://www.time.com]

"[O]ur spies and our satellites ... collect less than 10% of the relevant information that we must digest to understand the complex multi-cultural world.... We need a 'new craft of intelligence' that can access and digest the broad historical, cultural, and current events knowledge that is available openly in over twenty-nine languages. By exploiting these open sources we can create open source intelligence, or OSINT, suitable for informing our public as well as our state and local authorities and our international partners[] as to the threats to our nation."

4. "The New Craft of Intelligence: Reconstruction & Globalization." Sep. 2000. [http://www.oss.net]

5. "Possible Presidential Intelligence Initiatives." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 409-423.

"National Intelligence must be redefined away from secrets and toward the more fundamental mission of informing policy and[,] most particularly, the President. At the same time, recognizing the growing power of non-governmental organizations, a truly national intelligence community must be formed by harnessing the distributed intelligence of the business, academic, media, and individual experts outside of the government."

Stubbing, Richard A., and Melvin A. Goodman. "How to Fix U.S. Intelligence." Christian Science Monitor, 26 Jun. 2002, 11.

The CIA and FBI "suffer from organizational overload.... Reorganization is required in both agencies.... Intelligence needs to be reshaped to combat terrorism. Intelligence on counterterrorism must supplant military intelligence as America's top priority."

Verton, Daniel. "Data-rich Spy Center on the Drawing Board: Hub to Integrate Dozens of Intell Systems." Federal Computer Week, 8 May 2000. [http://www.fcw.com]

Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) will propose legislation as part of the fiscal 2001 Defense Department budget which would create a National Operations and Analysis Hub (NOAH). The new organization "would support high-level government policymakers by integrating the more than 28 intelligence community networks, as well as the databases from a vast array of federal agencies. The plan is to model the new agency after the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity [LIWA] at Fort Belvoir, Va., which Weldon credits with one of the most effective 'massive data mining' capabilities in the intelligence community."

Return to Reform 2000s Table of Contents

Return to Reform Table of Contents