Smith, R. Jeffrey.
1. "Deutch Outlines Plan to Centralize Control of Intelligence Community." Washington Post, 20 Dec. 1995, A23.
2. "Clinton to Sign Bill Giving CIA Three New Managers; Measure also Expands Powers of FBI, NSA." Washington Post, 5 Oct. 1996, A4.
Snider, L. Britt.
Snider was Staff Director of the Commission on Roles and Capabilities of U.S. Intelligence Community (Aspin commission).
1. "A (Largely) Overlooked Accomplishment: Assessing the 1992 Intelligence Reorganization Legislation." National Security Law Report 15, no. 5 (May 1993): 1, 3.
2. "National Security Issues Facing the New Congress." National Security Law Report 16, no. 1 (Jan. 1994): 1, 4, 6.
Snider discusses: Making the intelligence budget public; the classification system; the report of Joint Security Commission; and the intelligence-law enforcement relationship.
3. "National Security Issues in the 104th Congress." National Security Law Report 17, no. 2-3 (Feb.-Mar. 1995): 1, 2.
Snider discusses: United Nations issues; potential legislation on organizational issues; counter-terrorism legislation; new Executive orders.
4. "The New (and Largely Unappreciated) Legal Framework for U.S. Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 3 (Autumn/Winter 1993/1994): 77-80.
Snider argues that the importance of the language in Title VII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L. 102-496), signed by President Bush on 24 Oct. 1992, is being missed.
Soper, Karl. "Getting Serious About Restructuring Intelligence." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 1-3.
The following exchange was carried in "NIP Forum," Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Apr. 1996), p. 14.
"Just finished Soper's article, 'Getting Serious About Restructuring Intelligence,' and can hear the howls all the way [o]ut here in Ohio. Soper's outline of a truly centralized intelligence structure (my words, not his) deserves more discussion than I fear it will achieve.
"The concept of a 'Department of Intelligence' has an appealing simplicity, and would do much to rationalize the existing multiple intelligence organizational entities and chains of command. It also offers more from a management point of view than continued 'restructuring' by the creation of ever more entities, a direction begun under Cheney and Gates but toward which Deutch and others seem to lean.
"One quibble worth mentioning is Soper's neglect of counterintelligence. Or is he assuming that CI will become totally the FBI domain? J. Ransom Clark, New Concord, OH."
"The author replies: 'The issue of responsibility for CI is a difficult one and I semiconsciously neglected it for that reason. I did allude, however, to intelligence ceding responsibility to the FBI in law enforcement areas. But to address the issue squarely, I view the current division of responsibility for CI as an unmitigated failure, as demonstrated most recently in the Ames case. In my view, the only way to rectify the problem is to give the FBI full authority in CI matters, including HUMINT operations outside the United States."
Steele, Robert David
Towell, Pat. "Schwarzkopf Points Out Flaws in Wartime Intelligence." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 15 Jun. 1991, 1603.
In 12 June 1991 appearances before the Senate and House armed services committees, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf criticized Washington-generated intelligence as too cautious to be useful during the Gulf War. He called for equipping field commanders to collect their own intelligence about specific targets. He argued that "we focus too much on what might be called 'national systems.' which respond more to national directives out of Washington."
Turner, Stansfield. "Intelligence for a New World Order." Foreign Affairs (Fall 1991): 150-166.
Twentieth Century Fund. The Need to Know: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy. With a background paper by Allan E. Goodman and Bruce D. Berkowitz. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1992.
"Covert action is likely to remain an instrument of U.S. national security policy for the foreseeable future.... At the same time, it is no longer possible to justify the enthusiasm and prominence covert action once enjoyed.... [S]ince the United States may need to hide its fingerprints on at least some operations, we need to set down some clear criteria for assessing proposed covert actions and establish effective institutions for both implementing and monitoring such activities."
According to Grose, FA 71.4 (Jul.-Aug. 1992), this is the work of a 15-member task force chaired by Harvard's Richard E. Neustadt. It "recommends tight new restrictions, mainly that overt means to achieve the same purpose be thoroughly canvassed first, that private action groups come under the same accountability requirements as government agencies and, most important, that covert action be undertaken only in support of policies that have been fully and publicly articulated. Notable is the eloquent dissent of task force member Hodding Carter III, who calls the practice an 'addiction' of the Cold War: 'To continue covert action now is to admit that we have become what we have fought.'"
Allen, DIJ 1.2, comments that although "much of this book rehashes old arguments," it is a "valuable compilation of resource material." Substantially after publication of this report, Warren, Intelligencer 14.2 (Winter-Spring 2005), opines that "[t]he bias of the task force ... precluded a real discussion of the issues." Essentially, "the report is incomplete and tainted."
Johnson, I&NS 9.2, says the "end result ... [is] outstanding ... despite its silly title." The report's recommendations call for more vigorous legislative oversight and thorough periodic review of ongoing covert actions. Its "weakest position ... is its willingness to accept post facto reporting to Congress on covert action." The report gives "a masterful summary of the key issues.... [It is] well organized, lucidly written, thorough, and sensitive to the ethical dimensions of covert action." This is the "best overview of the subject yet published."
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. S. 2726 to Improve U.S. Counterintelligence Measures: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 23 May and 12 July 1990.
U.S. Intelligence Community Staff. Community Management Staff. Quality Council Secretariat. National Performance Review: Phase II Initiatives, September 1995; An Intelligence Community Report. Washington, DC: 1995.
Surveillant 4.2: This examination of the U.S. intelligence community "focuses on two areas: high-priority items on DCI Deutch's agenda and improvements in management services and infrastructure.... This report seeks to set forth actions which should result in greater efficiencies in effort and costs over the long term."
Wilson, James Q. [James Collins Professor of Management, Graduate School of Business, UCLA]. Thinking About Reorganization. Working Group on Intelligence Reform. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1992.
Clark comment: I recommend that anyone enamored of reorganization as a cure for the "problems" of U.S. intelligence read this monograph before they get too wedded to the concept.
Wood, C. Norman [LTGEN/USAF (Ret.)].
1. "President's Commentary: Intelligence May Be Bent, But Not Broken." Signal, Oct. 1997, 14.
This is an opinion piece by the AFCEA President. He acknowledges that American intelligence "must respond to changes wrought by the post-Cold-War era and the information technology revolution." However, he argues that the solution "does not lie in a brute force reorganization or in chain-saw budget cutting." Interestingly, Wood supports efforts to "strengthen the hand of the ... DCI," and notes that the "[k]ey to success in this position is more control over intelligence resources."
2. "President's Commentary: Intelligence Is at a Crucial Crossroad." Signal, Oct. 1999, 14.
In this opinion piece, the AFCEA President argues that because of the "sense of uncertainty" that characterizes the post-Cold War era, the U.S. Intelligence Community needs to "take the initiative in developing a broad, cohesive plan for national intelligence. This effort must encompass specific funding requirements, new sensor and collection systems, information architectures and centralized authority" under a strengthened DCI.
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