American Bar Association. Standing Committee on Law and National Security. "Glickman Calls for Releasing Intelligence Community Budget." National Security Law Report 16, no. 2 (Feb. 1994): 1, 2, 6-8.
Remarks of Dan Glickman (D-KS), 27 January 1994.
American Intelligence Journal. Editors. "Intelligence Authorization Act [for the FY-1998 Budget] Report of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 105th Congress." 17, nos. 3/4 (1997): 13.
This is an edited version, reflecting only some of the findings of the 80-page HPSCI report. Areas of concern to the Committee include: (1) shortfalls in all-source analysis; (2) an imbalance in the allocation of resources between collection and processing; (3) the funding process for HUMINT; (4) cost of overhead collection technologies; (5) lack of system interoperability; (6) declassification criteria; and (7) drug intelligence collection and analysis activities.
Berkowitz, Bruce D.
1. "Information Age Intelligence." Foreign Policy 103 (Summer 1996): 35-50.
The author argues that incremental change or reform in the U.S. intelligence apparatus is and will be insufficient to meet the needs of the "information age." He suggests a more decentralized model, and offers some examples of how such a system might work.
2. "Information Technology and Intelligence Reform." Orbis 41, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 107-118.
Efforts to reform the U.S. intelligence are missing the point. The focus should be on effective information technology development, organization, and management.
Breckinridge, Scott D.
1. "Post-Cold War Intelligence." World Intelligence Review 13, no. 4 (1994): 1-2.
The author points to major cuts projected in CIA and Defense Department intelligence positions and dollars. He expresses concern that further cuts, given the continuing absence of policy guidance from either the White House or Congress, "may fail to preserve the capabilities needed to provide the information required.... Major comprehensive planning must be done ... before tinkerers rearrange pieces and reassign missions so that they differ materially from those already in the process of change."
2. "The Shape of Post-Cold War Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 1-10.
"[I]f done soundly the main benefit [of restructuring] will prove to be a realignment of the pieces of the Intelligence Community so as to reduce redundancies." However, it would be realistic to recognize that a "new system will bring limited change in the community functioning and the basic product, assuming that the principle of 'national intelligence' is protected.... [G]reat care is critical to avoid damage to the intelligence community during the period of adjustment, [but] doubt exists that the requisite care is being or will be exercised by Congress or the president."
Clark comment: Making the assumption that the principle of "national intelligence" will be protected does not guarantee its fulfillment. This is an area of concern to those who favor continuation or strengthening of centralized, civilian control of American intelligence: Diminishing military resources has the services beginning to cast covetous looks toward control of "national" assets.
Brethauer, Todd. "Adam Smith Examines the Intelligence Economy: The Intelligence of Nations." Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 5 (1996): 71-73.
This is a neat "little" article, done perhaps with a bit of tongue in cheek; but with an important issue behind it. The author assails the "waste and inefficiency of central planning" as practiced by the intelligence community. He argues for a market-driven allocation of resources, with consumers "paying" for the product they receive.
Bruemmer, Russell J. "Intelligence Community Reorganization: Declining the Invitation to Struggle." Yale Law Journal 101 (Jan. 1992): 867-891
Bruemmer was CIA General Counsel from 1988 to 1990. Here, he looks at the relationship between the President and Congress with regard to the possible reorganization of the intelligence community. He concludes that Congress should play a circumspect role in such matters.
Codevilla, Angelo. Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century. New York: The Free Press, 1992.
Clark comment: Codevilla returns us to many of the positions advocated by the Reagan Administration's "transition team" of late 1980-early 1981. That group's right-wing views did not carry the day then, and I fail to find the overall thrust of Codevilla's arguments any more persuasive now that the Soviet Union is no longer the center of attention of U.S. national security policy. Nevertheless, Informing Statecraft does go far in identifying many of the issues that will be discussed -- and some acted upon -- in the years to come. Whether you agree with Codevilla's criticisms and "solutions" is not the point; the book is still important in the discussion of what intelligence is and needs to be in the future.
Campbell, AIJ 14.2/3, says Codevilla "finds the Agency's performance over the years to be marred by serious mistakes, both analytic and operational." Allen, DIJ 1.2, views this "outstanding book [as] the next major installment ... in the formulation of a concept of strategic intelligence." According to Rich, FILS 12.3, Informing Statecraft is "both a critique of American intelligence as it is today and an exhaustive guide to principles for intelligence policymakers in the future." Codevilla is "thoroughly up-to-date" in his sources, but is "unconvincing ... when he attempts to lay some blame" for the state of intelligence affairs "on 'the CIA's American Liberal culture.'"
In his review, Glynn, Commentary, Dec. 1992, concludes that "[t]he value of Codevilla's account is to connect the CIA's chronic failures ... with its corporate or bureaucratic culture.... Where the book is weaker is in regard to ... comprehensiveness and applicability to the future." Lowenthal also notes that Codevilla is "[s]tronger on criticisms than on possible solutions."
While basically pleased that American intelligence is being criticized, the NameBase reviewer seems unhappy with why those criticisms are being made: "Codevilla ... presents the conservative argument for major reform of the U.S. intelligence community. It's not because he has ethical objections to spying or covert action.... It's just that the taxpayers are not getting much more than incompetence and a self-serving bureaucracy for their $31 billion per year.... Over half of this budget figure is for expensive snooper satellites, many of which are focused so narrowly that they produce little that's useful."
The quality of a review in Economist, 6 Jun. 1992, is illustrated by the following example of complete ignorance of U.S. intelligence: "[I]t was only when John Walker's wife told the CIA that her husband was a spy that the agency realised that its naval codes had been read as clearly as if written in Russian." The CIA naval codes?
Wirtz, IJI&C 10.2, refers to Codevilla's "finely crafted and scholarly argument," but also finds Codevilla inconsistent in the manner in which he criticizes both American efforts at clandestine collection when they are discovered and American security when similar foreign activities are discovered. In addition, the author's "effort to interpret dozens of well-known incidents in U.S. intelligence folklore from an ultra-conservative perspective detracts from his presentation."
Colby, William E. "Retooling the Intelligence Industry." Foreign Service Journal, Jan. 1992, 21-25.
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. The Future of U.S. Intelligence: Report Prepared for the Working Group on Intelligence Reform. Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1996.
Surveillant 4.2: The Consortium "has, for a number of years, hosted special 'Working Groups' on specific intelligence topics and has pulled the findings from those multi-year reports into this important document."
Council on Foreign Relations [Richard N. Haass, Project Director]. Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence -- Report of an Independent Task Force. New York: Public Affairs Office, Council on Foreign Relations, 1996.
Surveillant 4.3: "This is a very worthwhile report to have in your possession." Excerpts of this report are available as: Maurice R. Greenberg and Richard N. Haas, "Making Intelligence Smarter: [Excerpts of] Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations 1996," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 135-144.
Doherty, Carroll J. [arranged chronologically]
1. "Spy Agency Overhaul Drive Loses Momentum." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 24 Aug. 1996, 2393.
Despite the conclusion by blue-ribbon commissions and leaders of the House and Senate intelligence committees that "the key to reforming the fragmented intelligence bureaucracy was for the Pentagon to cede some of its authority over spy programs to a strengthened" CIA, "proposals to achieve that goal appear doomed." In fact, DoD "is likely to gain control over a new agency assigned to manage all imagery and mapping operations, including some programs currently run by the CIA."
2. "Hill Clears Modest Overhaul of Spy Organizations." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 28 Sep. 1996, 2769.
On 25 September 1996, the House and Senate adopted the conference report on the Fiscal Year 1997 intelligence authorization bill. The legislation authorizes "a 2.3 percent increase in funding over President Clinton's budget and a 4.2 percent increase over fiscal 1996." The overall budget for intelligence activities "is believed to total about $30 billion a year."
Efforts by the chairmen of the intelligence committees -- Representative Larry Combest (R-TX) and Senator Arlen Spector (R-PA) -- to expand the power of the DCI were scaled back "in the face of intense opposition from the Pentagon and its congressional allies."
The bill establishes the new position of deputy director for community management, as well as three assistant directors to oversee collection, analysis, and administration; all of these new positions would require Senate confirmation. The Senate-passed provision requiring the President to make public the total amount spent annually on intelligence was dropped from the final bill.
Earlier reports on budget authorization and intelligence reform activities can be found in CQWR at pages 2681 (Senate passage), 2065 (House National Security Committee action), 1609 (Senate Armed Services Committee action), 1477 (House action), 1317 (HPSCI action), and 1181 (SSCI action).
Return to Reform 1990s Table of Contents