1. General Strategic Monitoring
2. Legal Issues
4. The Impact of Science
Aviation Week & Space Technology. Editors. "How U.S. Taps Soviet Missile Secrets." 21 Oct. 1957, 26-27. [Petersen]
Aviation Week & Space Technology. Editors. "Iranian Monitor Loss Minimized." 30 Apr. 1979, 30.
This article deals with U.S. government efforts to minimize the negative effect of the loss of the SIGINT sites in northern Iran following the ouster of the Shah.
Hall, R. Cargill. "Strategic Reconnaissance in the Cold War." Prologue (Summer 1996): 107-25.
Richelson, Jeffrey T. "High Flyin' Spies." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52, no. 5 (Sep.-Oct. 1996): 48-54.
Part of this article is a basic-level description of U.S. technical collection systems. Beyond that, the author makes some useful comments on the future of such systems. The important question is: "Are national technical means still of primary importance? The short answer is yes.... [But] the targets have changed." In this new target environment, "the ability of technical collection systems to provide the same degree of valuable intelligence cannot be assumed." Some of the challenges include the development of fiber-optic communication networks, the use of denial and deception operations, and the inherent difficulties associated with such targets as terrorist and criminal groups. The changes in technology and targets will make it necessary for the U.S. intelligence community to "rethink the deployment of existing collection apparatus and the development of new systems."
van de Aart, D. Aerial Espionage: Secret Intelligence Flights by East and West. New York: Prentice Hall, 1985.
York, Herbert F., and G. Allen Greb. "Strategic Reconnaissance." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 33, no. 4 (Apr. 1977): 33-41.
Ziegler, Charles A., and David Jacobson. Spying Without Spies: Origins of America's Secret Nuclear Surveillance System. Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood, 1995.
Van Nederveen, Air Chronicles, at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil, notes that Spying Without Spies "tells how scientists, intelligence officials, Air Force officers, and commissioners of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) grappled with the problem" of detecting atomic events deep inside the Soviet Union. The authors provide "the first description of the creation and institutionalization of America's nuclear detection system and the relationship it forged between the science and intelligence communities. Thus, the book makes a unique contribution to intelligence literature."
To Rosenberg, AHR 101.4, this "political and technical analysis ... is solidly researched, sound in narrative, effectively organized, and judicious -- if unambitious -- in its conclusions." It is, however, "a work for specialists."
Beresford, A.M. "Surveillance Aircraft and Satellites: A Problem of International Law." Journal of Air Law and Commerce 27 (1960): 107 ff. [Petersen]
Columbia Law Review. Editors. "Legal Aspects of Reconnaissance in Airspace and Outer Space." 61 (1961): 1074 ff. [Petersen]
U.S. Department of Defense. Central Imagery Office. "Future Direction for the United States Imagery System." American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 3 (Autumn-Winter 1993-1994): 31-34.
The "present imagery resources were developed primarily to support the needs of the President and senior national security decisionmakers. Not surprisingly, attempts to apply these resources and supporting infrastructure to support war fighters have fallen short. Furthermore, today's exploitation and production capabilities are fragmented and prone to duplication. They neither form a coherent, responsive, or flexible system to serve the needs of the war fighter, nor do they adequately support an increasingly diverse set of civil imagery users. The challenge for the CIO is to lead the imagery community to design a United States Imagery System that responds to [current] trends, takes advantage of state-of-the-art advances in technology, and is responsive to imagery user needs. The USIS architecture should address the full imagery cycle: requirements management, collection, processing, production, and delivery. It will fully integrate management of all elements of the cycle, whether during war or peace."
Divine, Robert A. The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Smith, I&NS 9.4, notes that President "Eisenhower was able to respond in a calm and systematic manner to Sputnik because he had access to intelligence information which led him to conclude that the Soviet satellite did not pose a threat to U.S. national security." Cold War Connection, "Top Books on the Cold War," http://www.cmu.edu/coldwar/annot.htm, says "this dynamic ... political history" provides good coverage of "[t]he Eisenhower administration's various responses to 'Sputnik,' including a fear of a growing 'missile gap,' an increased interest in US scientific and engineering capabilities, and a reevaluation of the national education system."
Herken, Gregg. Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Surveillant 2.5 notes that "[i]ntelligence gathering and high technology are inextricably linked." In this book, Herken explores "the impact of proposed technology, including ... the U-2 spy plane [and] the electronic gadgets poured into Vietnam.... At the heart of the book is the tension between the experts and the politicians in the making of`cardinal choices.'"
McDougall, Walter A. The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. New York: Basic Books, 1985.
For Cold War Connection, "Top Books on the Cold War," http://www.cmu.edu/coldwar/annot.htm, this "richly detailed ... work provides the best overview to date on the complex intersections of the space program and politics (both international and domestic), as well as the larger issue of the relationship between the state and technological development."
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