Scott, William B. "High Demand Stretches NRO Intelligence Assets." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 Feb. 1993, 49-52.
"The uncertainties of the post-Cold War world have triggered an explosion of requests for a broad range of intelligence data.... The surge in requirements for national security intelligence conflicts directly with shrinking budgets."
Scully, Megan. "National Reconnaissance Office Cancels Contracts for Proposed Space Radar Project." Government Executive, 4 Apr. 2008. [http://www.govexec.com]
NRO officials "last week officially notified Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin that they are terminating their contracts on the troubled Space Radar development project, effectively ending a program whose support on Capitol Hill had been dwindling amid cost concerns, schedule delays and technological problems."
Shulman, Seth. "Code Name: CORONA." Technology Review, Oct. 1996, 22-25, 28-32.
This is primarily a look at the early days of the Corona photo-reconnaissance satellite project through the eyes of Walter Levison and Frank Madden. The article strays in its later pages into an echoing of the tedious-but-not-completely-unfounded complaints of the Federation of Atomic Scientists about government secrecy.
Shrader, Katherine. "Spy Chief Scraps Satellite Program." Associated Press, 21 Jun. 2007. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
DNI Mike McConnell has scrapped a multibillion-dollar imaging satellite program to produce a stealth spacecraft capable of taking pictures from space while avoiding detection. The move "comes after several years of congressional efforts to kill the program, known publicly as the next generation of 'Misty' satellites."
For additional information on the "Misty" satellite, see Charles P. Vick, "MISTY/FP-731, Follow-on ADVANCED CRYSTAL: The Stealth Reconnaissance Imaging Spacecraft," GlobalSecurity.org, 26 Apr. 2007. [http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/afp-731.htm]
Sparaco, Pierre. "French Satellite Details Air Strike Damage." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 Apr. 1999, 26-27.
"The French Helios 1 imaging reconnaissance satellite and two air force Mirage IVPs are making a significant contribution in providing detailed assessment of NATO air strikes against military targets in Yugoslavia."
Sweetman, Bill. "Spies in the Sky." Popular Science, Apr. 1997, 42-48.
This is a very good, brief walk-through of the U.S. "spy" satellite inventory, past and present. Included are imagery (photographic and radar), signals intelligence, and the Navy Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) satellites. The author acknowledges that most of the technical details come from the database of John Pike and Charles Vick at the Federation of American Scientists, which has been developed from public sources.
Taubman, Philip. "Failure to Launch: In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids." New York Tmes, 11 Nov. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]
The collapse of the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) project in September 2005, "at a loss of at least $4 billion, was all but inevitable." It was "the result of a troubled partnership between a government seeking to maintain the supremacy of its intelligence technology, but on a constrained budget, and a contractor [Boeing] all too willing to make promises it ultimately could not keep." Combined with other recent failures, this has left "the nation ... without advanced new systems to replace a dwindling number of reconnaissance satellites first designed in the 1970s and updated in the 1990s."
Thomson, Allen. "Satellite Vulnerability: A Post-Cold War Issue?" Space Policy 2, no. 1 (Feb. 1995).
Tomme, Edward B. [LTCOL/USAF (Ret.)] "The Myth of the Tactical Satellite." Air & Space Power Journal 20, no. 2 (Summer 2006). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil]
"A combination of physical constraints placed on satellites by orbital mechanics and operational requirements placed on their payloads by the missions that can be performed from space prevents all but the most rudimentary tactical missions from being attainable for the foreseeable future. Even if these missions can be performed from space, they will end up costing hundreds of thousands to several million dollars per hour overhead.... Continued funding of the tactical satellite program under the misguided notion that such satellites can provide tactical effects on the ground only serves to drain scarce budgetary resources from other programs that can provide the desired effects."
Guerriero, A&SPJ 21.2 (Summer 2007), suggests that "[w]e should not dismiss the value of tactical satellites. They can fill an important role as complements to other existing constellations and assets while providing a level of responsiveness to theater commanders not available from strategic systems."
Tomme, A&SPJ 21.2 (Summer 2007), responds that "we must definitely look to space when it offers the most effective way to accomplish the mission. Without a doubt, a mission requiring global coverage or even overflight of denied territory beyond the range of airborne or near-space sensors plays to the strength of space.... However..., given the existence of so many more effective ways to support our tactical warriors..., it appears that promoting the theory of 'space because we can' is an unaffordable, unresponsive, ineffective, and ill-advised course of action."
Trimble, Paula Shaki. "DARPA Investigates Satellite Pit Stops." Defense News, 25 Oct. 1999, 1.
According to David Whelan, director of the tactical technology office at DARPA, the "Pentagon research agency has taken preliminary steps toward the design and deployment of small robotic spacecraft to service and refuel U.S. spy satellites. The goal of the project, called Orbital Express, is to make national security satellites more maneuverable, more difficult to track and to enhance their effectiveness."
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