RECONNAISSANCE

Verification and Arms Control

Adelman, Kenneth L. "Why Verification is More Difficult and Less Important." International Security 14, no. 4 (1990): 141-146.

Allard, C. Kenneth. "Intelligence and Arms Control: Process and Priorities." Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 5, no. 1 (Winter 1981): 1-26.

Aspin, Les.

1. SALT Verification: Prudence or Paranoia? Washington, DC: 1978. [Petersen]

2. "The Verification of the SALT II Agreement." Scientific American, Feb. 1979, 30-37.

Bates, Asa. "National Technical Means of Verification." Royal United Services Institute Journal 123 (Jun. 1978): 64-73. [Petersen]

Beecher, William. "Spy Satellites Will Monitor Pacts." Sea Power 15 (Jul.-Aug. 1972): 20-24. [Petersen]

Bowen, Russell J. "Soviet Research and Development: Some Implications for Arms Control Inspection." Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 3 (1973): 426-448.

Graham, Thomas, Jr., and Keith A. Hansen. Spy Satellites and Other Intelligence Technologies That Changed History. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2007.

Peake, Studies 51.3 (2007), notes that this work deals with both the collection of monitoring data and verification issues involved in agreements on nuclear weapons. "The authors' narrative is not technical.... For those wishing to know how NTM [National Technical Means] contributed to the end of the Cold War and to learn about the demands placed on them by the war against terror," this "is an excellent place to start." For Poteat, Intelligencer 15.3 (Summer-Fall 2007), this book "is an excellent primer on U.S. reconnaissance systems,... and the many arms control treaties made possible -- and mutually acceptable -- by both the U.S. and Soviet Union."

Greenwood, Ted.

1. "Reconnaissance and Arms Control." Scientific American, Feb. 1973, 2-13 [Petersen] or 14-25 [Rip & Fontanella].

2. Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms Control. Adelphi Papers No. 86. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972. [Petersen]

Haffenmeister, D., J. Romm, and K. Tsipis. "The Verification of Compliance with Arms-Control Agreements." Scientific American, Mar. 1985, 28-35.

Kelleher, Catherine A., and Joseph E. Naftzinger, eds. Intelligence in the Arms Control Process: Lessons from INF. College Park, MD: University of Maryland Center for International Security Studies, 1990. [Petersen]

Krepon, Michael. "Glasnost and Multilateral Verification: Implications for the U.S. Intelligence Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 47-57.

Oelrich, Ivan. "The Changing Rules of Arms Control Verification: Confidence Is Still Possible." International Security 14, no. 4 (1990): 176-184.

Shulsky, Abram N. "Intelligence and Arms Control Policy." Comparative Strategy 6, no. 2 (1987): 145-164.

Skorve, Johnny. The Kola Satellite Image: Perspectives on Arms Control and Environmental Protection. Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1991.

Surveillant 1.6: The author "shows that intelligence gathering can be easily accomplished by Landsat-TM images and presents 17 photos showing the Kola peninsula -- a location holding many of the Soviet Union's nuclear warheads. Each map is analyzed and one easily follows the development and growth of, first, Schagui Air Base from 1972 to 1988, and then Gremikha Naval Base."

Tsipis, Kosta.

1. "Arms Control Pacts Can Be Verified." Discover, Apr. 1987: 79-93.

2. ed. Arms Control Verification: The Technologies That Make It Possible. New York: Pergamon-Brassey's 1985.

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