United States


D - I

Devine, Jack. "Tomorrow's Spygames." World Policy Journal 25, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 141-151. [http://www.mitpressjournals.org] Intelligencer 17, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 17-24.

The former CIA ADDO takes a look at what he thinks the next 25 years will bring in the intelligence arena. For instance, he suggests that in response to the future's "more complex, interconnected environment, the American intelligence community will enter a period of consolidation as various agencies are further centralized under the leadership of a future secretary of intelligence." This is a good read, whether you agree or disagree with Devine's projections.

Doerries, Reinhard R., ed. Diplomaten und Agenten: Nachrichtendienste in der Geschichte der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen. [Diplomats and Agents: Intelligence Services in the History of German-American Relations] Heidelburg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 2001.

Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), comments that the seven articles here make up "a compressed, useful collection. All the articles are well footnoted."

Eisendrath, Craig, ed. National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2000.

Robert David Steele provides the following comments: "[T]his book brings together a series of chapters that are largely anecdotal (but reasoned) pieces from former foreign service officers recalling all the terrible things CIA did or did not do while they were in service.... The chapter by Richard A. Stubbing on 'Improving the Output of Intelligence: Priorities, Managerial Changes, and Funding' is quite interesting. There is a great deal of truth in all that is presented here."

Immerman, Choice, Sep. 2000, finds that this work's "diagnoses and prescriptions are predictable. American intelligence efforts historically did more harm than good.... [I]ntelligence collection ... targets should be limited and precise. The US should rely almost exclusively on technical intelligence and the reports of foreign-service officers..., covert operations should be abandoned, and the intelligence budget should be reduced.... The recommendations, while useful, add almost nothing new to the national debate."

For Pincus, Washington Monthly, Oct. 2000, this work is a mixed bag. He finds it difficult to imagine how, in the real world, intelligence activities might be based on "law and cooperation," as suggested in Sen. Tom Harkin's "Foreword." Similarly, it seems doubtful that the "politicization" of intelligence can be solved through making Congress an active partner in developing clandestine programs. On the other hand, some restructuring of intelligence along the line of the British system seems to be "a route worth pursuing." Broadly, however, this work can "make you think about the good and the bad [of intelligence] all over again."

Goldman, Jan, and Susan Maret, eds. Government Secrecy: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Westport, CT: Libraries Unlimited, 2009.

Moss, AIJ 28.1 (2010), comments that "[w]hile rich in depth and background, the utility of this text is largely limited to the classroom, and not to the field. For those who wish to understand the nature and history of secrecy, though, this compilation of essays has few peers....It is a guide to understanding how the concept has evolved and become interwoven into our society and our institutions.... [T]here is an apparent bias in favor of greater transparency and openness that cannot be ignored, though it is not overpowering by any means. The authors of these essays largely all respect the need to keep certain information secret and protected."

Graham, Bob, with Jeff Nussbaum. Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of American's War on Terror. New York: Random House, 2004. With a New Preface and Postscript. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008.

According to Studies 49.1 (2005), this work summarizes Senator Graham's role in the House-Senate Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community's performance prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, "his views on the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his recommendations for reform of the Intelligence Community.... Graham has shared some interesting insights on how things work in Washington, and, although some of his views are controversial, he more than justifies the conclusion that intelligence matters."

Hastedt, Glenn, and Mildred Vasan. Espionage: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003.

Bullock, Air & Space Power Journal 22.2 (Summer 2008), says that this work "skillfully explores numerous historical examples from the American Revolution to events subsequent to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, tracing the evolution of intelligence-collections capabilities -- particularly human intelligence (HUMINT)."

Hosmer, Stephen. Operations against Enemy Leaders. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001.

Cohen, FA 81.3 (May-Jun. 2002), finds that this work "breaks little new ground, but it does document concisely and clearly the difficulty the United States has had in overthrowing or killing enemy leaders." The author "considers direct attacks, coups, rebellions, and invasion and comes to a gloomy conclusion: leadership attacks are difficult to pull off."

Hughes, R. Gerald. "Of Revelatory Histories and Hatchet Jobs: Propaganda and Method in Intelligence History." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 6 (Dec. 2008): 842-877.

To anyone with a scholarly bent, particularly historians, this is an important article. Its fulcrum point is Tim Weiner's Legacy of Ashes (2007), a work that purports to be "The" history of the CIA. Hughes argues that "much of the praise directed at Weiner's book results from misconceptions about what the discipline of history is and how an understanding of the evolution of historical method can assist those who read history, as well as those who write it."

This article is filled with such high-level and thought-provoking analysis that attempting to capture it in brief is futile. What follows are some "one-liners" that particularly caught this reader's fancy: "[T]he idea that rectitude of analysis automatically follows exhaustive research is entirely [italics in original] fallacious"; "[b]ias lies at the heart of [Weiner's] critique of the CIA and his selective use of material further reinforces those prejudices"; [t]he belief [by reviewers] that Weiner's book contained a large number of revelations betrayed an ignorance of the wealth of CIA material that had been available for many years"; and it is "clear to scholars that a more rigorous methology would have ameliorated many of the book's worst failings."

Clark comment: In the interest of truth in reviewing, please note that this bibliography (Intellit) and its author are cited by name and internet address at page 874, footnote 135.

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