Doerries, Reinhard R., ed. Diplomaten und Agenten: Nachrichtendienste in der Geschichte der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen. [Diplomats and Agents: Intelligence Services in the History of German-American Relations] Heidelburg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 2001.
Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), comments that the seven articles here make up "a compressed, useful collection. All the articles are well footnoted."
Eisendrath, Craig, ed. National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2000.
From advertisement: "[T]en prominent experts describe, from an insider perspective, what went wrong with the U.S. intelligence system and what needs to be done to fix it."
Robert David Steele provides the following comments: "[T]his book brings together a series of chapters that are largely anecdotal (but reasoned) pieces from former foreign service officers recalling all the terrible things CIA did or did not do while they were in service.... The chapter by Richard A. Stubbing on 'Improving the Output of Intelligence: Priorities, Managerial Changes, and Funding' is quite interesting. There is a great deal of truth in all that is presented here."
Immerman, Choice, Sep. 2000, finds that this work's "diagnoses and prescriptions are predictable. American intelligence efforts historically did more harm than good.... [I]ntelligence collection ... targets should be limited and precise. The US should rely almost exclusively on technical intelligence and the reports of foreign-service officers..., covert operations should be abandoned, and the intelligence budget should be reduced.... The recommendations, while useful, add almost nothing new to the national debate."
For Pincus, Washington Monthly, Oct. 2000, this work is a mixed bag. He finds it difficult to imagine how, in the real world, intelligence activities might be based on "law and cooperation," as suggested in Sen. Tom Harkin's "Foreword." Similarly, it seems doubtful that the "politicization" of intelligence can be solved through making Congress an active partner in developing clandestine programs. On the other hand, some restructuring of intelligence along the line of the British system seems to be "a route worth pursuing." Broadly, however, this work can "make you think about the good and the bad [of intelligence] all over again."
Graham, Bob, with Jeff Nussbaum. Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of American's War on Terror. New York: Random House, 2004.
According to Studies 49.1 (2005), this work "is a summary" of Senator Graham's role in the House-Senate Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community's performance prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, "his views on the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his recommendations for reform of the Intelligence Community.... Senator Graham has shared some interesting insights on how things work in Washington, and, although some of his views are controversial, he more than justifies the conclusion that intelligence matters."
Hastedt, Glenn, and Mildred Vasan. Espionage: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003.
Bullock, Air & Space Power Journal 22.2 (Summer 2008), says that this work "skillfully explores numerous historical examples from the American Revolution to events subsequent to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, tracing the evolution of intelligence-collections capabilities -- particularly human intelligence (HUMINT)."
Hosmer, Stephen. Operations against Enemy Leaders. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001.
Cohen, FA 81.3, finds that this work "breaks little new ground, but it does document concisely and clearly the difficulty the United States has had in overthrowing or killing enemy leaders." The author "considers direct attacks, coups, rebellions, and invasion and comes to a gloomy conclusion: leadership attacks are difficult to pull off."
Hulnick, Arthur
S. Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999.
Clark comment: Despite its title, this book is not focused on reform issues; it is, instead, a contender for adoption as a text for a college course in intelligence or as a supplemental text in a broader national security course. Despite the qualms expressed about the work by CIA critics, it fulfills the textbook need admirably.
http://www.amazon.com: "Hulnick suggests that things are not as bad [with U.S. intelligence] as they seem, that America's intelligence system is reasonably well prepared to deal with the many threats to national security. He examines the various functions of intelligence from intelligence gathering and espionage to the arcane fields of analysis, spy-catching, secret operations, and even the business of corporate espionage."
Robert David Steele provides the following comments: "This book has two good features -- the author really does understand the personnel issues, and hence one can read between the lines for added value; and the book is as good an 'insider' tour of the waterfront as one could ask for. How the book treats the CIA-FBI relationship, for example, is probably representative of how most CIA insiders feel. The book does not reflect a deep understanding of open sources and tends to accept the common wisdom across the intelligence bureaucracy, that all is 'generally okay' and just a bit of change on the margin is necessary. In this respect, it is a good benchmark against which the more daring reformist books may be measured."
Melvin Goodman, Washington Monthly, Mar. 2000, 54-55, can find little good to say about Hulnick's work: "Hulnick ... spent 28 years in the CIA and his new book reads very much like he's still in it"; "the reader confronts a generally out-of-date review of the various functions of the CIA and the intelligence community in America"; and "systemic problems receive little scrutiny from Hulnick and he leaves major issues unaddressed."
Wirtz, IJI&C 13.2, has a more positive view of Fixing the Spy Machine. He sees the work as a "lively overview of the workings" of the U.S. Intelligence Community and "a highly accessible and balanced assessment of the dilemmas created by the presence of secret organizations in American democracy." Wirtz does suggest, however, that the "information revolution" is confronting the CIA with "a deeper crisis than Mr. Hulnick recognizes."
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