INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT

Material Prior to the 1990s

A - C

Aberbach, Joel D.

1. "Changes in Congressional Oversight." American Behavioral Scientist 22 (May-Jun. 1979): 493-515. [Calder]

2. "The Congressional Committee Intelligence System: Information, Oversight and Change." Congress and the Presidency 14, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 51-76.

American Bar Association. Working Group on Intelligence Oversight and Accountability of the Standing Committee on Law and National Security. Oversight and Accountability of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies: An Evaluation. Washington, DC: ABA, 1985.

American Enterprise Institute. Foreign Intelligence: Legal and Democratic Controls. Washington, DC: AEI, 1980.

Armed Forces Management. Editors. "Congress Lacks Intelligence in Agency Review." 15 (Oct. 1968): 156-157. [Petersen]

Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Committee on Civil Rights. The Central Intelligence Agency: Oversight and Accountability. New York: 1975.

Baldwin, Gordon. "Congressional Power to Demand Disclosure of Foreign Intelligence Agreements." Brooklyn Journal of International Law 3 (Fall 1976): 1-30. [Petersen]

Barrett, David M. "Secrecy, Security, and Sex: The NSA, Congress, and the Martin-Mitchell Defections." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 699-729.

It "seems fair and accurate" to say that congressional oversight of NSA from late1952 through the summer of 1960 "was almost nonexistant.... When Martin's and Mitchell's spectacular defections and press conference in Moscow unfolded, the 'alarms' set off in the United States were sufficient to provoke a relatively assertive response from Capitol Hill which did, indeed, result in changes of NSA policies and procedures. Having said that, no available evidence suggests that monitoring of the NSA by legislators became even close to comprehensive during the remainder of the 1960s."

Block, Lawrence J., and David B. Rivkin, Jr. "The Battle to Control the Conduct of Foreign Intelligence and Covert Operations: The Ultra-Whig Counterrevolution Revisited." Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 303-355.

Boland, Edward. "The Role of the Intelligence Committee." First Principles 10, no. 1 (1984): 14-16. [Petersen]

Bruemmer, Russell J., and Marshall H. Silverberg. "The Impact of the Iran-Contra Matter on Congressional Oversight of the CIA." Houston Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 (1988): 219-243.

Bruemmer was CIA General Counsel from 1988 to 1990; Silverberg served as CIA Assistant General Counsel.

Cimbala, Stephen J., ed. Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational, 1986.

McWilliams, IJI&C 2.2 says that the essays in this edited volume "are uneven in quality, often redundant, and apt to deviate from the main theme.... Yet ... the plurality of voices ... makes their commonalities more impressive and more deserving of concern." The contributors here "are more or less critical of Congress, of public deliberation, and of attempts to regulate intelligence by statute."

Cinquegrana, Americo R. "Dancing in the Dark: Accepting the Invitation to Struggle in the Context of 'Covert Action,' The Iran-Contra Affair and the Intelligence Oversight Process." Houston Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 (Fall 1988): 177-209.

Petersen: "Analysis of oversight legislation and executive orders 1976-1988."

Cohen, William S. [Sen.; R-ME]

1. "Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 155-162.

The then-SSCI member (later Secretary of Defense) argues in favor of the "48-hour rule" on notification of Congress regarding covert actions. He also discusses some of the oversight problems involved in such activities.

2. "Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions: The Public's Stake in the Forty-Eight Hour Rule." Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 285-302.

Colton, David E. "Speaking Truth to Power: Intelligence Oversight in an Imperfect World." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 137, no. 2 (Dec. 1988): 571-613.2.

According to Lowenthal, this article finds that "the various oversight mechanisms ... have created too rigid and legalistic a system" of intelligence oversight. The author also offers "suggestions for a more flexible system that would still assure accountability."

Congressional Digest. Editors. "Controversy Over Legislative Limitations on Covert U.S. Intelligence Operations: Pro and Con." 59 (May 1980): entire issue.

Crabb, Cecil V., Jr., and Pat M. Holt. Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy. 2d ed. Washington, DC: CQ, 1984. 4th ed. 1992.

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