Kaiser,
Frederick M. "Congress and the Intelligence Community: Taking the Road
Less Traveled." In The Postreform Congress, ed. Roger H. Davidson,
279-300. New York: St. Martin's, 1992.
Kaiser,
Frederick M. "Impact and Implications of the Iran-Contra Affair on
Congressional Oversight of Covert Action." International Journal
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 205-234.
Knott, Stephen.
"Executive Power and the Control of American
Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 2
(Summer 1998): 171-176.
Responding to an earlier essay by Loch Johnson -- "The CIA and the Question of Accountability," Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 178-200 -- Knott argues that Congressional involvement in oversight of previously executively controlled secret activities is a phenomenon of the Vietnam-Watergate era. In fact, the author states, "[e]vidence now abounds that Congress has actually wrested control of the CIA away from the executive branch," a circumstance that "fails to recognize a distinction between the highly sensitive and discreet world of clandestine operations and more routine government functions."
Johnson takes issue with Knott's arguments and conclusions in "Intelligence and the Challenge of Collaborative Government," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 177-182. He concludes that Knott's "disdain for the Congress drips from his pen like a corrosive acid that would eat away all vestiges of accountability."
Clark comment: It is in the latter observation -- and this from a writer who accuses the other of hyperbole -- that the real point of friction between Knott and Johnson can be found: This is at heart a dispute over the Constitution's "invitation to struggle," despite Johnson's protestations otherwise.
Koh,
Harold Hongju. The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After
the Iran-Contra Affair. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.
KF4651K64
According to Valcourt, IJI&C 4.2, Koh is a Yale law professor and former adviser in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice. "The Iran-Contra affair constituted a 'fundamental interbranch dispute over what the rule of law governing national security should be.'... Congress perhaps did not 'so much misdefine its institutional task as leave it unfinished." The National Security Constitution "consists of the U.S. Constitution and several legislative enactments pertaining to foreign policy.... [M]ost presidents have misused this [military and intelligence] power by committing U.S. forces to overt or covert action without having obtained sufficient consensus from Congress and the public." This is a "thoughtful book on the current state of the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches."
Lehman, John. Making War: The 200-Year-Old Battle Between the President and Congress Over How America Goes to War. New York: Scribner's, 1992.
MI 20.2: Lehman "draws on historical examples dating from Barbary Coast Pirates to Desert Storm. [His] research is exceptional, and the footnotes provide many valuable resources."
Treverton, FA (Summer 1992), says that "[t]his engaging essay, part memoir, begins with Desert Storm and ends with Panama, with constitutional theory and history in between. Lehman ... is wise enough to recognize that the Constitution hardly settled the tussle over war powers.... He is also honest enough to admit that while he favors a strong president in principle, he tends, like most of us, to look more favorably on Congress. Lehman emphasizes the leverage of congressional investigation..., and he concludes that Congress' power of the purse has been roughly the check on executive discretion that the Founding Fathers had in mind."
Manget, Fred F.
1. "Another System of Oversight: Intelligence and the Rise of Judicial Intervention." Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 5 (1996): 43-50.
"In effect, the judicial review of issues touching on intelligence matters has developed into a system of oversight.... Congressional inroads on all types of executive branch foreign affairs powers ... increased in the 1970s." Judicial oversight exists "in effective and powerful ways that go far beyond the conventional wisdom that national security is a cloak hiding intelligence activities from the Federal judiciary.... Federal judges are the essential third part of the oversight system in the United States, matching requirements of the laws to intelligence activities and watching the watchers."
2. "Presidential Powers and Foreign Intelligence Operations." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 131-153.
"Foreign intelligence operations are conducted under a direct line of authority from the powers granted to the president by the Constitution. As the needs of the nation for security from external threats have grown, so have the foreign affairs and war powers of the executive branch. Today, they clearly and directly encompass foreign intelligence operations, whether such operations have Congressional sanction or not."
McCarthy, Gregory C. "GOP Oversight of Intelligence in the Clinton Era." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 26-51.
"While varying greatly by issue and period, both select committees performed commendably" during the Clinton years. "Although comity would generally characterize the [SSCI's] approach, a notable exception is ... [t]he nomination of Anthony Lake" to be DCI." The "nadir of [HPSCI's] effectiveness" was the Torricelli case, which "was a disaster" for the committee. Overall, however, "the committees allowed Congress to play a major and mostly positive role in oversight."
Orman, John M.
1. Presidential Secrecy and Deception: Beyond the Power to Persuade. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980.
Wilcox: "Critical study of executive secrecy."
2. Presidential Accountability: New and Recurring Problems. Contributions in Political Science, No. 254. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1990.
Surveillant 1.5 notes that there is a chapter on "Presidential Accountability in Controlling Intelligence." The book also "looks at the conflict between national security and civil liberties." The author's conclusion is that "Americans have lost the desire to hold presidents accountable for their actions."
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