Kaiser, Frederick. Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 1 Apr. 2008. [Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32525.pdf] Kaiser, Frederick. Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 1 Apr. 2008. [Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32525.pdf]
"This report first describes the current select committees on intelligence and then covers the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, often cited as a model for a counterpart on intelligence. The study also sets forth proposed characteristics for a joint committee on intelligence, differences among these, and their pros and cons. The report ... also examines other actions and alternatives affecting congressional oversight in the field."
Kaiser, Frederick M. "GAO Versus the CIA: Uphill Battles against an Overpowering Force." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 330-389.
"From the CIA's perspective, GAO lacks independent statutory power to perform audits, evaluations, examinations, or reviews of the Agency, its personnel, operations, or activities.... In contrast, the GAO maintains that it possesses sufficient authority to conduct such audits and reviews but lacks the necessary enforcement powers to carry them out.... [T]he competition between GAO and the CIA has been one-sided and generally won by the Central Intelligence Agency."
Kaiser, Frederick M. A Joint Committee on Intelligence and Alternatives: Proposals and Options from the 9/11 Commission and Others. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 20 Dec. 2006. [Accessible at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32525.pdf]
"This report first describes the current select committees on intelligence and then covers the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The analysis then sets forth proposed characteristics for a Joint Committee on Intelligence, their differences, and their pros and cons. It also discusses alternatives for congressional oversight in the field."
Kane, Paul. "GAO Seeks Review of Spy Agencies: The Outgoing Chief Auditor Makes a Pitch on Capitol Hill." Washington Post, 7 Mar. 2008, A15. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Comptroller General David M. Walker, whose 10-year term concludes on 12 March 2008, "is again asking Congress to give the Government Accountability Office [GAO] the power to review the finances of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.... [T]he Justice Department issued a ruling in the early 1990s that restricted oversight of the CIA to House and Senate select committees on intelligence." Lawmakers and others question "whether the GAO is too closely aligned with the congressional majority and whether its investigators have the proper clearances to handle classified intelligence matters."
Writing to IAFIE members, Mark M. Lowenthal commented: "GAO has been sucking around the IC for years, trying to get in. Bad case of oversight envy. They could never articulate what they would bring, they just wanted in. I never understood the value add proposition." To which, J. Ransom Clark added: "I always figured that GAO's hots for the IC role was connected with bureaucratic politics -- expand your responsibilities, get more staff for the new responsibilities, get more dollars to pay staff and handle the new responsibilities, grow your empire. Sounds like a normal bureaucratic imperative to me." And Bart Bechtel noted: "GAO needs to examine itself. There is no oversight of this office anywhere near what already exists in the IC. GAO was a pass the buck exercise by Congress wanting to avoid its duty."
Knott, Stephen
F. "The Great Republican Transformation on Oversight." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13, no. 1 (Spring 2000):
49-63.
Knott develops the idea of "the abandonment by congressional Republicans of the prnciple of executive control of the nation's intelligence community.... [S]ince taking control of Congress in January 1995, Republican-dominated intelligence committees have strengthened the new oversight regime and displayed an aversion to executive secrecy that would make Frank Church proud....
"The [Anthony] Lake affair demonstrated in bold relief that the traditional Republican defense of the idea that the President should have his own national security 'team' had been abandoned by the party." And with regard to Newt Gingrich's "Iraq Liberation Act of 1998," "[i]n forcing the President to accept congressionally sponsored covert initiatives..., the Republicans have expanded the role of Congress in intelligence oversight to new, ill-defined, and dangerous levels."
Mazzetti, Mark, and Sheryl Gay Stolberg. "Wider Briefing for Lawmakers on Spy Efforts." New York Times, 18 May 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 17 May 2006, NSA Director Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander provided classified briefings to the full committee of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the adminsistration's "controversial domestic eavesdropping program."
Mazzetti, Mark, and Jeff Zeleny. "Next Chairman for Intelligence Opposed War." New York Times, 2 Dec. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Incoming House speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) has named Texas congressman Silvestre Reyes to be the next chairman of the House intelligence committee. Reyes is "a former Border Patrol agent and Vietnam combat veteran." He "voted against authorizing President Bush to go to war with Iraq." In September 2006, he "blasted the White House’s justifications for the National Security Agency wiretapping program." Reyes taks over "a committee that in recent years has become one of Congress’s most dysfunctional and partisan panels."
Murphy, George F. "Putting the Congressional Intelligence Genie Back in the Classified Bottle." Intelligencer 15, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007): 21-22.
Argues for a Joint Committee on Intelligence, modeled after Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
New York Times. "[Editorial:] Beware of Tinkering Lawmakers." 28 Aug. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"Underpinning the 9/11 commission's call to reform the nation's intelligence services is the parallel warning that Congress must reform itself. The commission called on Congress to junk its 17-committee jungle of jurisdictional fiefs, which have failed miserably in their responsibility of oversight.... [A]ny real attempt at oversight means Congress must stop signing blank checks for the Pentagon, which controls most of the annual $40 biillion intelligence budget in various secretive ledgers. For openers, the budget should be made public."
Ott, Marvin C. "Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 69-94. "Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight." In Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges, eds. Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline, 103-123. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004.
The author argues that while "the U.S. system of intelligence oversight by Congress has proven to be a viable solution to a tricky problem" over time, "the system requires a very special set of conditions to work.... [U]nder present circumstances, Senate-conducted intelligence oversight" no longer meets these conditions and is no longer viable.
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