Associated Press. "Michigander Picked to Lead Intelligence Panel." Washington Post, 26 Aug. 2004, A11. [http://www.washingtonpost.com] Associated Press. "Michigander Picked to Lead Intelligence Panel." Washington Post, 26 Aug. 2004, A11. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 25 August 2004, six-term congressman Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-MI) was picked to head the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Hoekstra has served on the committee since 2001.
Babington, Charles. "Hill Wary of Intelligence Oversight Changes: Lawmakers from Both Parties Resist Recommendations of 9/11 Commission." Washington Post, 12 Sep. 2004, A5. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Babington, Charles. "Senate Intelligence Panel Frayed by Partisan Infighting." Washington Post, 12 Mar. 2006, A9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The Senate intelligence committee, once a symbol of bipartisan oversight, is now so torn by partisan warfare that it can barely function in a time of sharp national debate over intelligence matters, according to several analysts, officials and past and current members."
Babington, Charles, and Dafna Linzer. "More Lawmakers to Be Privy to Classified Briefings." Washington Post, 17 May 2006, A7. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 16 May 2006, "the White House agreed to brief all 21 members of the House intelligence committee and all 16 of the Senate panel's members" on the administration's "antiterrorism efforts that include warrantless wiretaps of domestic phone calls and e-mails."
Barrett, David M. The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005.
DKR, AFIO WIN 33-05 (29 Aug. 2005), says that the author finds that "Congress was a firm, if not always wise, taskmaster in the agency’s early decades. The CIA was repeatedly criticized for Intel failures, harassed by budget cutters and witch hunts, and pressed by legislators to slant analysis on politically charged issues.... Barrett has written a trenchant study of Congressional oversight that is in sharp contrast to a widespread, popular image of the CIA."
For Scheuer, Washington Post, 27 Nov. 2005, this work is "is a triumph of research." Faced with "widely dispersed research materials," the author has "displayed sound analytic sense and balance in their use." Along the way, he provides "superb portraits and assessments of the key players."
Snider, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), finds that the author paints "a far richer picture" of the Congress-CIA relationship "than we had before. Intriguing tidbits are scattered throughout," and "almost every chapter reveals something that we did not quite appreciate before.... [T]he DCI and other senior CIA officials appeared far more often before congressional committees ... than was previously understood. In 1958, for example, DCI Dulles appeared a surprising 27 times before 16 different committees.... Still, as Barrett’s account documents, a great deal of what passed for oversight during this period was informal and less than rigorous."
To Platt, I&NS 22.4 (Aug. 2007), the author provides "a detailed, comprehensive, and highly persuasive examination of congressional oversight" of the CIA "during the early Cold War.... Barrett's lengthy, somewhat densely written tome convincingly demolishes the myth of congressional deference to and salutary neglect towards the CIA from its founding in 1947 to the Bay of Pigs debacle in 1961."
Nolen, IJI&C 21.1 (Spring 2008), lauds the author as "a master at culling the important details of secret history hidden in the dusty attic archives of America.... Barrett tells new tales of congressional oversight, reinterprets the old, and whets the appetite for more to come."
Barrett, David M. "An Early 'Year of Intelligence': CIA and Congress, 1958." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 468-501.
"If 1975 ... was a year of firestorms [for the CIA], 1958 might be characterized as a year of serious grassfires which led to persistent questioning in Congress of the CIA's competence." Events impacting on the CIA's relationship with Congress in 1958 included the fallout from the launching of Sputnik by the Soviet Union, Vice President's Nixon's trip to Venezuela, and the Iraqi coup.
Best, Richard A., Jr. Intelligence Estimates: How Useful to Congress? Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 21 Nov. 2006. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33733.pdf.
"In the past, Congress was not a principal consumer of NIEs but now appears increasingly interested in obtaining NIEs on key security issues despite or perhaps because of the experience with the 2002 Iraq NIE. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364) specifically requests a comprehensive NIE on Iran. Some observers assert, however, that public discussion on specific NIEs may not adequately reflect the process by which they are prepared or their inherent limitations."
Born, Hans, and Ian Leigh. Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies. Oslo, Norway: Parliament of Norway, 2005.
According to Lilliu, I&NS 21.4 (Aug. 2006), the authors "have drafted a concise manual, documenting legal standards for democratic accountability together with best practices and procedures for oversight. Their analysis is based on the legal frameworks of intelligence oversight from a variety of democratic countries."
Born, Hans, and Marina Caparini, eds. Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.
According to Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008), four Western (France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and five former Soviet bloc (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) countries are discussed; there are also articles discussing "the fundamental principles of oversight." Although this work "looks closely at what has been and what needs to be done, it does not address the practical problem of the qualifications of those doing the oversight."
Born, Hans, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh, eds. Who's Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2005.
From publisher: "The assembled authors ... bring together in one volume the rich experience of three decades of experimentation in intelligence accountability. Using a structured approach, they examine the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence systems of Argentina, Canada, Germany, Norway, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.... The contributors draw together the best practices into a framework for successful approaches to intelligence accountability, including a prescription for a model law."
Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), comments that "[t]he experiences of each nation provide an interesting mosaic of desired goals and problems of implementation.... It is a timely topic and worth the attention of all those who must deal with these issues everyday as well as the general public whose civil rights are affected when oversight is too robust or inadequate."
For Winn, Parameters, Summer 2006, this "valuable contribution ... addresses the central criteria that should be taken into account by any nation or international organization that hopes to place intelligence agencies under democratic supervision.... [T]he objectives are to ensure that intelligence and security agencies are insulated from political abuse, but not isolated from executive governance."
Brown, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), finds this work to be "a disappointment. Most of the material is dry and sometimes soporific. It is also biased toward the advocates of intelligence accountability," in that the "essays all address the positives of such a program, but not the negatives.... A debate format would have been much more appropriate..., and could have easily been accomplished by excluding numerous irrelevant and tedious essays."
To Jacoby, DIJ 16.2 (2007), this work "succeeds greatly as an informative source on the workings of current intelligence oversight systems." However, "[t]he reader is left wanting recommendations and commentary on the ethics of intelligence oversight."
Daugherty, William J. "Approval and Review of Covert Action Programs since Reagan." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 62-80.
"Since the Reagan years, the covert action approval and review processes have been such that (a) there is no possibility of a 'rogue' operation by the CIA, and (b) lawyers are present at every stage to insure that constitutional requirements, federal statutes, executive orders, and internal agency regulations are fully complied with."
Dewar, Helen. "Senate Names Intelligence Panel: Frist, Daschle Appoint 22 to Work on 9/11 Recommendations." Washington Post, 25 Aug. 2004, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 24 August 2004, "Senate leaders tapped 22 of the chamber's most powerful members to undertake the highly sensitive task" of reorganizing its intelligence and homeland security operations. The report of the Sept. 11 commission "described congressional oversight of intelligence and counterterrorism operations as 'dysfunctional' and said major changes are needed."
Glees, Anthony, and Philip H.J. Davies. "Intelligence, Iraq and the Limits of Legislative Accountability during Political Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2006): 848-883.
The authors use the inquiries of the UK's Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) into the issue of Iraq's possession/nonpossession of weapons of mass destruction to frame their discussion of the impact of political loyalties on the legislative oversight function. They conclude that "[a]s a means to provide reliable, trustworthy and hence legitimate and effective oversight,... the legislature and its committees are limited tools.... Legislative oversight ... needs to be combined with various forms of oversight such as independent, judicial and administrative arrangements."
Hulse, Carl. "House Democrats Planning New Intelligence Oversight." New York Times, 15 Dec. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Incoming House speaker Nancy Pelosi said on 14 December 2006 that "House Democrats would create a new ... select committee, which would include the lawmakers who set intelligence policy as well as those who oversee the intelligence budget.... The committee will review intelligence spending requests, conduct hearings, make financing recommendations and assess how the money is spent."
Johnson, Loch K. "The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern Intelligence Accountability." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 2 (Apr. 2008): 198-225.
This article proves to be both interesting and useful. As the author acknowledges, it only scatches the surface of the analysis to be done on how Congress has responded to the changed landscape left behind by the committee's work. Nonetheless, it is well worth a read. Johnson's "central thesis is that the Church Committee substantially strengthened the opportunities for lawmakers to keep tabs on America's hidden government, but that the level of rigor displayed by intelligence overseers in Congress has fallen below the expectations of the Committee's reformers in 1975."
Johnson, Loch K. "Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee." Public Administration Review 64, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2004): 3-14.
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