AFP. "A Third of Russian Diplomats in Sweden Are Spies, Swedish Intelligence Says." Telegraph (London), 18 Mar. 2015. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
Presenting the agency's annual security report, the chief counter-espionage analyst of Sweden's intelligence agency Saepo, Wilhelm Unge, told reporters that "'[o]f the Russian embassy's diplomatic staff, about one-third of them are not actually diplomats, they are in fact intelligence officers.'" Unge said "Russias Foreign Intelligence Service SVR, military intelligence GRU and the Federal Security Service FSB were all present in Sweden.... Saepo said the Russian presence in Sweden was aimed at acquiring cutting-edge technology and 'preparations for military operations against Sweden'."
1. "Intelligence in an Age of Transition -- The Case of Sweden." National Security and the Future 1, no. 2 (2000): 15-24.
2. "Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 ( 2006): 633-651.
From abstract: Despite a declared policy of non-alignment during the Cold War, Sweden "established security links with a number of Western powers, first of all Britain and the US.... Intelligence liaison was of crucial importance for the security of non-aligned Sweden, but also significant for the major Western powers in filling gaps in intelligence collection.... However, intelligence liaison contained policy dilemmas, some of a more general nature, some specific for a country with an overt policy of non-alignment."
Aid, Matthew M. "In the Right Place at the Right Time: US Signals Intelligence Relations with Scandinavia, 1945-1960." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 (Aug. 2006): 575-605.
From abstract: "US-Scandinavian intelligence relations in general, and Signals Intelligence (Sigint) relations in particular, during the period 1945 through 1960 were more extensive and complicated than had previously been believed.... This paper covers the quantity, quality, and types of intelligence information provided to the US by each of the Scandinavian nations [Norway, Denmark, and Sweden], demonstrating that the nature of US intelligence relations with these countries changed substantially as time went by."
Beckman, Bengt. Svenska Kryptobedrifter [Swedish Achievements in Cryptology]. Stockholm: Albert Bonniers förlag, 1996.
McKay, Cryptologia 23.3, notes that the author worked in the Swedish Sigint organization, the Defense Radio Institute (FRA). Beckman's book "is an excellent illustration of the best kind of popularization of a complex, technical subject."
Brodeur, Jean-Paul, Peter Gill, and Dennis Töllborg, eds. Democracy, Law and Security: Internal Security Services in Contemporary Europe. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.
Peake, Studies 47.3 (2003), notes that this work is "drawn from papers presented at two symposia in Gothenburg, Sweden, that compare intelligence services in 10 countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The various chapters look at historical, organizational, and political differences.... In most cases, very little has been published in English about the services discussed, and that enhances the book's importance. For students of intelligence, and especially counterintelligence, this is a very worthwhile contribution."
For Henderson, IJI&C 17.3, this work "provides useful background reference material on several less well-known European domestic security systems." However, "the index and bibliography ... are generally weak"; and the "collection lacks, except for Spain, organizational charts for the various national communities and individual services."
Davies, Philip H. J., and Kristian C. Gustafson, eds. Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013.
Heard, Studies 59.1 (Mar. 2015), calls this work "a remarkably ambitious, edited collection of essays on the intelligence activities and organizations of a dozen countries or regions of the world." The book is divided into two sections. "The first contains four studies of what might be called the 'deep history' of intelligence in ancient China, India, the Byzantine Empire..., and the Islamic world. The book's second section has chapters on contemporary intelligence issues in Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Japan, Ghana, Argentina, Sweden, and Finland."
Herring, Jan P. "Business Intelligence in Japan and Sweden: Lessons for the US." Journal of Business Strategy (Mar.-Apr. 1992): 44-48.
Inquirer. "The Practice of a Prophet." Studies in Intelligence 6, no. 4 (Fall 1962): A29-A41. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 83-92. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
The author recounts the story of Ernst Hilding Andersson, who spied for the Soviet Union against his native Sweden from 1949 to 1951. The focus is on tradecraft practices and the capture of Andersson because of "the ineptitude of an ill-trained young case officer sent out from Moscow."
Jacobsen, Alf R. "Scandinavia, Sigint and the Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 209-242.
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were all "deeply engaged in signals intelligence collection against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, albeit in great secrecy.... Available evidence suggests that Sweden, despite its neutrality, maintained a substantial clandestine Sigint sharing relationship with the US and Great Britain, particularly during the early stages of the Cold War."
Lillbacka, Ralf. "Was Olof Palme Killed by an Intelligence Agency?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 119-147.
The author's "findings are consistent with previous inquiries using a similar research design, suggesting a random opportunistic killing."
McKay, Craig G., and Bengt Beckman. Swedish Signal Intelligence 1900-1945. London: Frank Cass, 2002.
Hess, JIH 3.1, calls this "an important account about ... Sigint as it developed in a medium-sized, neutral country of Europe.... This definitive, exhaustive and illuminating account draws on the official archives notably from Sweden and provides new and surprising results.... The centrepiece of the study ... is the Sigint contribution to Sweden's neutrality in two world wars, particularly in the second.... [T]he book is well presented and thoroughly edited."
For Van Nederveen, Air & Space Power Journal 17.3 (Fall 2003), this "first authoritative account of Swedens SIGINT [is] both valuable and unique.... The authors are to be commended for their detailed, up-front explanation of SIGINT: how radio and telegraph coding was used between various countries and their diplomatic missions, what kinds of transmissions third parties could intercept, and the numerous tasks involved in decoding that data.... SIGINT books are rare, and this one is a must-read for intelligence professionals.... Historians interested in World War II may even have to reconsider some events of that war after reading this book."
Kruh, Cryptologia 27.2, calls this work "a definitive account of the evolution of Swedish signal intelligence between 1900 and 1945.... It is an interesting and surprisingly revealing source of European cryptology in the first half of the twentieth century." To Erskine, I&NS 18.3, the authors "have researched their subject thoroughly and know it well." The work "deals mainly with the collection and breaking of messages and the establishment and organisation of the various bodies which were responsible for Sigint. It contains comparatively little on analysing the resulting intelligence, or how it was used by policy makers."
Nilsson, Sam. Stalin's Baltic Fleet and Palm's T-Office: Two Sides in the Emerging Cold War 1946-1947. Stockholm: Swedish National Defense College, 2006.
Gardner, I&NS 22.2 (Apr. 2007), notes that this work deals with "Swedish naval intelligence in the early post-war years." The focus is on "the T-Office set up under Dr. Thede Palm," with "the task of considering potentially hostile naval forces." The author has produced "a thoughtful and thoroughly researched study dealing with a little known aspect of mid-twentieth century naval intelligence." However, it is narrowly focused and lacks "any significant insight outside its immediate area of study."
Petersson, Magnus. "The Scandinavian Triangle: Danish-Norwegian-Swedish Military Intelligence Cooperation and Swedish Security Policy during the First Part of the Cold War." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 ( 2006): 607-632.
From abstract: For Sweden, Scandinavian intelligence cooperation "represented an important part of the wider contacts with the West. Although military intelligence was important for Swedish security policy-making in some respects (e.g. military readiness), it did not have a significant influence in others (e.g. the politicians' threat perceptions). One important reason is the Swedish tradition of weak connections between the political and military leadership."
Pfalzer, Janina, and Toby Alder. "Bomb Blasts Pave Way for Surveillance as Swedes React to Terror." Bloomberg, 15 Dec. 2010. [http://www.bloomberg.com]
"Swedens brush with terror after a suicide bomber on Dec. 11 detonated himself before executing a planned strike in central Stockholm has eroded lawmaker resistance to pushing through tougher surveillance laws. The opposition Social Democrats will no longer block a government proposal to let the Swedish Security Service use information from the National Defense Radio Establishment, said Morgan Johansson, chairman of parliament's justice committee."
Weller, Geoffrey R.
1. "Political Scrutiny and Control of Scandinavia's Security and Intelligence Services." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 171-192.
The author covers the services of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
2. "Scandinavian Security and Intelligence, the European Union, WEU and NATO." Scandinavian Studies 70, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 70-86.
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