Carnier, Carmer, and Javier Marcos. Espias de Felipe II: Los servicios secretos del Imperio español. [Spies of Philip II: The Secret Services of the Spanish Empire] Madrid: La Esfera de los libros, 2005.
According to Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), "[t]his sumptuous book, with its numerous color plates, lays out the intelligence activities" of Philip II. The authors call the late 1500s "the golden age of espionage."
Hugon, Alain. Au Service du roi catholique: "Honorables ambassadeurs" et "Divins espions": Représentation diplomatique et service secret dans les relations hispano-françaises de 1598 a 1635. [In the Service of the Catholic King: "Honorable Ambassadors" and "Divine Spies": Diplomatic Representation and Secret Service in Hispano-French Relations from 1598 to 1635] Madrid: Casa de Velazquez, 2004.
According to Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), "[a]mong the many excellencies of this work are its data base of information about 240 spies and informers, with summaries of what is known about their persons and work."
Navarro Bonilla, Diego. Cartas entre espias e inteligencias secretas en la siglo de los validos (Juan de Torres-Gaspar Bonifaz, 1632-1638). [Letters between Spies and Secret Intelligence in the Century of the Validos (Juan de Torres-Gaspar Bonifaz, 1632-1638)] Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2007. [Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008)]
Pérez-Grueso, María Dolores Elizalde. "Los Servicios de Información Británicos en España durante la I Guerra Mundial." Revista de historia militar, Suppl. 3 (2005): 227-259.
Richardson, W.A.R. "An Elizabethan Pilot's Charts (1594): Spanish Intelligence Regarding the Coasts of England and Wales and the End of the XVIth Century." Journal of Navigation 53, no. 2 (2000): 313-327.
Storrs, Christopher. "Intelligence and the Formulation of Policy and Strategy in Early Modern Europe: The Spanish Monarchy in the Reign of Charles II (1665-1700)." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (Aug. 2006): 493-519.
From abstract: "There was nothing particularly distinctive about Spain's intelligence machinery. Nor was it always effective.... [However,] intelligence contributed to the remarkable resilience of the Spanish Monarchy in an age of supposed Spanish decline."
Salinas, David. Espionaje y Gastos en la Diplomacia Española (1663-1683): En sus documentos. [Espionage and Expenditures in Spanish Diplomacy (1663-1683): In Its Documents] Valladolid: Ambito, 1995.
Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), notes that the "documents come from the Archive of Simancas and deal with the Spanish embassies in Vienna, London, Genoa, and The Hague and the politico-military expenditures of four officials against the aggressive policy of Louis XIV of France."
Téllez Alarcia, Diego. "La misión secreta de D. Ricardo Wall en Londres (1747-1748)" [The secret mission of Don Ricardo Wall in London (1747-1748)]. Brocar: Cuadernos de investigación histórica 24 (2000): 49-72.
Belamendia, Zigor Ibernia, and Antonio M. Díaz Fernández. "The Basque Secret Service (1936-1945). International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 575-600.
Day, Peter. Franco's Friends: How British Intelligence Helped Bring Franco To Power In Spain. London: Biteback Publishing, 2011.
According to Peake, Studies 56.3 (Sep. 2012), the author shows that "British support for the Spanish monarchy involved more than political and military considerations -- it also surreptitiously furnished planes and other materials to Franco's government.... When the Second World War began, the British worked hard to keep Franco from siding with Hitler. Day explains the complex machinations -- from persuasion to bribery -- undertaken to achieve that end.... Day has drawn on primary source documents and interviews to tell this heretofore unknown story, and he tells it well."
Diaz, Antonio. "Spanish Intelligence During the Second Republic and the Civil War: 1931-1939." Journal of Intelligence History 6, no. 1 (Summer 2006). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
Frank, Willard C. "Politico-Military Deception at Sea in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 84-112.
In a contest with the two sides roughly balanced in fighting power, "[s]upply was the key to victory, and most of it had to come by sea." The focus here is on two aspects of deception: "(1) deception and maritime arms traffic and (2) clandestine naval intervention." The author finds that "German deception was the most successful of all, both in the supply effort and in clandestine submarine warfare, the result of favorable conditions, intense care and good luck."
Macklin, Graham D. "Major Hugh Pollard, MI6, and the Spanish Civil War." Historical Journal 49, no. 1 (2006): 277-280.
Navarro Bonilla, Diego. Derrotado, pero no Sorprendido: Reflexiones sobre la información secreta en tiempo de guerra. [Defeated but Not Surprised: Reflections on Secret Information in Wartime] Madrid: Plaza y Valdez Editores, 2007.
Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), notes that one chapter of this work "offers a conditional history of Republican intelligence during the Spanish civil war."
Nuñez de Prado y Clavel, Sara. Servicios de información y propaganda en la guerra civil española, 1936-1939. [Information and Propaganda Services in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939] Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1992. [Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008)]
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