OTHER COUNTRIES

Pakistan

2000 - 2009

Materials presented in chronological order..

Woodward, Bob, and Thomas E. Ricks. "CIA Trained Pakistani Commandos to Nab Bin Laden." Washington Post, 3 Oct. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to "people familiar with the operation," the CIA in 1999 "trained and equipped" some 60 commandos from the Pakistani intelligence agency to enter Afghanistan to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. "The operation was arranged by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his chief of intelligence.... The plan was aborted later that year when Sharif was ousted in a military coup."

Sipress, Alan, and Vernon Loeb. "CIA's Stealth War Centers on Eroding Taliban Loyalty and Aiding Opposition." Washington Post, 10 Oct. 2001, A1. "The CIA's Stealth War: U.S. Covert Efforts Include Winning the Loyalty of Taliban Defectors." Washington Poat National Weekly Edition, 15-21 Oct. 2001, 6.

According to administration officials, the CIA has launched an effort "in the parts of Afghanistan where the ruling Taliban is most deeply rooted in the local ethnic Pashtun community ... to win the loyalty of dissident Taliban commanders through the use of money or fear.... The success of this strategy could turn on the intelligence efforts and intimate cooperation of Pakistan.... That prospect received a crucial boost" on 7 October 2001 when Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf "ousted several influential intelligence and military leaders who remained close to the Taliban, most notably purging Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed of the Interservices Intelligence Agency."

Risen, James, and Judith Miller. "Pakistani Intelligence Had Links to Al Qaeda, U.S. Officials Say." New York Times, 29 Oct. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to U.S. officials, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) "has had an indirect but longstanding relationship with Al Qaeda.... The intelligence service even used Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to train covert operatives for use in a war of terror against India, the Americans say."

Frantz, Douglas. "Pakistan Ended Aid to Taliban Only Hesitantly." New York Times, 8 Dec. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"One month after the Pakistan government agreed to end its support of the Taliban, its intelligence agency [Inter-Services Intelligence] was still providing safe passage for weapons and ammunition to arm them, according to Western and Pakistani officials."

McGirk, Tim. "Has Pakistan Tamed Its Spies?" Time, 6 May 2002, 32-35.

It appears that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is cooperating in the U.S. war against terrorism. This "is quite a switch. Until Sept. 11, the organization was suspected of propping up the Taliban and by extension its al-Qaeda guests in Afghanistan."

Corera, Gordon. Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Kahn Network. London: Hurst, 2006.

This is the story of Pakistani national hero and worldwide nuclear proliferator. He was finally taken down in early 2004 -- at least, to the extent of being placed under house arrest by the Pakistani authorities. Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), finds that the author's "documentation is impressive.... How much damage Kahn did is a question yet to be answered. Corera's story is well told and of value to intelligence officers and students of national security."

Reuters. "Pakistan Appoints New Intel Chief." Gulfnews.com, 22 Sep. 2007. [http://gulfnews.com]

On 21 September 2007, General Pervez Musharraf "appointed Nadeem Taj as director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and promoted him from major-general to lieutenant-general. Taj was formerly the head of Military Intelligence."

Broad, William J., and David E. Sanger. "In Nuclear Net's Undoing, a Web of Shadowy Deals." New York Times, 25 Aug. 2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Swiss engineers, Friedrich Tinner and his two sons, have been accused of working with Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, "the Pakistani bomb pioneer-turned-nuclear black marketeer." However, interviews with current and former Bush administration officials point to "a clandestine relationship between the Tinners and the C.I.A." Several of these officials say that CIA operatives "paid the Tinners as much as $10 million" to supply "a flow of secret information that helped end Libya's bomb program, reveal Iran's atomic labors and, ultimately, undo Dr. Khan's nuclear black market."

Cameron-Moore, Simon. "Pakistan Changes ISI Chief." Reuters, 30 Sep. 2008. [http://www.reuters.com]

On 29 September 2008, Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani named Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shujaa Pasha, formerly head of military operations, Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), replacing Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj. Pasha "is expected to overhaul the ISI."

Schmitt, Eric, Mark Mazzetti, and Jane Perlez. "Pakistan's Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege." New York Times, 8 Dec. 2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-based group suspected of conducting the Mumbai attacks, "has quietly gained strength in recent years with the help of Pakistan's" Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). U.S. "officials say there is no hard evidence to link" ISI to the attacks. However, the officials said that "the ISI has shared intelligence with Lashkar and provided protection for it,... and investigators are focusing on one Lashkar leader they believe is a main liaison with the spy service and a mastermind of the attacks."

Warrick, Joby, and Karen DeYoung. "CIA Helped India, Pakistan Share Secrets in Probe of Mumbai Siege." Washington Post, 16 Feb. 2009, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"In the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, the CIA orchestrated back-channel intelligence exchanges between India and Pakistan, allowing the two former enemies to quietly share highly sensitive evidence while the Americans served as neutral arbiters, according to U.S. and foreign government sources familiar with the arrangement."

Coghlan, Tom, Zahid Hussain, and Jeremy Page. "Secrecy and Denial as Pakistan Lets CIA Use Airbase to Strike Militants." Times (London), 17 Feb. 2009. [http://www.timesonline.co.uk]

A Times investigation has found that the "CIA is secretly using" Shamsi airfield "in southern Pakistan to launch the Predator drones that observe and attack al-Qaeda and Taleban militants on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan.... Key to the Times investigation is the unexplained delivery of 730,000 gallons of F34 [JP8] aviation fuel to Shamsi. Details were found on the website of the Pentagon's fuel procurement agency."

DeYoung, Karen, and Joby Warrick. "Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan Will Continue, CIA Chief Says: Panetta Calls Strikes 'Successful' at Disrupting Insurgents." Washington Post, 26 Feb. 2009, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 25 February 2009, CIA Director Leon Panetta said in his first news briefing since taking the job that "U.S. aerial attacks against al-Qaeda and other extremist strongholds inside Pakistan would continue."

Scahill, Jeremy. "Blackwater's Secret War in Pakistan." The Nation, 23 Nov. 2009. [http://www.thenation.com]

"At a covert forward operating base run by the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, members of an elite division of Blackwater are at the center of a secret program in which they plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, 'snatch and grabs' of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan, an investigation by The Nation has found. The Blackwater operatives also assist in gathering intelligence and help direct a secret US military drone bombing campaign that runs parallel to the well-documented CIA predator strikes, according to a well-placed source within the US military intelligence apparatus."

Perlez, Jane. "Spy Chief in Pakistan to Stay On Another Year." New York Times, 10 Mar. 2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 10 March 2010, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani announced that Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha "has been granted an unusual one-year extension" in his position as director of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Wax, Emily, and Greg Miller. "Indian Report Accuses Pakistan's Intelligence Service of Significant Role in Mumbai Siege." Washington Post, 19 Oct. 2010. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to a classified Indian investigative report, "based primarily on the interrogation of David Coleman Headley," a Pakistani American who has pleaded guilty in U.S. federal court to helping plot the attack, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) "was far more involved in funding and orchestrating the 2008 Mumbai attacks than was previously believed." However, "that conclusion was disputed [on 19 October 2010] by U.S. intelligence officials, who said they saw no evidence to substantiate agency involvement."

Mazzetti, Mark, and Salman Massod. "Pakistani Role Is Suspected in Revealing U.S. Spy’s Name." New York Times, 17 Dec. 2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The CIA station chief in Islamabad left "the country on [16 December 2010] amid ... recriminations between American and Pakistani spies, with some American officials convinced that the officer's cover was deliberately blown" by Pakistan's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence. U.S. officials said the "station chief had received a number of death threats since being publicly identified in a legal complaint sent to the Pakistani police this week by the family of victims of earlier drone campaigns." See also, Karin Brulliard, "Pakistani Intelligence Official Denies Agency Role in Revealing Name of CIA Station Chief," Washington Post, 18 Dec. 2010.

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