OTHER COUNTRIES

Pakistan

Arif, Khalid Muhammad. Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997. Karachi: Oxford University Press 2001.

For Arazi, JIH 2.2, this book "provides some of the raw material" for a history of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), offering "tantalizingly illuminating glimpses into its modus operandi." However, the book "is mainly a memoir of a career in the Pakistani Army which brought [the author] the highest rank.... A staff officer with no specific intelligence training or experience, he was nevertheless closely involved in intelligence matters at the highest level, not least thanks to his close working relationship with [Zia ul-Haq's] powerful and long-serving ISI chief, General Akhtar Abd-ur-Rahman."

Ball, Desmond J. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in South Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (Ceylon). Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1996.

Broad, William J., and David E. Sanger. "In Nuclear Net's Undoing, a Web of Shadowy Deals." New York Times, 25 Aug. 2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Swiss engineers, Friedrich Tinner and his two sons, have been accused of working with Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, "the Pakistani bomb pioneer-turned-nuclear black marketeer." However, interviews with current and former Bush administration officials point to "a clandestine relationship between the Tinners and the C.I.A." Several of these officials say that CIA operatives "paid the Tinners as much as $10 million" to supply "a flow of secret information that helped end Libya's bomb program, reveal Iran's atomic labors and, ultimately, undo Dr. Khan's nuclear black market."

Cameron-Moore, Simon. "Pakistan Changes ISI Chief." Reuters, 30 Sep. 2008. [http://www.reuters.com]

On 29 September 2008, Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani named Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shujaa Pasha, formerly head of military operations, Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), replacing Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj. Pasha "is expected to overhaul the ISI."

Coghlan, Tom, Zahid Hussain, and Jeremy Page. "Secrecy and Denial as Pakistan Lets CIA Use Airbase to Strike Militants." Times (London), 17 Feb. 2009. [http://www.timesonline.co.uk]

A Times investigation has found that the "CIA is secretly using" Shamsi airfield "in southern Pakistan to launch the Predator drones that observe and attack al-Qaeda and Taleban militants on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan.... Key to the Times investigation is the unexplained delivery of 730,000 gallons of F34 [JP8] aviation fuel to Shamsi. Details were found on the website of the Pentagon's fuel procurement agency."

DeYoung, Karen, and Joby Warrick. "Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan Will Continue, CIA Chief Says: Panetta Calls Strikes 'Successful' at Disrupting Insurgents." Washington Post, 26 Feb. 2009, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 25 February 2009, CIA Director Leon Panetta said in his first news briefing since taking the job that "U.S. aerial attacks against al-Qaeda and other extremist strongholds inside Pakistan would continue."

Dhar, Maloy. Fulcrum of Evil: The ISI-CIA-Al Qaeda Nexus. New Delhi: Manas, 2006.

Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006), says that the author's "somewhat warped analysis [concerning the CIA] suggests care should be taken in accepting his statements about other players. But the book has real value, despite its lack of documentation.... As a view from inside India and Islam, this is ... important if not easy reading."

Frantz, Douglas. "Pakistan Ended Aid to Taliban Only Hesitantly." New York Times, 8 Dec. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"One month after the Pakistan government agreed to end its support of the Taliban, its intelligence agency [Inter-Services Intelligence] was still providing safe passage for weapons and ammunition to arm them, according to Western and Pakistani officials."

McGirk, Tim. "Has Pakistan Tamed Its Spies?" Time, 6 May 2002, 32-35.

It appears that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is cooperating in the U.S. war against terrorism. This "is quite a switch. Until Sept. 11, the organization was suspected of propping up the Taliban and by extension its al-Qaeda guests in Afghanistan."

Reuters. "Pakistan Appoints New Intel Chief." Gulfnews.com, 22 Sep. 2007. [http://gulfnews.com]

On 21 September 2007, General Pervez Musharraf "appointed Nadeem Taj as director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and promoted him from major-general to lieutenant-general. Taj was formerly the head of Military Intelligence."

Risen, James, and Judith Miller. "Pakistani Intelligence Had Links to Al Qaeda, U.S. Officials Say." New York Times, 29 Oct. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to U.S. officials, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) "has had an indirect but longstanding relationship with Al Qaeda.... The intelligence service even used Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to train covert operatives for use in a war of terror against India, the Americans say."

Roberts, Mark J. "Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State within a State?" Joint Force Quarterly 48 (1st Quarter 2008): 104-110.

"Is it possible to carry out effective, combined U.S.-Pakistani counterterrorism operations yet encourage structural reforms within Pakistan's security organs with any hope of success? While the easy answer is to continue the war on terror and maintain the status quo, ignoring Pakistan's structural deficiencies, this path of least resistance has potentially deadly ramifications."

Schmitt, Eric, Mark Mazzetti, and Jane Perlez. "Pakistan's Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege." New York Times, 8 Dec. 2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-based group suspected of conducting the Mumbai attacks, "has quietly gained strength in recent years with the help of Pakistan's main spy service," the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). "American officials say there is no hard evidence to link" ISI to the attacks. However, the officials said that "the ISI has shared intelligence with Lashkar and provided protection for it,... and investigators are focusing on one Lashkar leader they believe is a main liaison with the spy service and a mastermind of the attacks."

Sipress, Alan, and Vernon Loeb. "CIA's Stealth War Centers on Eroding Taliban Loyalty and Aiding Opposition." Washington Post, 10 Oct. 2001, A1. "The CIA's Stealth War: U.S. Covert Efforts Include Winning the Loyalty of Taliban Defectors." Washington Poat National Weekly Edition, 15-21 Oct. 2001, 6.

According to administration officials, the CIA has launched an effort "in the parts of Afghanistan where the ruling Taliban is most deeply rooted in the local ethnic Pashtun community ... to win the loyalty of dissident Taliban commanders through the use of money or fear.... The success of this strategy could turn on the intelligence efforts and intimate cooperation of Pakistan.... That prospect received a crucial boost" on 7 October 2001 when Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf "ousted several influential intelligence and military leaders who remained close to the Taliban, most notably purging Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed of the Interservices Intelligence Agency, which long served as the Taliban's patron."

Tirmazi, Syed A. T. [Brigadier] Profiles of Intelligence. Lahore, Pakistan: Fiction House, 1995.

According to Peake, Studies 50.4 (2006), the author served in Pakistan's Intelligence Bureau and Inter-Services Intelligence, retiring in 1985. The term "profiles" in the title refers to case summaries or studies. "Counterintelligence and security operation -- defections and agent recruitments -- are described" in each of the book's chapters. In an unexplained omission, "the chapter on the KGB in Pakistan is only five pages long and says little." Nonetheless, the "book is a valuable contribution."

Warrick, Joby, and Karen DeYoung. "CIA Helped India, Pakistan Share Secrets in Probe of Mumbai Siege." Washington Post, 16 Feb. 2009, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"In the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, the CIA orchestrated back-channel intelligence exchanges between India and Pakistan, allowing the two former enemies to quietly share highly sensitive evidence while the Americans served as neutral arbiters, according to U.S. and foreign government sources familiar with the arrangement."

Winchell, Sean P. "Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 374-388.

"Since partition, no political force within Pakistan has driven the nation's domestic and international political agenda as has its army, and more specifically, one of its intelligence units, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.... With the rise of President Musharraf, and Pakistan's strengthened relationship with the United States, enough pressure may now exist to afford Musharraf the opportunity to bring the ISI firmly under government control."

Woodward, Bob, and Thomas E. Ricks. "CIA Trained Pakistani Commandos to Nab Bin Laden." Washington Post, 3 Oct. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to "people familiar with the operation," the CIA in 1999 "trained and equipped" some 60 commandos from the Pakistani intelligence agency to enter Afghanistan to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. "The operation was arranged by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his chief of intelligence.... The plan was aborted later that year when Sharif was ousted in a military coup."

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