Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "The 1978 Battle of Larnaca Airport, Cyprus, and UK Diplomacy." Middle East Review of International Affairs 13, no. 2 (Jun. 2009): 95-104.1. Cyprus
2. Denmark
3. Estonia
4. Georgia
5. Ghana
6. Hong Kong
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "The 1978 Battle of Larnaca Airport, Cyprus, and UK Diplomacy." Middle East Review of International Affairs 13, no. 2 (Jun. 2009): 95-104.
In 1978, when Egypt tried to stage an Entebbe-style raid on terrorists at Larnaca airport, the Cypriot National Guard opened fire on the Egyptian forces, "killing 15 commandos and destroying their C-130H transport.... The conclusion of this forgotten crisis may be relevant to today's war on terrorism strategy; no matter how weak a country is considered, no matter how high the terrorist threat might be, states planning a foreign intervention should obtain the agreement of the sovereign government first."
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "British Intelligence and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955-1959." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 375-394.
"The British services had very good intelligence on the EOKA organization, methods, tactics, and operations.... Tactical intelligence on the whereabouts of the guerrilla leaders was, however, hard to come by.... [T]he guerrillas were able to maintain the military and political initiative."
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "The Special Operations Executive and Cyprus in the Second World War." Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 2 (Mar. 2009): 315-328.
"Poor co-ordination between the SOE and the 25th Army Corps was the main aspect of the SOE story in Cyprus. Regular staff officers did not believe in guerrilla warfare and it seems that the SOE officers did not successfully defend their role within the overall strategy on Cyprus. Besides, distrust of the Cypriots was so profound that the British plan was encapsulated in the phrase 'let the Germans first invade and then we will train our guerrillas.'"
U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Gen. ed., David S. Patterson. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968.
Vol. XVI. Ed., James E. Miller. Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Washington, DC: GPO, 2000. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/.
Claick for material on the Danish Resistance in World War II.
Aid, Matthew M. "In the Right Place at the Right Time: US Signals Intelligence Relations with Scandinavia, 1945-1960." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 (Aug. 2006): 575-605.
From abstract: "US-Scandinavian intelligence relations in general, and Signals Intelligence (Sigint) relations in particular, during the period 1945 through 1960 were more extensive and complicated than had previously been believed.... This paper covers the quantity, quality, and types of intelligence information provided to the US by each of the Scandinavian nations [Norway, Denmark, and Sweden], demonstrating that the nature of US intelligence relations with these countries changed substantially as time went by."
Hansen, Peer Henrik. "'Upstairs and Downstairs' -- The Forgotten CIA Operations in Copenhagen." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 685-701.
Outlines the activities of "The Firm," an anticommunist group formed by former Resistance fighters in Denmark in the aftermath of World War II. From 1952 to 1959, the group maintained an "eavesdropping operation" in the apartment of the depauty chairman of the Danish Communist Party. The take was shared with the CIA.
Jacobsen, Alf R. "Scandinavia,
Sigint and the Cold War." Intelligence and National Security
16, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 209-242.
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were all "deeply engaged in signals intelligence collection against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, albeit in great secrecy.... Available evidence suggests that Sweden, despite its neutrality, maintained a substantial clandestine Sigint sharing relationship with the US and Great Britain, particularly during the early stages of the Cold War."
Petersson, Magnus. "The Scandinavian Triangle: Danish-Norwegian-Swedish Military Intelligence Cooperation and Swedish Security Policy during the First Part of the Cold War." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 ( 2006): 607-632.
From abstract: For Sweden, Scandinavian intelligence cooperation "represented an important part of the wider contacts with the West. Although military intelligence was important for Swedish security policy-making in some respects (e.g. military readiness), it did not have a significant influence in others (e.g. the politicians' threat perceptions). One important reason is the Swedish tradition of weak connections between the political and military leadership."
Philipsen, Ingeborg. "Out of Tune: The Congress for Cultural Freedom in Denmark, 1953-1960." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 237-253.
The author notes that the formation of the Society for Freedom and Culture "was an all-Danish initiative," not the result of activities by the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). Even when the CCF Secretariat tried to take a more active role with the national committee, controlling the Danish committee was not an easy task -- or perhaps was an impossible proposition.
Weller, Geoffrey R.
1. "Political Scrutiny and Control of Scandinavia's Security and Intelligence Services." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 171-192.
The author covers the services of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
2. "Scandinavian Security and Intelligence, the European Union, WEU and NATO." Scandinavian Studies 70, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 70-86.
Tanner, Jari. "Estonian Official Convicted of Treason in Spy Case." Associated Press, 25 Feb. 2009. [http://www.ap.com]
On 25 February 2009, an Estonian court convicted Herman Simm, former head of security at the Estonian Defense Ministry, of having passed "domestic and NATO secrets to Russia" from at least 1995 until his arrest in 2008.
Goble, Paul. "The War Behind the War: Russian and Georgian Intelligence Agencies Join Battle." Intelligencer 17, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2009): 7-9.
"Before, during and after the five-day war in Caucasus, the intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia played significant roles in the decisions and actions of their respective governments."
Lefebvre, Stéphane, and Roger N. McDermott. "Intelligence Aspects of the 2008 Conflict Between Russia and Georgia." Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22, no. 1, (2009): 4-19.
"Georgia's underestimation of the strength and overall military capabilities of the Russian armed forces as well as the planning and force of the Russian response, lack of Western intervention, even what has been referred to Saakashvili's 'gamble' in the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali, may all reflect in some measure the failures and systemic weakness of Georgian intelligence. These factors will prove important in any remedying undertaken by the government in Tbilisi, and will need to be understood by [NATO] as it considers how best to assist in efforts to enhance the security capabilities of post-conflict Georgia."
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. "North Ossetian Court Sentences Georgian on Spy Charges." 14 Sep. 2009. [http://www.rferl.org]
The Supreme Court in the Russian republic of North Ossetia has sentenced Aleksandr Khachirov to seven years in jail or being a Georgian spy. Khachirov was charged "with disclosing information about the location of Russian military forces within North Ossetia and the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia."
RIA Novosti. "Russian Army Officer Gets 6 Years in Jail for Spying for Georgia." 28 Aug. 2009. [http://en.rian.ru]
On 28 August 2009, a Russian military court sentenced Lt. Col. Mikhail Khachidze, a deputy unit commander in the North Caucasus Military District, to "six years in prison for high treason and espionage and stripped him of his rank." Khachidze was arrested in August 2008; an investigation showed that he "was recruited by Georgian military intelligence in October 2007 and had been passing them military secrets."
Tass. "Russian Officer Convicted for Espionage in Favour of Georgia." 16 Oct. 2009. [http://www.itar-tass.com]
On 16 October 2009, the North Caucasian district court martial sentenced Sergeant Major Dzhemal Nakaidze "to nine years of imprisonment in a maximum-security penal colony for espionage in favour of Georgia.... The investigators established that Nakaidze's spying had lasted from July 9 to November 25, 2008."
Quantson, Kofi Bentum. Ghana: National Security -- The Dilemma. 2d ed. Accra, Ghana: NAPASVIL Ventures, 2006.
Henderson, IJI&C 20.3 (Fall 2007), notes that the author is a "long-time Ghanaian national security practitioner." Although this book is "well drafted, it has been written principally for a local audience," which means it may be difficult for someone not familiar with Ghanaian affairs.
Rathbone, Richard. "Police Intelligence in Ghana in the later 1940s and 1950s." Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21, no. 3 (Sep. 1993): 107-128.
Lombardo, Johannes
R. "A Mission of Espionage, Intelligence and Psychological Operations:
The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64." Intelligence and
National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 64-81.
Hong Kong "became a very important location for American intelligence operations and propaganda policy in Asia.... [S]ome of the American Consulate's activities ... at this time put a strain on the Anglo-American relationship."
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