Nair, K. Sankaran. Inside IB and RAW: The Rolling Stone that Gathered Moss. New Delhi: Manas, 2008.
According to Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), the author "served as a head of R&AW ... for less than 3 months in the 1970s.[footnote omitted] He spent more time in the IB, and the book has some interesting stories about his attempts in the 1960s to advise recently formed African nations about security services." Mostly, however, he focuses on "personal episodes and dealings with his superiors that are of no great intelligence value." This memoir "is primarily of local interest and a minor contribution to the intelligence literature."
Parihar, Sunil S. [Lt. Col.] India's Spy Agencies: Shaken Not Stirred. New Delhi: Manas, 2012
For Peake, Studies 57.3 (Sep 2013), and Intelligencer 20.2 (Fall-Winter 2013), this work "is a somewhat disjointed account of an important topic by a firsthand participant."
Pathak, D.C. Intelligence: A Security Weapon. New Delhi: Manas, 2003.
Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), notes that this is "the first book published by a former director of India's Intelligence Bureau, the organization responsible for domestic security." However, the author's approach is "normative -- how things should work --" rather than "a functional description of how intelligence actually operates." This "is a thoughtful book that provides an idealistic view of how the author hopes the Indian intelligence services practice their profession."
Pullin, Eric D. "'Money Does Not Make Any Difference to the Opinions That We Hold': India, the CIA, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 195158." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2 & 3 (Apr.-Jun. 2011): 377-398.
From Abstract: "During the 1950s, the United States conducted both overt and covert propaganda activities in India.... [D]omestic opposition composed primarily of members of the Praja Socialist Party worked closely with US-backed groups, in particular the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, to generate a political alternative to the ruling Congress party. Although receiving covert money from the Americans, these Indians did not believe that foreign money determined or shaped their opinions. On the other hand, their close association with the Americans undermined their claims to represent a legitimate domestic opposition."
Raman, B. Intelligence: Past, Present and Future. New Delhi: Lancer, 2002.
Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), says that the author "presents a survey of Indian intelligence from colonial times ... to the present.... His approach is topical, covering all elements of modern intelligence." This "is a text book by an experienced intelligence officer who certainly understands the fundamental elements of the profession and provides a framework for successful operations, not only in India, but in any democratic society."
Raman, B. The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane. New Delhi: Lancer, 2007.
Clark comment: The reference in the title is to Rameshwar Nath Kao, the first chief of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), India's foreign intelligence service.
Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), notes that the author "tells about India's struggle to develop a full range of intelligence service capabilities while at war with Pakistan and China and while managing conflicts among religious factions and dealing with tribal disputes on its borders.... Raman does not provide operational detail in terms of tradecraft or case studies." The book "gives a good high-level overview of the formation, evolution, and current status of the Indian intelligence services."
For Arpin, NWCR 61.3 (Summer 2008), the author's "informal (and somewhat unfocused) memoir ... provides an interesting view from India on critical past and current U.S. policies." Raman "outlines several instances of R&AW working with the CIA to counter Chinese moves, while at the same time claiming that the CIA was working against India -- sometimes with Pakistan, sometimes not.... While expressing a fondness for the American people, Raman is definitely no fan of the U.S. State Department. Curiously, he displays no animosity for the CIA, despite his claims that the agency engineered a key defection and conducted 'psywar' campaigns against India."
Schmitt, Eric, Mark Mazzetti, and Jane Perlez. "Pakistan's Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege." New York Times, 8 Dec. 2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-based group suspected of conducting the Mumbai attacks, "has quietly gained strength in recent years with the help of Pakistan's" Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). U.S. "officials say there is no hard evidence to link" ISI to the attacks. However, the officials said that "the ISI has shared intelligence with Lashkar and provided protection for it,... and investigators are focusing on one Lashkar leader they believe is a main liaison with the spy service and a mastermind of the attacks."
Shaffer, Ryan. "Unraveling India's Foreign Intelligence: The Origins and Evolution of the Research and Analysis Wing." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 252-289.
Sheikh, Danish. Locating India's Intelligence Agencies in a Democratic Framework. New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2011.
According to Peake, Studies 56.4 (Dec. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.3 (Winter-Spring 2013), the author argues that India's three intelligence agencies, which function without a statutory charter, should be put under parliamentary oversight.
Shrivastava, Manoj. Re-energising Indian Intelligence. New Delhi: Vij Books, 2013.
Peake, Studies 58.2 (Jun. 2014), finds that the autjor "presents a useful analysis of contemporary Indian intelligence organizations with sensible suggestions for meeting the demands of a rapidly changing international and technological environment."
Singh, M.K. Indian Intelligence: Missing in Action. Delhi, India: Prashant Publishing House, 2012.
Peake, Studies 57.1 (Mar. 2013), says that in the absence of source notes, this book "must be used with caution. But for those interested in studying foreign intelligence services from an organizational and operational perspective, it provides a good starting point."
Singh, V.K. [Maj. Gen.] Indias External Intelligence: Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). New Delhi, India: Manas, 2007.
Peake, Studies 51.4 (2007), comments that the author gives us "insightful views of India's intelligence community that are worthy of serious attention and have much in common with the services of other democratic nations."
Sinha, Deepak [Brig.]. Beyond The Bayonet: Indian Special Operations Forces in the 21st Century. Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2006.
From publisher: "India has had extensive experience with [Special Operations Forces] with different Services and ministries having a vast array of such forces with no national perspective for the raising or employment of such forces. This study addresses these very aspects along with their relevance ... and suggests the way forward."
Times of India. "New RAW Chief Expert on Pak, China." 15 Dec. 2000. [http://www. timesofindia.com]
On 14 December 2000, the Indian government announced the appointment of senior security official Vikram Sood as the new chief of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the country's external intelligence agency. He will succeed A.S. Dulat who retires on 31 December. Sood comes to the position from the Indian Police Service (IPS). Security experts say that Sood "has considerable expertise on Pakistan and China."
Vaughn, Bruce. "The Use and Abuse of Intelligence Services in India." Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 1 (Jan. 1993): 1-22.
Warrick, Joby, and Karen DeYoung. "CIA Helped India, Pakistan Share Secrets in Probe of Mumbai Siege." Washington Post, 16 Feb. 2009, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"In the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, the CIA orchestrated back-channel intelligence exchanges between India and Pakistan, allowing the two former enemies to quietly share highly sensitive evidence while the Americans served as neutral arbiters, according to U.S. and foreign government sources familiar with the arrangement."
Wax, Emily, and Greg Miller. "Indian Report Accuses Pakistan's Intelligence Service of Significant Role in Mumbai Siege." Washington Post, 19 Oct. 2010. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to a classified Indian investigative report, "based primarily on the interrogation of David Coleman Headley," a Pakistani American who has pleaded guilty in U.S. federal court to helping plot the attack, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) "was far more involved in funding and orchestrating the 2008 Mumbai attacks than was previously believed." However, "that conclusion was disputed [on 19 October 2010] by U.S. intelligence officials, who said they saw no evidence to substantiate agency involvement."
Weiner, Myron. "India's New Political Institutions." Asian Survey 16, no. 9 (Sep. 1976): 898-901.
Included is brief mention of new centralized intelligence organization.
Windmiller, Marshall. "A Tumultuous Time: OSS and Army Intelligence in India, 1942-1946." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 105-124.
Army G-2 was the first U.S. intelligence organization in India, in the form of a Military Observer Group (the "Osmun Group") in February 1942. Establishment of an OSS contingent was slowed by British intelligence objections. In April 1942, OSS activated Detachment 101, but its activities were directed toward Burma. Gandhi launched the "Quit India" movement in August 1942 -- tumult followed, along with British concerns that the Americans would use their intelligence activities against British interests in India. Agreement for OSS to operate in India was not reached until August 1943. Problems with the British were compounded by turf wars among the Americans themselves. Nonetheless, it is clear that OSS from early on violated the British-American agreement and gathered intelligence in India.
Yadav, R.K. Mission R&AW. New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2014.
Shaffer, Studies 58.4 (Dec. 2014), notes that the author is "a former R&AW [Research and Analysis Wing] officer who joined the agency in 1973.... Ultimately, Yadav has tried to do too much with this book. He might have done better had he focused on his own first-hand experience in R&AW rather than retelling second or third-hand claims. Even so, the book contains insight into a rarely-written-about agency and discusses events that are of interest to scholars."
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