OTHER COUNTRIES

India

Indian intelligence and security organizations include the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the civilian external intelligence organization that is part of the Prime Minister's Cabinet Secretariat; the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the internal security organization that is part of the Home Affairs Ministry; as many as a dozen organizations that are engaged in Sigint activities; and various military intelligence organizations.

Ali, Salamat. "The Imperfect Spies." Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 Jan. 1989, 18-19.

ProQuest: "India's intelligence agencies have had less than wonderful success. Woefully underequipped from the beginning, India's intelligence agencies are only just achieving some moderate level of efficiency."

Balachandran, V. "Intelligible Intelligence: An Alchemy of Collation & Coordination." The Times of India, 21 Sep. 2000. [http://www.timesofindia.com]

The author is a former Special Secretary in the Indian Cabinet Secretariat. Here, he argues for stronger central coordination of Indian intelligence, for clear charters for the Indian intelligence agencies, for the Indian government to seek to learn from the Brown Commission Report of 1996 in the United States, and for upgrading of India's technical collection capability.

Ball, Desmond J. "Signals Intelligence in India." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 3 (Jul. 1995): 377-407.

Ball notes that the British began signals intelligence operations in India early this century. He reviews briefly British activities in India, the future Pakistan, and Ceylon in World War II.

"Cooperation with the US with respect to some specific but very important Sigint activities was established in the early 1960s, after the war with China in October-November 1962. In 1962-63 the CIA funded the construction of a base at Charbatia ... which was used for airborne intelligence ... operations against China.... In early 1964 India agreed to a US proposal to install, in the Himalayas, remotely-operated telemetry intelligence (Telint) devices.... In 1969 the United States established a large Sigint station in north India" to replace the station at Peshawar closed in July 1969 by the Pakistanis.

"In the early 1970s the Soviet Union established two Sigint stations in Punjab."

Ball reviews the organizational structure of the Indian signals intelligence establishment. He believes that the performance of Indian Sigint "at the strategic level has been consistently poor." On the other hand, tactical-level signals intelligence "has been fairly good.... The principal reason for the relatively poor performance of the Indian Sigint establishment ... is the lack of any comprehensive Sigint policy and coordination machinery." He also regards Indian communications security (Comsec) as a "significant weak link" in signals intelligence activities. Ball concludes that "overall, the cost-effectiveness of India's Sigint activities must be reckoned to be fairly low."

Ball, Desmond J. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in South Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka (Ceylon). Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1996.

Kruh, Cryptologia 21.1, finds that this "slim volume ... hold[s] a voluminous amount of information on signals intelligence in South Asia." The author covers intelligence establishments, organizational aspects, facilities, capabilities, and efficiency and effectiveness.

Dhar, Maloy Krishna. Open Secrets: India’s Intelligence Unveiled. New Delhi: Manas, 2005.

Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), comments that whether the author "has got it exactly right is difficult to say since he provides no documentation." What he offers "is a professional intelligence officer’s view of India’s intelligence organizations based on his observations during a 29-year career. The central theme of the book is that legislative oversight of the organizations, which are subordinate only to the executive branch, has long been needed.... Dhar retired in 1995 after being passed over ... for the top position in the [Intelligence Bureau], and he is critical of the man who got the job -- D.C. Pathak.... But this doesn’t distract from the unique look Open Secrets provides into India’s intelligence services."

Kashmeri, Zuhair, and Brian McAndrew. Soft Target: How the Indian Intelligence Service Penetrated Canada. Toronto: James Lorimer, 1989.

Hannant, I&NS 5.1, notes that the "conventional wisdom" is that militant Sikhs were responsible for the bombing of Air India Flight 182 in 1985. The authors of Soft Target blame the Indian government, although they do "not offer irrefutable proof" of their thesis. Nevertheless, they do paint a "disturbing portrait of the Canadian and Indian intelligence agencies."

Kohli, M.S., and Kenneth Conboy. Spies in the Himalayas: Secret Missions and Perilous Climbs. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2003.

Umansky, Washington Post, 16 Mar. 2003, notes that this book tells the "repeatedly jaw-dropping" story of the efforts of "a joint team of the best American and Indian mountain climbers" to plant high in the Himalayas a device to monitor Chinese nuclear tests. Kohli led the Indian half of the expedition.

For Goodman, I&NS 18.4, this "is effectively a memoir" of Kohli's experiences. It "is a very readable and very enjoyable account of a hitherto heavily classified mission."

Wales, H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews, May 2003 [http://www.h-net.org], says that this "is not a particularly scintillating read," as it is burdened with "plodding prose." In addition, "the story is narrowly focused and there is little historiographic background.... Nevertheless, there are several vignettes in Spies that will fascinate students of intelligence history."

Mullik, Bhola Nath. Chinese Betrayal: My Years With Nehru. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971.

The author headed the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB) under Nehru until 1964.

Nair, K. Sankaran. Inside IB and RAW: The Rolling Stone that Gathered Moss. New Delhi: Manus, 2008.

According to Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), the author "served as a head of R&AW ... for less than 3 months in the 1970s.[footnote omitted] He spent more time in the IB, and the book has some interesting stories about his attempts in the 1960s to advise recently formed African nations about security services." Mostly, however, he focuses on "personal episodes and dealings with his superiors that are of no great intelligence value." This memoir "is primarily of local interest and a minor contribution to the intelligence literature."

Pathak, D.C. Intelligence: A Security Weapon. New Delhi: Manas, 2003.

Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), notes that this is "the first book published by a former director of India’s Intelligence Bureau, the organization responsible for domestic security." However, the author's approach is "normative -- how things should work --" rather than "a functional[] description of how intelligence actually operates." This "is a thoughtful book that provides an idealistic view of how the author hopes the Indian intelligence services practice their profession."

Raman, B. Intelligence: Past, Present and Future. New Delhi: Lancer, 2002.

Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), says that the author "presents a survey of Indian intelligence from colonial times ... to the present.... His approach is topical, covering all elements of modern intelligence." This "is a text book by an experienced intelligence officer who certainly understands the fundamental elements of the profession and provides a framework for successful operations, not only in India, but in any democratic society."

Raman, B. The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane. New Delhi: Lancer, 2007.

The reference in the title is to Rameshwar Nath Kao, the first chief of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), India’s foreign intelligence service.

Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), notes that the author "tells about India’s struggle to develop a full range of intelligence service capabilities while at war with Pakistan and China and while managing conflicts among religious factions and dealing with tribal disputes on its borders.... Raman does not provide operational detail in terms of tradecraft or case studies." The book "gives a good high-level overview of the formation, evolution, and current status of the Indian intelligence services."

Singh, V.K. [Maj. Gen.] India’s External Intelligence: Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). New Delhi, India: Manas, 2007.

Peake, Studies 51.4 (2007), comments that the author gives us "insightful views of India’s intelligence community that are worthy of serious attention and have much in common with the services of other democratic nations."

Times of India. "New RAW Chief Expert on Pak, China." 15 Dec. 2000. [http://www. timesofindia.com]

On 14 December 2000, the Indian government announced the appointment of senior security official Vikram Sood as the new chief of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the country's external intelligence agency. He will succeed A.S. Dulat who retires on 31 December. Sood comes to the position from the Indian Police Service (IPS). Security experts say that Sood "has considerable expertise on Pakistan and China."

Vaughn, Bruce. "The Use and Abuse of Intelligence Services in India." Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 1 (Jan. 1993): 1-22.

Weiner, Myron. "India's New Political Institutions." Asian Survey 16, no. 9 (Sep. 1976): 898-901.

Included is brief mention of new centralized intelligence organization.

Windmiller, Marshall. "A Tumultuous Time: OSS and Army Intelligence in India, 1942-1946." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 105-124.

Army G-2 was the first U.S. intelligence organization in India, in the form of a Military Observer Group (the "Osmun Group") in February 1942. Establishment of an OSS contingent was slowed by British intelligence objections. In April 1942, OSS activated Detachment 101, but its activities were directed toward Burma. Gandhi launched the "Quit India" movement in August 1942 -- tumult followed, along with British concerns that the Americans would use their intelligence activities against British interests in India. Agreement for OSS to operate in India was not reached until August 1943. Problems with the British were compounded by turf wars among the Americans themselves. Nonetheless, it is clear that OSS from early on violated the British-American agreement and gathered intelligence in India.

Return to Other Countries Table of Contents