For materials specific to the 1973 war, see Israel/Surprise.
1. Prior to 2000
2. 1973 War
3. From 2000
1. Prior to 2000
Bar-Joseph, Uri. "Israel Caught Unawares: Egypt's Sinai Surprise of 1960." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 203-219.
The author describes the "Rotem" crisis of February-March 1960, arising out of the massive and surprise Egyptian build up of its forces in the Sinai, as "a missing link in the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as in the study of strategic surprises." The article seeks to bridge this gap "by offering a detailed description and analysis of the intelligence aspects of this episode." See also, Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (New York: SUNY Press, 1998), 43-44.
Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "The 1978 Battle of Larnaca Airport, Cyprus, and UK Diplomacy." Middle East Review of International Affairs 13, no. 2 (Jun. 2009): 95-104.
In 1978, when Egypt tried to stage an Entebbe-style raid on terrorists at Larnaca airport, the Cypriot National Guard opened fire on the Egyptian forces, "killing 15 commandos and destroying their C-130H transport.... The conclusion of this forgotten crisis may be relevant to today's war on terrorism strategy; no matter how weak a country is considered, no matter how high the terrorist threat might be, states planning a foreign intervention should obtain the agreement of the sovereign government first."
Kahana, Ephraim. Ashraf Marwan: Israel's Most Valuable Spy: How the Mossad Recruited Nasser's Own Son-in-Law. Lewiston, NY: Mellon Press, 2010.
For Peake, Studies 55.3 (Sep. 2011), "[t]he really important question of Marwan's true allegiance as an agent remains unanswered." This book "is a good case summary of what is already known, nothing more."
Rathmell, Andrew. "Brotherly Enemies: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Egyptian Intelligence Axis, 1954-1967." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 230-253.
This is the story "of allied services whose ties helped bring about a union between their two states. However, after the collapse of the union the services concentrated their energies on attacking each other."
Sheffy, Yigal. "Unconcern at Dawn, Surprise at Sunset: Egyptian Intelligence Appreciation Before the Sinai Campaign, 1956." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 7-56.
The author notes that Egyptian President Nasser had received recent early warnings of an Israeli attack, yet was shocked when the attack began on 29 October 1956 and was surprised yet again when the British and French entered the fray. The question, then, is, "Why?" Sheffy finds the answer rooted in "almost universal failures in judgement at [the] national level which give rise to mistaken intelligence appreciations. Such failures are based at first on fixed perceptions and preconceptions, gather strength with the adaptation of information to the conception, and finally fall victim to the enemy's deception stories."
For information on the Israeli deception plan, see Michael Handel, "Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab Israeli Wars," in Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, eds. Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, 111-122 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984).
2. 1973 War
3. From 2000
Denyer, Simon. "Egypt's Former Spy Chief Omar Suleiman, 76, Dies in Cleveland." Washington Post, 19 Jul. 2012. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to the Egyptian government, former head of Egypt's national security intelligence agency Omar Suleiman, a trusted adviser of ousted president Hosni Mubarak and a key CIA partner in the Middle East, died" on 19 July 2011 at the Cleveland Clinic.
Ignatius, David. "The Future of Egypt's Intelligence Service." Washington Post, 11 Nov. 2013. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The U.S.-Egyptian relationship has been through some rocky months since the June 30 military coup that toppled President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. But, according to Gen. Mohammed Farid el-Tohamy, the director of Egypt's General Intelligence Service, "the strain doesn't seem to have diminished cooperation between the two countries' intelligence services."
Sheridan, Mary Beth, and Joby Warrick. "Mubarak Resignation Throws into Question U.S.-Egyptian Counterterrorism Work." Washington Post, 13 Feb. 2011. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The ouster of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak puts into question the future of the decades-long cooperation between U.S. and Egyptian intelligence agencies in counterterrorism operations. "Some U.S. officials and analysts say they are not overly worried, noting the continued strong role of the Egyptian military and the fact that the United States gives Egypt more than $1.3 billion a year in military aid." Robert Grenier, former head of the CIA's counterterrorism center and now chairman of the consulting firm of ERG Partners, "predicted the relationship would continue even if the Muslim Brotherhood controlled the next government."
Sirrs, Owen L. A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910-2009. London: Routledge, 2010. 2011. [pb]
Peake, Studies 55.1 (Mar. 2011) and Intelligencer 19.1 (Winter-Spring 2012), says that this "fine, well-documented voume ... adds significantly to public knowledge" of the Egyptian intelligence service.
Return to Other Countries Table of Contents