Caroz,
Yaakov. The Arab Secret Services. London: Transworld, 1978.
1. General
2. Bahrain
3. Egypt
4. Jordan
5. Lebanon
6. Morocco
7. Oman
8. Palestinians
9. Syria
Caroz,
Yaakov. The Arab Secret Services. London: Transworld, 1978.
Wilcox: "Covers the intelligence services of the major Arab powers."
Handel,
Michael I. "Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab Israeli Wars." In
Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, eds.
Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, 111-122. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Books, 1984.
This article includes information on the Israeli deception plan prior to the Sinai Campaign in 1956.
O'Ballance,
Edgar. Electronic War in the Middle East, 1968-70. Hamden, CT: Shoe String Press, 1974. [Wilcox]
Tadmor,
Joshua. Silent Warriors: The Dramatic Story of the Men and Women, Israeli
and Arab Secret Agents in the Middle East from World War II to the Present.
New York: Macmillan, 1969. [Chambers]
Allen, Robin. "Bahrain
Spy Chief Replaced." Financial Times, 20 Feb. 1998, 8.
For materials specific to the 1973 war, see Israel/Surprise.
Bar-Joseph, Uri. "Israel Caught Unawares: Egypt's Sinai Surprise of 1960." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 203-219.
The author describes the "Rotem" crisis of February-March 1960, arising out of the massive and surprise Egyptian build up of its forces in the Sinai, as "a missing link in the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as in the study of strategic surprises." The article seeks to bridge this gap "by offering a detailed description and analysis of the intelligence aspects of this episode."
See also, Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (New York: SUNY Press, 1998), 43-44.
Rathmell, Andrew. "Brotherly Enemies: The Rise and Fall of the Syrian-Egyptian Intelligence Axis, 1954-1967." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 230-253.
This is the story "of allied services whose ties helped bring about a union between their two states. However, after the collapse of the union the services concentrated their energies on attacking each other."
Sheffy,
Yigal. "Unconcern at Dawn, Surprise at Sunset: Egyptian Intelligence
Appreciation Before the Sinai Campaign, 1956." Intelligence and
National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 7-56.
The author notes that Egyptian President Nasser had received recent early warnings of an Israeli attack, yet was shocked when the attack began on 29 October 1956 and was surprised yet again when the British and French entered the fray. The question, then, is, "Why?" Sheffy finds the answer rooted in "almost universal failures in judgement at [the] national level which give rise to mistaken intelligence appreciations. Such failures are based at first on fixed perceptions and preconceptions, gather strength with the adaptation of information to the conception, and finally fall victim to the enemy's deception stories."
For information on the Israeli deception plan, see Michael Handel, "Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab Israeli Wars," in Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, eds. Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, 111-122 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984).
4. Jordan
Whitlock, Craig. "Jordan's Spy Agency: Holding Cell for the CIA." Washington Post, 1 Dec. 2007, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"[A]ccording to documents and former prisoners, human rights advocates, defense lawyers and former U.S. officials," Jordan's General Intelligence Department (GID) has provided "a covert way station for CIA prisoners captured in other countries."
Aburish,
Said K. Beirut Spy: International Intrigue at the St. George Hotel Bar. London: Bloomsbury, 1990.
Surveillant 1.1 identifies this as a "revised paperback edition of earlier work titled 'St George Hotel Bar: International Intrigue in Old Beirut -- An Insider's Account.' Tales of middle eastern politics and espionage." Chambers calls it "a nostalgia piece."
Harnden, Toby. "CIA Gets the Go-ahead to Take on Hizbollah." Daily Telegraph (London), 10 Jan. 2007. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
A finding signed by President George W. Bush before Christmas 2006 authorizes the CIA "to take covert action against Hizbollah ... to help the Lebanese government prevent the spread of Iranian influence. Senators and congressmen have been briefed on the classified 'non-lethal presidential finding' that allows the CIA to provide financial and logistical support to the prime minister, Fouad Siniora."
Kennedy, David, and Leslie Brunetta. "Lebanon and the Intelligence Community: A Case Study." Studies in Intelligence 37, no. 5 (1994): 37-51.
"This article is an abridged version of a case written in 1988 at the Kennedy School of Government."
Nasif, Nicholas. "Tenet Given Assurances that No al-Qa'ida Cells Infiltrated Lebanon." Beirut al-Nahar in Arabic, 28 Nov. 2002.
[Excerpts from FBIS Translated Text] "A security official has recently returned from Washington after three days of meetings with CIA Director George Tenet and his assistants for terrorism and Middle Eastern affairs. The talks dealt with the security cooperation between Lebanon and the United States within the framework of the US-led international campaign on terror....
"As a result of the discussions, Tenet and his aides expressed satisfaction with stability in Lebanon and with the cooperation of the Lebanese security services with the CIA station in the American Embassy in Beirut. This is a constant and accurate cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The Lebanese authorities deal seriously with the information they receive from the CIA station, and they regularly supply the station with information within the anti-terror plan."
Phares,
Walid. "The Intelligence Services in Lebanon During the War of 1975-1990."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7,
no. 3 (Fall 1994): 363-381.
Schleiffer, Ron. "Psychological Operations: A New Variation of an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 1-19.
Thomas, Martin. "Crisis Management in Colonial States: Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Morocco and Syria after the First World War." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2006): 697-716.
This article "analyses the performance of French security services confronted with violent unrest and communal rebellion in Morocco and Stria in the 1920s.... [T]he central proposition ... is that the inter-war protectorates, mandates and colonies stretching in an arc through the Arab world were 'intelligence states.'"
Eickelman,
Dale F. "Intelligence in an Arab Gulf State [Oman]." In Comparing
Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the USSR, the U.K. & the Third World,
ed. Roy Godson, 89-114. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988.
Eickelman,
Dale F., and M. G. Dennison. "Arabizing the Omani Intelligence Services:
Clash of Cultures?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
7, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 1-28.
Click for materials regarding the CIA's role vis-a-vis the Palestinians and Israel under the Wye Peace Agreement.
Pacepa,
Ion Mihai. "The Arafat I Know." Wall Street Journal, 10
Jan. 2002.
The former head of the Romanian foreign intelligence service, who defected to the West in 1978, claims to have aided the Soviet KGB in the indoctrination and training of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat.
Schleiffer, Ron. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and Military Strategies. Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2006.
For Gordon, DIJ 16.2 (2007), this work "provides valuable insights into the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians." It "is especially strong in its discussion of media policy in the furtherance of strategy.... Israeli fear and distrust of propaganda resulted in an information mechanism [that] was inadequate to deal with the challenge presented by the Intifada. Palestinians on the other hand ... understood the power of propaganda and did not hesitate to employ it in their struggle."
Perry, NWCR 61.2 (Spring 2008), believes that this work "offers a unique, though logically flawed, perspective of the first intifada, which he describes as 'political warfare.'" The author "analyzes the successful Palestinian tactics and compares them to the unsuccessful Israeli response through the components of 'psychological operations' (PSYOP) as presented in the U.S. Army Manual of Psychological Warfare.... [T]his work is ultimately unsatisfying, because its organization and thesis have logical flaws."
Weiner, Tim. "C.I.A.
Is Teaching Tricks of the Trade to the Palestinians." New York Times,
5 Mar. 1998, A1, A9 (N).
"With Israel's knowledge. C.I.A. counter-terrorism and covert-operations officers have been instructing senior and mid-level Palestinian security officials" in information-gathering, interrogation, and "other techniques of the trade." In the mid-to-late 1970s, the CIA had established ties with the PLO, only to have them broken when Ali Hassan Salemah was killed in 1979 and the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was bombed in 1983.
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