Allard, Kenneth. "Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary Assessment." American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 3/4 (1997): 55-58.
"While its effects are often overstated, an unprecedented amount of information flows from Washington to European headquarters and intermediate staging bases.... But elaborate information flows between higher command levels do not always translate into better support for the warfighter. In fact, life in Bosnia has not changed very much for the American soldier, because the information revolution largely stops at Division level."
Bissell, Schuyler, and Daniel G. Kniola. "Intelligence for War Fighting." Signal 41 (Sep. 1986): 48-49. [Petersen]
Bullock, Joan G. "Intelligence Support of Military Operations: A Perspective." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 181-198.
Defense Intelligence Journal. "Intelligence Support to the Warfighter." 4, no. 2 (Fall 1995): Entire issue.
1. William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., "From the Editor," pp 2-3.
"The lessons learned from the Gulf War provided the impetus for a subsequent and continuing shift to joint warfighting, creating the need for a whole new joint structure and doctrine to provide intelligence support.... Today, the warfighters are joint commanders with joint intelligence staffs and commands supporting them. The operations that commanders must initiate have expanded far beyond warfighting.... From this edition of the Journal the reader should be able to recognize how intelligence support to the warfighter has changed over the years, understand its current nature and status, and discern prospects for future improvements."
2. Dennis C. Blair [Associate DCI for Military Support], "The Future of Intelligence Support to the Armed Forces," pp. 7-15.
Blair looks at intelligence support to "the four general phases" of military operations: preparation and planning, deployment, employment, and post-conflict monitoring. He concludes, regarding the future, that "the question is: `What is required?' not "What is desired?'"
3. Michael V. Hayden, "Warfighters and Intelligence: One Team - One Fight," pp. 17-30.
In recent events, EUCOM intelligence personnel have been tasked with supplying intelligence to a wide range of customers: In Bosnia, to "American consumers, the NATO alliance and United Nations forces"; and in Rwanda, to international relief organizations. In addition, the type of information needed was "both more varied and more detailed," the areas were not those where we had "traditionally invested much energy," and the operations "frequently departed dramatically from classic warfighting."
The author proposes that intelligence should be properly understood in these kinds of environments, not just in support of operations, but as part of operations. He questions whether the two major regional contingencies concept is adequate for structuring intelligence. He also offers other thoughts based on EUCOM operational experience.
4. Richard F. Riccardelli, "News from the Front: Warfighter Intelligence and Combat Operations," pp. 31-43.
Concerns intelligence for Operation Uphold Democracy, the planned airborne operation into Haiti in September 1994. "From the commanding general to the paratrooper, an unparalleled quantity and diversity of information on the enemy, weather and terrain was provided." Reprinted as "Warfighter Intelligence for Operations Other Than War," in American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 3/4 (1997): 49-54.
5. Michael Ratliff, "Joint Doctrine, Service Intelligence and Support to the Warfighter," pp. 45-65.
The author traces the development of joint and service doctrinal products for military intelligence activities. With regard to the future, he notes that joint intelligence doctrine will need "to better account for the role of Service Intelligence."
6. Alfred Monteiro, Jr., "Mustering the Force: Cryptologic Support to Military Operations," pp. 67-82.
NSA has adopted a broad definition of "warfighter": "Any individual, regardless of rank or position, responsible for making operational decisions which result in the use of military forces. This includes everyone from the President, deciding whether or not to commit troops to battle, to the individual soldier, airman ormarine deciding whether or not to fire." Reprinted as "Cryptologic Support to Military Operations," American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 3/4 (1997), 39-44.
7. Stephen L. Caldwell, "Defense Intelligence Training: Changing to Better Support the Warfighter," pp. 83-100.
The author focuses on "key courses in general military intelligence taught by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the military services." He documents a decline in classroom instruction targeted on the USSR/Russia and the Warsaw Pact and an increase in instruction on joint topics and operations other than war.
Hoffman, Daniel M. [LT/USNR] "Naval Counterintelligence in the 90s: A Whole New Way of Doing Things." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 11, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 5-7.
This article deals with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and its Naval Counterintelligence and Force Protection role. The author notes the shift toward support to the warfighting commands and joint activities.
Messer, William. "Getting Space-Based ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] Data to Warfighters." Military Review 81 (Nov.-Dec. 2001): 42-45.
Ross, William A. [LTC/USAF].
1. "Space Support to the Warrior: The Intelligence Professional's Responsibility." American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 2 (Autumn-Winter 1994): 72-76.
The author concludes that "space warfare has arrived and DESERT STORM was the first space war." To make space work for the intelligence professional in supporting the warfighter "the military intelligence community needs to ... define space war fighting doctrine and vision and ... [develop] a robust and dynamic intelligence-wide training program."
2. "Space Support to the Warfighter." Military Intelligence 21, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1995): 23-25, 53.
"[T]he intelligence community has yet to develop a clear direction, policy, and doctrine regarding space application, system requirements, and training.... Desert Storm proved space-based capabilities are invaluable for threat warning and mission execution.... A significant lesson learned from Desert Storm is the criticality of operational electronic intelligence (ELINT) analysis.... MI professionals ... currently lack the necessary tools and understanding to effectively support the warfighter with space intelligence."
Sadler, Lori M. [COL/USMC] "Improving National Intelligence Support to Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces." American Intelligence Journal 13, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 49-51.
Thomas, David. "U.S. Military Intelligence Analysis: Old and New Challenges." In Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, eds. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, 138-154. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2007.
Hulnick, IJI&C 24.4, p. 756/fn. 13, refers to this as a "good source on intelligence collection and analysis to support combat operations."
Return to Defense Intelligence Journal
Return to Military Intelligence Table of Contents