Ackerman, Robert K. "Special Operations Forces Become Network-Centric." Signal, Mar. 2003. [http://www.afcea.org/signal/]
According to Brig. Gen. James W. Parker, USA, director of SOCOM's Center for Intelligence and Information Operations, "[n]etwork-centric warfare proved to be a key enabler for U.S. special operations forces to rout the Taliban in Afghanistan.... These forces were empowered by shared situational awareness and robust communications that allowed them to maximize the effects of air and naval support against Taliban positions."
Aftergood, Steven. "Army Rethinks Unconventional Warfare." Secrecy News, 12 Nov. 2008. [http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy]
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-05.130, "Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare," dated 30 September 2008, defines unconventional warfare (UW) as "'[o]perations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations.... This definition reflects two essential criteria: UW must be conducted by, with, or through surrogates; and such surrogates must be irregular forces.'" The manual "presents updated policy and doctrine governing unconventional warfare, and examines its 'three main component disciplines': special forces operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs operations. Appendices include an historical survey of unconventional warfare as well as an extensive bibliography."
The 248-page manual is available as a 3.7 mb PDF file at: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm-3-05-130.pdf.
Allen, Patrick H. F. U.S. Special Operations Command in Action. Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife, 2002.
Atkinson,
Rick. "Special, Not Super." Washington Post, 4 Oct. 2001,
A31.
The U.S. Special Forces "are among the best trained, best equipped and best conditioned soldiers of any army in any era.... [But] there are limits to what can be expected of these elite forces." In an unconventional campaign, such as they will be called upon to conduct in Afghanistan, "the ability of the U.S. military to think in unorthodox terms will be as important as valor, tenacity and firepower."
Bennett, Richard M. Elite Forces: The World’s Most Formidable Secret Armies. London: Virgin Press, 2003.
Peake, Studies 47.3, finds that "[t]here are numerous unit misidentifications, British and American, and the historical details cannot be accepted as written.... Bennet’s topic is timely, but the book is unreliable."
Best, Richard A., Jr., and Andrew Feickert. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 6 Dec. 2006. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22017.pdf.
A judicious look at the issues surrounding the 9/11 Commission's Recommendation 32, which called for responsibility for all covert and clandestine paramilitary activities to be shifted to the Defense Department.
Bloom, Bradley. "Information Operations in Support of Special Operations." Military Review 84 (Jan.-Feb. 2004): 45-49.
Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
Briscoe, Charles H., et al. All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq. Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, 2006.
Dugat, Air & Space Power Journal 21.4 (Winter 2007), calls this "an eye-opening account" of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This is "a superb picture of th[e] war and its aftermath.... Written chronologically, the study covers details down to the hour when the planning stage began.... Some portions seem repetitive, however, and several times the authors' clear recounting of operations makes the summaries unnecessary."
Briscoe, C. H. "Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and PSYOP (Psychological Operations) Teams in Afghanistan." Special Warfare 15 (Sep. 2002): 36-38.
Brown, Bryan D. ("Doug") [GEN/USA] "U.S. Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century." Joint Force Quarterly 40 (1st Quarter 2006): 38-43. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/issue40.htm]
The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, (USSOCOM), traces the early history of U.S. special forces from OSS through the years of ups and downs in terms of attention paid to such forces. Why such inaction? General Brown states that it was due to the fact that "the services did not view Special Operations as vital to national defense, and they could not agree on its substance, funding, or how it would be controlled." The turning point was the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Nunn-Cohen amendment in 1987. Dramatic change has followed Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's designation of USSOCOM as the lead element in planning the war on terror.
Brown, David. "SpecOps Chief Wants More Active PSYOPS, Civil Affairs Companies." Air Force Times 63 (24 Mar. 2003): 22.
Gen. Charles Holland (USAF), Commander, Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command, wants to increase the number of active-duty soldiers in civil affairs and PSYOPS units.
Bruner, Edward F., Christopher Bolkum, and Ronald O'Rourke. Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 15 Oct. 2001. [MSmith]
Busch, Briton Cooper. Bunker Hill to Bastogne: Elite Forces and American Society. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2006. 2007. [pb]
Chivers, C.J. "Long Before War, Green Berets Built Military Ties to Uzbekistan." New York Times, 25 Oct. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"In 1999, teams of Green Berets arrived at former Soviet garrisons" outside Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. "The mission was straightforward: to train the army of a former foe, in part to prepare its inexperienced conscripts for skirmishes with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a terrorist group accused of setting off bombs in Tashkent earlier that year. The long-term goal was more ambitious. The Green Berets were one element of an accelerating security arrangement in which the two nations were laying the groundwork for more extensive military cooperation."
Clancy, Tom. Special Forces: A Guided Tour of U.S. Army Special Forces. New York: Berkley, 2000.
Publisher's Weekly, 1 Jan. 2001, calls this "the most comprehensive overview of the U.S. Army Special Forces available to general readers." Although his "language slips into jargon often enough to confuse the target audience of interested generalists..., Clancy remains a consummate storyteller."
Clancy, Tom, Carl Stiner [GEN/USA (Ret.)], and Tony Koltz. Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces. New York: Putnam, 2002. [pb] New York: Berkley, 2003.
General Stiner is a former commander of USSOCOM.
Cline, Lawrence E. "Special Operations and the Intelligence System." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006): 575-592.
"Given the complexity of special operations missions and their significance, special operations forces are voracious consumers of intelligence." Special operations forces (SOF) also "can be major producers of intelligence.... The biggest stumbling block to improving intelligence support to SOF, and to maximizing SOF's contribution to the overall intelligence structure, is the distribution system."
Cogan, Charles G. "Desert One and Its Disorders." Journal of Military History 67, no. 1 (Jan. 2003): 201-216.
From abstract: Desert One "was not only an organizational failure, due to a splintering of the U.S. armed forces, but a failure of political will and political appreciation. The U.S. ... reacted tentatively [to the hostage situation] and with a certain propitiation. When ... a hostage rescue operation was finally mounted, it was so conceived that the U.S. could call it off at any step along the way. Desert One turned out to be the defining moment that led to a sea-change in American military policy in the 1980s: the spread of the principle of joint operations for the U.S. armed forces (Goldwater-Nichols Act), and the companion Cohen-Nunn Act consolidating Special Forces under a U.S. Special Operations Command."
Couch, Dick [CAPT/USNR (Ret.)]. Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior. New York: Crown, 2007.
Keiser, Proceedings 133.3 (Mar. 2007), says that this is "a well-written inside view of Army Special Forces (SF) troops." The author "spells out the demanding selection process they undergo and the ardous training they endure."
Couch, Dick [CAPT/USNR (Ret.)]. Down Range: Navy SEALs in the War on Terrorism. New York: Crown, 2005. [pb] New York: Three Rivers, 2006.
Keiser, Proceedings 131.12 (Dec. 2005), sees this work as a "selected review of SEAL efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq." The author relates "the details of several combat operations, including insights on the rescue of Army Private First Class Jessica Lynch and the attendant publicity." This is "a fine account of exceptionally qualified and dedicated warriors."
Couch, Dick [CAPT/USNR (Ret.)]. "Shore Up SOF." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 131, no. 1 (Jan. 2005): 38-40.
"[G]iven the lead time required to train and develop a competent special operator, we are now losing them faster than we can make them.... Bottom line, we are losing our very best at a time when we are trying to grow the force to take the lead in the war on terror."
Cumming, Alfred. Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1 Dec. 2008. [Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33715.pdf]
"The lines defining mission and authorities with regard to covert action are less than clear. The lack of clarity raises a number of policy questions for the 111th Congress." These include: "By asserting that its activities do not constitute covert actions, is the Pentagon trying to avoid the statutory requirements governing covert action, including a signed presidential finding, congressional notification, and oversight by the congressional intelligence committees? Or, as Pentagon officials suggest, is DOD, in the wake of 9/11, fulfilling a greater number of intelligence needs associated with combating terrorism that are sanctioned in statute and do not fall under the statutory definition of covert action?"
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