Kaplan,
Robert D. "Special Intelligence." Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1998, 61- 62. [http://www.theatlantic.com]
"For an army that will have to act secretly, unconventionally, and in advance of crises rather than during them, intelligence is critical. Indeed, the growth of Special Forces might be a crude indication of the collapse of any distinction between our military and intelligence services. Yes, the CIA itself might be done away with. What the CIA does, however, will not only grow in importance but also have the support of armed troops within the same bureaucratic framework."
Kelly,
Francis J. The Green Berets in Vietnam, 1961-71. McLean, VA: Brassey's, 1991. [reissue]
This book surveys counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, which for the period 1961-1963 were CIA managed.
Kelly, Orr. Brave
Men -- Dark Waters: The Untold Story of the Navy SEALs. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1992. New York: Pocket, 2003. [pb]
Surveillant 2.6 identifies Kelly as a veteran defense correspondent who has worked for the Washington Star and U.S. News and World Report. Among other things, this work discusses the Marchinko case (see Marchinko and Wiseman, Rogue Warrior) and looks at the past and possible future mission of the SEALs.
According to Yang, FILS 12.5, this work "highlights several intelligence facets of the SEAL story." They "would gather their own intelligence and then act on it.... '[T]he SEALs found they were able to penetrate deep into VC sanctuaries where more conventional forces didn't know enough, or didn't dare, to go.' (p. 136) This ability was tapped by the Central Intelligence Agency, which recognized and exploited the SEALs special talents through the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Programs." The book has an "unmistakable air of authenticity." However, for all its merits, it "cannot be considered definitive"; nevertheless, it is "better than anything else that examines SEAL history before and since the Vietnam War."
Kelly, Orr. From a Dark Sky: The Story of U.S. Air Force Special Operations. Collingdale, PA: Diane, 1996. New York: Pocket, 1997. [pb]
A Library Journal review quoted by Amazon.com says that "Kelly's narrative is lively, and his mix of broad overview and personal experience makes for smooth reading."
Kelly, Orr. Never Fight Fair! Navy SEALS' Stories of Combat and Adventure. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995. Never Fight Fair! Inside the Legendary U.S. Navy Seals. New York: Pocket, 1996. [pb]
This book is primarily interviews/oral history with former (and some active) Navy SEALS.
Kelly, Ross S. Special
Operations and National Purpose. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.
[Gibish]
Klare, Michael T., and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Anti-Terrorism in the Eighties. New York: Pantheon, 1988.
Krause, Lincoln B. "Insurgent Intelligence: The Guerrilla Grapevine." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 3 (Fall 1996):
291-311.
The author examines the role and practice of intelligence in insurgency situations.
Lenahan, Rod. Crippled Eagle: A Historical Perspective of U.S. Special Operations, 1976-1996. Charleston, SC: Narwhal Press, 1998.
Despite its subtitle, Crear, AIJ 18.1&2, finds that this work "is overwhelmingly an account of the preparations for, conduct of and aftermath of the 1980 effort to rescue the American hostages in Tehran." The author "has used his personal knowledge of the operation in all its complexities and aspects plus a great quantity of material that has been declassified in recent years to write a riveting account."
Lindsay, Franklin A.
"Unconventional Warfare." Foreign Affairs 40, no. 2 (Spring
1962): 264-274.
Linn, Brian M.
1. "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 90-114.
"It is not too harsh to conclude that for much of the Philippine War, American intelligence was as diffuse, unconnected and disorganized as the resistance the soldiers encountered in the field.... Only at the end of the war, and then only in an area close to the DMI's [Division of Military Information; created by MacArthur in December 1900] headquarters, was the army's official intelligence agency able to play a major role in ending Filipino resistance." What occurred instead was that the officers in the field developed and implemented their own localized intelligence methods.
2. The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
O'Toole, I&NS 6.1, calls Linn's work "the most authoritative study to date of this all-but-forgotten chapter of American military history.... Linn has selected four districts on ... Luzon for his study, and he concentrates on both the military and non-military aspects of the US Army's pacification program within each of them.... [A]s intelligence was an integral part of counter-insurgency operations, ... [the author] presents a far more detailed picture than has been published before."
Locher, James R., III.
1. "Intelligence Support to Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict." American Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Autumn 1989-1990): 13-17.
2. "Interview: James R. Locher, III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict." Special Warfare 6 (May 1993): 33-35. [Gibish]
Lomperis, Timothy. From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention and the Lessons of Vietnam. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), see the author sliding "too easily from one time in place in history to another." He "explains the Vietnam War as a crisis of political legitimacy," but his "argument lacks depth and the centrality of political legitimacy is hardly a new insight." Overall, "Lomperis raises more questions than he answers."
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