
Taillon, J. Paul de B. The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.
Cronin, Joint Force Quarterly 29 (Autumn/Winter 2001-2002), notes that the author "describes a specific tool of response to terrorism, military missions by British and American forces.... The chapter on U.S. capabilities is more fluently written than that on their British counterparts; however, the comparison of the historical development of their respective operational doctrine is insightful. The culture of each nation's forces is described in the context of low-intensity conflicts.... The Americans do not fare well by comparison.... The book's conclusions are sound but general."
Tierney, John J., Jr. Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2006. 2007. [pb]
Tucker, David, and Christopher J. Lamb. United States Special Operations Forces. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
From publisher: In this book, "two national security experts and Department of Defense insiders put the exploits of America's special operation forces in historical and strategic context." This "overview of America's turbulent experience with special operations ... illustrate[s] the diversity of modern special operations forces and the strategic value of their unique attributes."
Tyson, Ann Scott. "Ability to Wage 'Long War' Is Key To Pentagon Plan; Conventional Tactics De-Emphasized." Washington Post, 4 Feb. 2006, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The Defense Department's latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) "concentrates on ... defeating terrorist networks; countering nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; dissuading major powers such as China, India and Russia from becoming adversaries; and creating a more robust homeland defense.
"Central to the first two goals is a substantial 15 percent increase in U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), now with 52,000 personnel, including secret Delta Force operatives skilled in counterterrorism.
"The review calls for a one-third increase in Army Special Forces battalions...; an increase in Navy SEAL teams; and the creation of a new SOF squadron of unmanned aerial vehicles to 'locate and target enemy capabilities' in countries where access is difficult.
"In addition, civil affairs and psychological operations units will gain 3,500 personnel, a 33 percent increase, while the Marine Corps will establish a 2,600-strong Special Operations force for training foreign militaries, conducting reconnaissance and carrying out strikes."
Tyson, Ann Scott. "Study Urges CIA Not To Cede Paramilitary Functions to Pentagon." Washington Post, 5 Feb. 2005, A8. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to senior defense officials on 4 February 2005, a study contracted by the Pentagon and carried out by McLean-based Booz Allen Hamilton "has concluded that the Defense Department should not take charge of the CIA's paramilitary functions." The study considered how to act on the 9/11 commission's recommendation "that lead responsibility for covert and clandestine paramilitary operations be ... consolidated under the ... Special Operations Command.... The study's conclusion ... reflects an emerging consensus among current and former defense, military and intelligence officials that it is more logical for the CIA to retain its relatively modest paramilitary force."
Tyson, Ann Scott, and Dana Priest. "Pentagon Seeking Leeway Overseas: Operations Could Bypass Envoys." Washington Post, 24 Feb. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to administration officials, "[t]he Pentagon is promoting a global counterterrorism plan that would allow Special Operations forces to enter a foreign country to conduct military operations without explicit concurrence from the U.S. ambassador there."
U.S. Air Force. "Special Operations." Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7. 16 Dec. 2005. [http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2-7.pdf]
From "Summary of Revisions": "As America continues to engage in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), AFSOF [Air Force Special Operations Forces] have had to shift from a platform-based to a capabilities-based model that can accommodate a GWOT-oriented campaign."
U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual [COIN FM]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
Kahl, FA 86.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2007), finds that "[t]he COIN FM is not an academic document, but it is deeply informed by classical counterinsurgency theory.... The manual embraces a model commonly referred to as 'clear, hold, and build.'" While "it is difficult to know whether its template can work in all cases,... overall, the COIN FM probably represents the single best distillation of current knowledge about irregular warfare."
See American Political Science Association, "The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis," Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 2 (Jun. 2008): 347-360.
Stephen Biddle sees the manual as "a remarkably thoughtful response to a vexing problem.... It is not perfect, however. In particular, it makes assumptions about the nature of insurgency and the relationship between the United States and the host government that are sometimes sound and sometimes not.... Iraq is precisely the kind of nonideological communal war of identity that the manual is least suited for."
To Stathis N. Kalyvas, "[t]he manual breaks little new ground." This is basically "an elaboration and reformulation of a body of work that emerged in the 1960s." It also "is in many ways a crysallization of the lessons that American commanders painfully learned in the wake of the invasion of Iraq in 2003-05. As such, it seems to have been overtaken by developments on the ground since that period."
Wendy Brown comments that "[i]f the COIN manual updates the military's approach to counterinsurgency, it remains premised on a severely outmoded figure of sovreign power, one in which American powers within the theater of war are imagined to be under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.."
For Douglas A. Ollivant, "the manual itself is not particularly radical," but "it is a radical challenge to conventional military culture and raises deep questions about the type of military -- and especially the type of army -- the United States wishes to maintain."
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be Addressed to Meet Expanded Role. Washington, DC: Jul. 2006. [GAO-06-812] [Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/gao-06-812.pdf]
This is a valuable report that provides detailed information on U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). It documents both the growth in SOF from 2000 to 2005 and the difficulties they face in meeting recruiting goals in the coming years. The GAO notes that "the Special Operations Command [SOCOM] cannot provide assurances ... that currently planned growth in the number of personnel for the Commands headquarters will meet, exceed, or fall short of the requirements needed to address the Commands expanded mission....
"[F]unding for [SOCOM] has increased from more than $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2001 to more than $6.4 billion in fiscal year 2005. In addition, the Command received more than $5 billion in supplemental funds from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005.... The Presidents fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Special Operations Command is $8 billion.... [SOCOM] is comprised of special operations forces from each of the military services. In fiscal year 2005, personnel authorizations for Army special operations forces military personnel totaled more than 30,000, the Air Force 11,501, the Navy 6,255, and the Marine Corps 79. Roughly one-third of special operations forces military personnel were in DODs reserve components, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force Reserve, and the Army and Air National Guard." [footnotes omitted]
U.S. Special Operations Command [SOCOM]. History and Research Office. United States Special Operations Command, 1987-2007. MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Apr. 2007. [Available as a 32.4 MB PDF file at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/2007history.pdf]
A 143-page document, this history of SOCOM includes sections on "Founding and Evolution of USSOCOM"; "Major Operations: 1987 to 2001"; operations in "Global War on Terrorism."
U.S. Special Operations Command. "USSOCOM Posture Statement 2007." MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Apr. 2007. [Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/posture2007.pdf]
From "Executive Summary": "USSOCOM has three simple and enduring priorities: Winning the Global War on Terror; Ensuring the Readiness of Special Operations Forces; and Posturing SOF for the Future."
The document gives the number of active SOF (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) as 37,518, with 2,426 reservists, 3,729 in the National Guard, and 1,780 civilians, for a total force of 47,911. In FY 2007, USSOCOM was funded at approximately $6.2 billion.
Vick, Alan J., et al. Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006.
Westermann, JFQ 48 (1st Quarter 2008), sees this as "a work of critical importance for Air Force senior leadership and the rank and file. It offers a prescient analysis of COIN warfare and strategy and provides trenchant recommendations for enhancing the Services capability in the long war against Islamic extremism."
Vistica, Gregory L. "Military Split on How to Use Special Forces in Terror War." Washington Post, 5 Jan. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
There is a "fierce debate" among military and intelligence officials "over when and how elite military units should be deployed for maximum effectiveness." At Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's direction, "secret commando units known as hunter-killer teams have been ordered to 'kick down the doors' ... all over the world in search of al Qaeda members and their sympathizers." However, the U.S. military "may have missed chances to capture" Mohammad Omar and Ayman Zawahiri "during the past two years because of restrictions on Green Berets in favor of ... the Delta Force and SEAL Team Six," termed Special Mission Units.
Waugh, Billy, with Tim Keown. Hunting the Jackal: A Special Forces and CIA Ground Soldier's Fifty-Year Career Hunting America's Enemies. New York: Morrow, 2004. Hunting the Jackal: A Special Forces and CIA Soldier's Fifty Years on the Frontlines against Terrorism. New York: Avon, 2005. [pb]
From amazon.com: "In remarkable detail [Waugh] recounts his participation in some of the most important events in American Special Operations history, including his own pivotal role in the previously untold story of the CIA's involvement in the capture of the infamous Carlos the Jackal."
Clark comment: Did Billy Waugh do all the things he chronicles in his book? I am assured by those who know more about him than I do that Waugh has done so much that there would be no need for him to make up the stories told here. If he had not already been a Special Forces legend, going to war in Afghanistan in 2001 at the age of 72 would have established a special place for him in the pantheon of real-life action figures. It is doubtful that we would want Waugh sitting in Washington making policy; but as a warrior in the field, it is good thing that he is on our side.
Weiner, Rebecca Ulam. "Sheep in Wolves' Clothing." Legal Affairs (Jan.-Feb. 2006). [http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/argument_weiner_janfeb06.msp]
"In recent years, private contractors have increasingly taken on important military functions, operating in some 50 countries.... They provide security to civilian aid workers, other contractors, and even military forces. They train local armies for combat, develop future American soldiers..., and interrogate prisoners. At times, they've engaged in combat. During the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the U.S. has relied heavily on their support -- private contractors make up a workforce of about 20,000, double the British troop presence."
Zimmerman, Dwight Jon, and John D. Gresham. Beyond Hell and Back: How America's Special Operations Forces Became the World's Greatest Fighting Unit. New York, St. Martin's, 2007.
From publisher: This book offers "[a]n inside look at seven of the most harrowing and significant Special Operations missions," from Vietnam to Iraq.
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