Lardner, Richard. "Commando Leaders Shift away from Rumsfeld Strategy." Associated Press, 10 May 2008. [http://www.ap.com]
The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) "has moved away from a contentious plan that gave it broad control over anti-terrorism operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other hot spots around the globe." SOCOM commander Navy Adm. Eric Olson "has steered clear of micromanaging specific missions against al-Qaida or other terrorist groups. The command's primary focus is to ensure these plans are fused into a broader strategy for defeating extremist ideologies."
Lardner, Richard. "Money Talks for U.S. Commandos." Associated Press, 18 Sep. 2007. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The Defense Department is urging Congress to extend the authority that gives U.S. Special Operations Forces "up to $25 million a year to pay for information, buy guns for allied forces and hire fighters willing to battle al-Qaida.... The little-noticed authority, approved in 2004, has been a hit within the special operations ranks because it relieved these front-line troops of waiting for the CIA to distribute the cash." [Clark comment: Becuse it frees them from having to work with the CIA?]
Leebaert, Derek. To Dare and to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to Al Qaeda. Boston: Little, Brown, 2006.
A Publishers Weekly (via Amazon.com) reviewer says that "[f]rom Gideon's terrifying assault on the Midianites in ancient Israel to the American Delta Force's special ops in the mountains of Afghanistan," the author analyzes special "operations in lively, if sometimes over-the-top, prose.... The last chapters of this mammoth book [688 pages], however, are drier, as Leebaert focuses on the relationship between politics and the use of special forces."
For DKR, AFIO WIN 11-06 (13 Mar. 2006), this is a "timely contribution to our knowledge of special operations." The author "shows that from the days of Alexander the Great onwards, ingenious, bold, and unexpected operations have been decisive in military conflicts. At the heart of such successes is a willingness to think outside the box and take high risks with small forces."
Peake, Studies 50.4 (2006), call this work "a vast undertaking. For those concerned with military history it offers much ... on a subject not dealt with in this magnitude elsewhere. And ... the role of intelligence is a major factor throughout.... Superbly documented and well written, this book deserves studied attention."
Luttrell, Marcus, with Patrick Robinson. Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10. New York: Little, Brown, 2007.
According to Longino, Proceedings 134, no. 5 (May 2008), this is the harrowing story of a special operation "mission that went awry." The author was the sole survivor of a four-man SEAL Team deployed into northeastern Afghanistan in June 2005.
Mattox, Raymond M., and Peter S. Rodgers. "Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: The Foundation and Implications of the New U.S. Doctrine." Strategic Insights 6, no. 6 (Dec. 2007). [http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si]
This student thesis from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School suggests that Field Manual (FM) 3-24 on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations "is a necessary step in developing an effective and coherent U.S. approach to COIN. However, it fails to incorporate some more contemporary social movement theory explanations into its strategies. For example, it fails to recognize the relative importance political inclusion in counterinsurgency strategies versus other variables, such as security, as a primary means of success in counterinsurgency campaigns."
Mazzetti, Mark. "Pentagon Sees Move in Somalia as Blueprint." New York Times, 13 Jan. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"Military operations in Somalia" carried out by the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command, "and the use of the Ethiopian Army as a surrogate force to root out operatives for Al Qaeda in the country, are a blueprint that Pentagon strategists say they hope to use more frequently in counterterrorism missions around the globe."
Metz, Steven. "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency." Parameters 37. no. 4 (Winter 2007-2008): 20-32.
Following the events of 9/11, "insurgency was again viewed as a strategic threat.... The global campaign against violent Islamic extremists forced the United States military to undertake counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.... The military services scrambled to develop new concepts and doctrine.[footnote omitted] Counterinsurgency ... became a centerpiece for Army and Marine Corps training.... There is a problem, however: As the American military relearned counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine, it may not have gotten them right."
Miller, Greg. "U.S. Seeks to Rein in Its Military Spy Teams." Los Angeles Times, 18 Dec. 2006. [http://www.latimes.com]
According to senior U.S. intelligence and military officials, U.S. Special Forces teams, known as military liaison elements (MLEs), that have been "sent overseas on secret spying missions have clashed with the CIA and carried out operations in countries that are staunch U.S. allies, prompting a new effort by the agency and the Pentagon to tighten the rules for military units engaged in espionage."
The MLEs are deployed "to American embassies to serve as intelligence operatives.... The troops typically work in civilian clothes and function much like CIA case officers, cultivating sources in other governments or Islamic organizations. One objective, officials said, is to generate information that could be used to plan clandestine operations such as capturing or killing terrorism suspects."
Moore, Robin. The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger. New York: Random House, 2003.
Stein, Washington Post, 16 Mar. 2003, says that this book "is fast-paced and immensely entertaining, in a ... cartoon-strippy way. Page after page, Moore's prose reads like a defiant country-and-western anthem.... (It should be noted ...that ... Moore was hardly 'on the ground with the Special Forces in Afghanistan,' except in the loosest sense of the phrase. This is the barroom version of the war, as told by their balladeer.) Nevertheless, it often rings true.... Moore does reach a kind of ground truth in his narrative of Special Forces at war: the dangerous, sometimes thrilling but unpredictable nature of combat."
For Clemens, MI 30.4 (Oct.-Dec. 2004), this "book’s strength is the chapters on operations with the NA [Northern Alliance], based on interviews with SF soldiers." However, "some chapters are more fully developed and better written than others." Moore's "analysis is unquestionably subjective.... This book is strictly a heroic portrayal of a military victory." In addition, the "sections covering operations after December 2001 relied on ... a source [who] proved dubious" and whose "fraudulent past casts doubt on parts of the book."
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