Dailey, Dell L. [LTGEN/USA], and Jeffrey G. Webb [LTCOL/USMC]. "U.S. Special Operations Command and the War on Terror." Joint Force Quarterly 40 (1st Quarter 2006): 44-47. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/issue40.htm]
"U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is structuring and posturing to lead Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in the war on terror.... [T]he command has been designated as the supported [emphasis added] combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and, when directed, executing campaigns against terrorist organizations."
Deady, Timothy K. "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902." Parameters 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 53-68.
The author provides a "brief review" of the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902, examines "the strategic and operational lessons of America’s successful campaign," considers "the belligerents’ policy goals, strategies, and their centers of gravity," and identifies "lessons applicable for winning today’s counterinsurgencies."
Dobbs, Michael J. [CDR/USN (Ret.)] "Hype, Hope & Hard Facts: Getting a Fix on SSGN SOF Capabilities." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 134, no. 2 (Feb. 2008): 28-32.
"The obstacles to the SSGN [converted Ohio-class SSBNs] living up to its advertised capability for SOF operations include material, operational, and training.... The advanced SEAL delivery system is the biggest question mark for the SSGN program, because it is esstential to the submarine's SOF capability."
Dolan, Ronald E. A History of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne). Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Oct. 2001. [http://www.nightstalkers.com/history/index.html]
Dunlap, Charles J., Jr. [MGEN/USAF]
1. "Air-Minded Considerations for Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine." Air & Space Power Journal 21, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 63-74.
"Editorial Abstract: According to the author, the recent publication of Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, reflects a distinctly 'surface-minded' perspective. Since airpower possesses unique capabilities, such as speed, range, flexibility, and persistence, he proposes exploiting these 'air-minded' viewpoints to enlarge and enhance what is currently a service-centric doctrine. General Dunlap suggests that doing so would produce a much-improved and well-rounded joint approach."
2. "Developing Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine: An Airman's Perspective." Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 86-92.
The Army’s new Field Manual (FM) 3–24 (designated by the Marine Corps as Warfighting Publication 3–33.5), Counterinsurgency, "superbly articulate[s] a thoughtful landpower [emphasis in original] perspective on the complicated challenge of counterinsurgency (COIN). It does not purport to be, however, a full-dimensional joint approach.... [T]he various groundcentric COIN strategies attempted in Iraq over the years may have proven costly and time-consuming. Exploiting the full capabilities of the whole joint team would seem the wiser course given the complexities of COIN."
Dunlap, Charles J., Jr. [COL/USAF] "Special Operations Forces after Kosovo." Joint Force Quarterly 119 (Spring/Summer 2001): 7-12.
Dunne, Martha S. [LT/USN] "SEALs Need Dedicated Helo Spport." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jun. 2001, 44-47.
"Special warfare forces operate extensively with surface and subsurface assets that deliver them from the sea, but they lack the rotary-wing support ... they need to carry out their littoral missions on land."
Feickert, Andrew.
1. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 17 Apr. 2006.
"Proposals to elevate the command of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the realignment of civil affairs, psychological operations (psyops) and combat search and rescue (CSAR) functions out from under the control of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)[] ha[ve] raised concerns that SOF is perhaps becoming too focused on immediate versus long-term results."
2. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 28 Jun. 2007. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf.
"Summary": "Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations and the Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. Recent leadership changes, the availability of SOF special mission unit (SMU) forces, and circumstances surrounding a Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) incident in Afghanistan might be issues for congressional consideration."
Ferrell, William H., III [MAJ/USMC]. "No Shirt, No Shoes, No Status: Uniforms, Distinction, and Special Operations in International Armed Conflict." Military Law Review 178 (2003): 94-140.
The law of war (LOW) "delineates criteria that combatants must meet to gain prisoner of war (POW) status, and it obligates combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians. Further, the LOW limits the conduct that combatants can engage in while dressed in civilian clothing, violations of which may result in a loss of POW status as well as disciplinary action against the combatants and their superiors." [footnotes omitted]
Flynn, Michael T. [BGEN/USA], Rich Juergens [COL/USA], and Thomas L. Cantrell [MAJ/USAF]. "Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices." Joint Force Quarterly 50 (Third Quarter 2008): 56-61.
The airstrike that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi "was only a fraction of the effort to find and accurately target him.... Airborne ISR was a critical and necessary piece, but it alone was not sufficient to target Zarqawi. Instead, it was focused and directed by a robust all-source intelligence network employing human intelligence (HUMINT), detainee intelligence, and signals intelligence (SIGINT). This collection and intelligence analysis was part of a network of personnel, systems, and mechanisms woven into the daily operations of and directed by a joint special operations task force (JSOTF)."
Galula, David. Counter-insurgency Warfare. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. [pb] St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 2005.
From advertisement: The author served as a French military officer and attache in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria. In this work, he seeks to "define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics."
Gellman, Barton. "Covert Unit Hunted for Iraqi Arms: Amid Raids and Rescue, Task Force 20 Failed To Pinpoint Weapons." Washington Post, 13 Jun. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to military and intelligence sources, Task Force 20, an Army Special Forces unit "operating in Iraq since before the war began in March, has played a dominant but ultimately unsuccessful role in the ... hunt for weapons of mass destruction....
Among its other assignments, Task Force 20 "captured Palestinian guerrilla leader Mohammed Abbas in Baghdad in mid-April and the Iraqi scientists nicknamed Mrs. Anthrax and Dr. Germ; it fought a bloody battle behind Iraqi lines to prevent a catastrophic release of floodwaters from the Haditha Dam; and it retrieved Pfc. Jessica Lynch, an Army prisoner of war, from a hospital in Nasiriyah."
Gertz, Bill. "Congress to Restrict Use of Special Ops." Washington Times, 13 Aug. 2003. [http://www.washtimes.com]
Restrictions on the use of Special Operations Forces, contained in the classified Senate report accompanying the current version of the intelligence authorization bill for FY 2004, would require "the Pentagon to first obtain a presidential 'finding,' ... similar to those required for covert-action intelligence operations," before deploying such forces.... The restrictions are not included in the House intelligence authorization report."
Gordon, Michael R., and Mark Mazzetti. "U.S. Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda in Africa." New York Times, 23 Feb. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to American officials, a U.S. Special Operations unit, Task Force 88, deployed in Ethiopia and Kenya, "waged a campaign from Ethiopia [in January 2007] to capture or kill top leaders of Al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa, including the use of an airstrip in eastern Ethiopia to mount airstrikes against Islamic militants in neighboring Somalia." U.S. officials described the effort "as a qualified success that disrupted terrorist networks in Somalia, [and] led to the death or capture of several Islamic militants." The officials "said that Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the mastermind of the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the alleged ringleader of Al Qaeda’s East African cell, remains at large."
Hammes, Thomas X. "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation." Strategic Forum (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University) 214 (Jan. 2005): 1-7.
"Fourth-generation warfare, which is now playing out in Afghanistan and Iraq, is a modern form of insurgency. Its practitioners seek to convince enemy political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.... Because it is organized to ensure political rather than military success, this type of warfare is difficult to defeat."
Hammes, Thomas X. [COL/USMC] The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Osceola, WI: Zenith, 2004.
From advertisement: The author shows "how war is evolution, not revolution, and that a 'weaker' opponent will continually evolve to use ways to avoid direct military engagement. Instead of winning militarily, an insurgency will work to test the political will of a more powerful nation to stay the course during a war.... He also examines in detail 'transnational' enemies like Al Qaeda, and how the U.S. military’s focus on high-tech weapons designed to overpower an enemy in a short amount of time means little when the enemy has a different concept of the time the conflict will last."
Haney, Eric L. Delta Force: The Story of America's Elite Counterterrorism Unit. New York: Delacorte, 2002. New York: Dell, 2003. [pb]
Howard, Christopher B. [MAJ/USAFR] "Special Operations Are Not Just for Operators." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Feb. 2004, 48.
The author argues for "[o]ffering select intelligence officers ... a special operations career track."
Return to Special Operations
Table of Contents