Cassidy, Robert M. "Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars." Parameters 36, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 73-83. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04summer/cassidy.htm]
"[T]his article aims to distill some of the more relevant counterinsurgency lessons from the American military’s experiences during Vietnam and before.... This analysis also offers a brief explanation of US military culture and the hitherto embedded cultural obstacles to learning how to fight guerrillas."
Cassidy, Robert M. Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.
Corum, Joint Force Quarterly 44 (1st quarter 2007), notes that the author "examines the problems that major powers face in dealing with modern counterinsurgency." He "provides three case studies as a base of analysis: the United States, Britain, and Russia." The reviewer finds that "Cassidy is on solid ground in his highly critical analysis of the U.S. military in its understanding of modern counterinsurgency." However, when he discusses "the cultures of militaries with which he does not have personal experience, the author is much weaker."
According to Flavin, Parameters 37.4 (Winter 2007-08), the author provides "the key historical studies, research papers, and policy initiatives that have shaped the United States and United Kingdom militaries' approach to counterinsurgency and stability operations, many of which have not been previously collected in a single source." Cassidy "emphasizes that the majority of successful operations have employed indigenous forces."
Chivers, C.J. "Long Before War, Green Berets Built Military Ties to Uzbekistan." New York Times, 25 Oct. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"In 1999, teams of Green Berets arrived at former Soviet garrisons" outside Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. "The mission was straightforward: to train the army of a former foe, in part to prepare its inexperienced conscripts for skirmishes with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a terrorist group accused of setting off bombs in Tashkent earlier that year. The long-term goal was more ambitious. The Green Berets were one element of an accelerating security arrangement in which the two nations were laying the groundwork for more extensive military cooperation."
Clancy, Tom. Special Forces: A Guided Tour of U.S. Army Special Forces. New York: Berkley, 2000.
Publisher's Weekly, 1 Jan. 2001, calls this "the most comprehensive overview of the U.S. Army Special Forces available to general readers." Although his "language slips into jargon often enough to confuse the target audience of interested generalists..., Clancy remains a consummate storyteller."
Clancy, Tom, Carl Stiner [GEN/USA (Ret.)], and Tony Koltz. Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces. New York: Putnam, 2002. [pb] New York: Berkley, 2003.
General Stiner is a former commander of USSOCOM.
Cline, Lawrence E. "Special Operations and the Intelligence System." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006): 575-592.
"Given the complexity of special operations missions and their significance, special operations forces are voracious consumers of intelligence." Special operations forces (SOF) also "can be major producers of intelligence.... The biggest stumbling block to improving intelligence support to SOF, and to maximizing SOF's contribution to the overall intelligence structure, is the distribution system."
Corum, James S. Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy. St. Paul, MN: Zenith, 2007.
Longino, Proceedings 133, no. 7 (Jul. 2007), says that the author "presents a well-researched and thought-provoking analysis of what must be done to respond and why" to a type of warfare in Iraq "that arguably took many military professionals by surprise."
Corum, James S. [LTCOL/USAR (Ret.)] "On Airpower, Land Power, and Counterinsurgency: Getting Doctrine Right." Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 93-97.
FM 3–24 keeps "the discussion of the various aspects of military operations in counterinsurgency ... to basic theory and guidelines. The doctrine was addressed to the strategic planner and operator and was not intended as a guide to the employment of specific technologies and tactics.... What the doctrine does stress is the need to understand the context of counterinsurgency and how airpower fits into that context."
Couch, Dick [CAPT/USNR (Ret.)]. Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior. New York: Crown, 2007.
Keiser, Proceedings, Mar. 2007, says that this is "a well-written inside view of Army Special Forces (SF) troops." The author "spells out the demanding selection process they undergo and the ardous training they endure."
Couch, Dick [CAPT/USNR (Ret.)]. Down Range: Navy SEALs in the War on Terrorism. New York: Crown, 2005. [pb] New York: Three Rivers, 2006.
Keiser, Proceedings, Dec. 2005, sees this work as a "selected review of SEAL efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq." The author relates "the details of several combat operations, including insights on the rescue of Army Private First Class Jessica Lynch and the attendant publicity." This is "a fine account of exceptionally qualified and dedicated warriors."
Couch, Dick [CAPT/USNR (Ret.)]. "Shore Up SOF." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 131, no. 1 (Jan. 2005): 38-40.
"[G]iven the lead time required to train and develop a competent special operator, we are now losing them faster than we can make them.... Bottom line, we are losing our very best at a time when we are trying to grow the force to take the lead in the war on terror."
Cumming, Alfred. Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2 Nov. 2006. [Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33715.pdf]
The issue is whether certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities being conducted by the Department of Defense "statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees.... Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating CIA and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each."
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