Ackerman, Robert K. "Special Operations Forces Become Network-Centric." Signal, Mar. 2003. [http://www.afcea.org/signal/]
According to Brig. Gen. James W. Parker, USA, director of SOCOM's Center for Intelligence and Information Operations, "[n]etwork-centric warfare proved to be a key enabler for U.S. special operations forces to rout the Taliban in Afghanistan.... These forces were empowered by shared situational awareness and robust communications that allowed them to maximize the effects of air and naval support against Taliban positions."
Atkinson,
Rick. "Special, Not Super." Washington Post, 4 Oct. 2001,
A31.
The U.S. Special Forces "are among the best trained, best equipped and best conditioned soldiers of any army in any era.... [But] there are limits to what can be expected of these elite forces." In an unconventional campaign, such as they will be called upon to conduct in Afghanistan, "the ability of the U.S. military to think in unorthodox terms will be as important as valor, tenacity and firepower."
Beckett, Ian F.W. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750. London: Routledge, 2001.
According to Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), the author "provides a long-term historical overview of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies." Beckett stresses "the historical and contemporary habit of Great Powers to take a relative lack of interest in counterinsurgency."
Bennett, Richard M. Elite Forces: The World’s Most Formidable Secret Armies. London: Virgin Press, 2003.
Peake, Studies 47.3, finds that "[t]here are numerous unit misidentifications, British and American, and the historical details cannot be accepted as written.... Bennet’s topic is timely, but the book is unreliable."
Berger, Mark T., and Douglas A. Borer. "The Long War: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Collapsing States." Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 197-215.
Best, Richard A., Jr., and Andrew Feickert. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 6 Dec. 2006. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22017.pdf.
A judicious look at the issues surrounding the 9/11 Commission's Recommendation 32, which called for responsibility for all covert and clandestine paramilitary activities to be shifted to the Defense Department.
Birtle, Andrew J. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006.
Cassidy, Parameters 37.4 (Winter 2007-08), comments that this is a "gem of a book." It has "eight full chapters on the development, propagation, and implementation of counterinsurgency and contingency operations doctrine." In his conclusion, the author assesses "the impact and value of the entire corpus of Vietnam-era counterinsurgency doctrine vis-à-vis the lack of military success in Vietnam."
Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), note that this work is "devoid of conceptual innovations" but deals with its time span in an "engaging and incisive fashion."
Boot, Max. War Made New: Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today. New York: Gotham, 2007.
For Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), this work is "highly readable, but also a highly schematic treatment of the dramatic changes in the character of warfare over five centuries." The book "is engaging and well written," but "does little to contextualize the changes" cataloged from 1500 to the present.
Briscoe, Charles H., et al. All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq. Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, 2006.
Dugat, Air & Space Power Journal 21.4 (Winter 2007), calls this "an eye-opening account" of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This is "a superb picture of th[e] war and its aftermath.... Written chronologically, the study covers details down to the hour when the planning stage began.... Some portions seem repetitive, however, and several times the authors’ clear recounting of operations makes the summaries unnecessary."
Brown, Bryan D. ("Doug") [GEN/USA] "U.S. Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century." Joint Force Quarterly 40 (1st Quarter 2006): 38-43. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/issue40.htm]
The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, (USSOCOM), traces the early history of U.S. special forces from OSS through the years of ups and downs in terms of attention paid to such forces. Why such inaction? General Brown states that it was due to the fact that "the services did not view Special Operations as vital to national defense, and they could not agree on its substance, funding, or how it would be controlled." The turning point was the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Nunn-Cohen amendment in 1987. Dramatic change has followed Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's designation of USSOCOM as the lead element in planning the war on terror.
Brown, Jason M. [MAJ/USAF] "To Bomb or Not to Bomb? Counterinsurgency, Airpower, and Dynamic Targeting." Air & Space Power Journal 21, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 75-85.
"Editorial Abstract: Air strikes, independent from ground operations, are known as 'dynamic targeting.' These types of strikes have typically been counterproductive in counterinsurgency campaigns due to subsequent collateral damage, whether real or perceived. However, Major Brown asserts that commanders and planners who integrate dynamic targeting into the counterinsurgency campaign using careful target selection; quick, precise employment; and solid assessment of the enemy and population will produce positive, tangible results."
Busch, Briton Cooper. Bunker Hill to Bastogne: Elite Forces and American Society. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2006. 2007. [pb]
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