MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Counterinsurgency

Q - Sha

Record, Jeffrey. Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2007.

Neiberg, Proceedings 133.9 (Sep. 2007), declares that this book's "brevity and clarity of writing make it accessible" to a wide audience. The author stresses the role of external assistance to the success of insurgencies. He attributes America's lack of success against insurgencies (indeed, lack of adeptness) to a failure to think beyond the use of force and adjust to this form of warfare.

For Markel, Parameters 38.3 (Autumn 2008), the author highlights the view that the major schools of thought on why insurgencies succeed or fail do not "accord the factor of external support its due weight.... He illustrates the importance of such help with brief but pithy analyses of prominent insurgent victories.... Unfortunately for Record, his analysis of the current war in Iraq is a 'snapshot in time' and no longer up to date."

Rich, Paul B., and Richard Stubbs, eds. The Counter-Insurgent State: Guerrilla Warfare and State Building in the Twentieth Century. New York: St. Martin's, 1997.

Rid, Thomas, and Marc Hecker. War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009.

Cassidy, Parameters 36.4 (Winter 2009-2010), notes that this work "analyzes the effects of media and information on the current struggle to influence the perception of the populations within and across insurgencies.... War 2.0 sees the public and the media as the ... central battlefield where information is preponderantly open source, public, and intended for external use.... [I]n the new style of conflict ... modern information technology amplifies acts of violence.... The objective of information operations in irregular warfare is to win the competition for legitimacy in the eyes of the population."

Robinson, Donald B. The Dirty Wars: Guerrilla Actions and Other Forms of Unconventional Warfare. New York: Delacorte, 1969.

Rooney, David. Guerrilla: Insurgents, Patriots, and Terrorists from Sun Tzu to Bin Laden. London: Brassey's UK, 2004.

From publisher: "Tracing the origins of guerrilla theories back to the Maccabees, the author moves on through the Napoleonic Age and the Boer Wars before considering Michael Collins, Mao Tse Tung, T E Lawrence, Castro and Guevara, and the Guerrillas of World War Two before arriving at the current situation with Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden."

Rothstein, Hy S. Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Maitre, Air & Space Power Journal 21.3 (Fall 2007), notes that the author is "a retired career special-forces officer with 30 years' active duty." His "concise, well-documented review of the literature, which defines the context of special operations and the arena of unconventional warfare, transforms several vague definitions into clear terminology." Rothstein "argues that despite significant investment in developing special operations, the military lacks the institutional capability of engaging opponents with irregular methods. Employing SOF in a mission does not automatically constitute a special operation."

For Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), "Rothstein does an excellent job of laying out the requirements for conducting unconventional warfare and uses his analysis of operations in Afghanistan to expose the failures of the US military, more specifically, of US special operations forces.... The only major shortcoming of the book is that it focuses primarily on the infrastructure requirements of an unconventional capability." Moir, Military Intelligence 35.2 (Apr.-Jun. 2009), says that this work "poses important questions that may guide decision making and organizational structure for conflicts, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, that require UW capabilities."

Russell, Charles A., and Robert E. Hildner. "Intelligence and Information Processing in Counterinsurgency." Air University Review 24 (Jul-Aug. 1973): 46-56. [Petersen]

Russell, James A. Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewah Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010.

From publisher: "Between 2005 and 2007,... some U.S. units [began] integrating counterinsurgency tactics and full-spectrum operations to great effect." The author "outlines how this change was spearheaded by the innovative actions of brigade and company commanders in Anbar and Ninewah."

Sarkesian, Sam C.

1. The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflict. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986.

2. Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.

McCombie, Parameters, Autumn 1995, sees this as a "scholarly, well-researched work," providing "an excellent analysis of the topic to readers who have some background in Vietnam studies or unconventional warfare." Sarkesian's "conclusions are supported by modern events in Malaysia." Despite the "brevity" of his section on Vietnam, the author "allows the reader to see easily the contrasting styles, successes, and failures of the two wars." In his valuable last chapter, Sarkesian "provides a scholarly analysis of the nature of future wars and the ability of US forces to conduct them efficiently."

3. ed. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare. Chicago: Precedent, 1975.

Schiattareggia, M. H. [Pseud.] "Counterintelligence in Counterguerrilla Operations." Studies in Intelligence 57, no. 2 (Jun. 2013): 39-63. [Originally published in Studies in Intelligence 6, no. 3 (Summer 1962).]

"[W]hile it is manifestly impossible for counterintellgence forces to carry out by themselves the whole responsibility for counter-guerrilla operations, their role in these operations is a critical one on which the success of the enterprise can very well hang."

Shackley, Theodore. The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.

Theodore (Ted) G. Shackley, retired CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations, died on 9 December 2002 at the age of 75. He was a three-time recipient of the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. J.Y. Smith, "Theodore Shackley Dies; Celebrated CIA Agent," Washington Post, 13 Dec. 2002, B8.

According to Pforzheimer, this is "a primer of the essential steps for effective counterinsurgency operations in areas important to the United States." Constantinides sees the work as "unmistakably that of a man who has studied the problems as well as having faced them." However, there is "insufficient discussion of the problems and difficulties involved once a nation is committed in a counterinsurgency effort." For Lowenthal, this book "[m]ay be somewhat dated in the post-Cold War world."

Shafer, D. Michael. Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Moise: "A comparison of Greece, the Phillippines, and Vietnam."

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