Mattox, Raymond M., and Peter S. Rodgers. "Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: The Foundation and Implications of the New U.S. Doctrine." Strategic Insights 6, no. 6 (Dec. 2007). [http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si] Mattox, Raymond M., and Peter S. Rodgers. "Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: The Foundation and Implications of the New U.S. Doctrine." Strategic Insights 6, no. 6 (Dec. 2007). [http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si]
This student thesis from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School suggests that Field Manual (FM) 3-24 on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations "is a necessary step in developing an effective and coherent U.S. approach to COIN. However, it fails to incorporate some more contemporary social movement theory explanations into its strategies. For example, it fails to recognize the relative importance political inclusion in counterinsurgency strategies versus other variables, such as security, as a primary means of success in counterinsurgency campaigns."
McClintock, Michael. Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counter-terrorism, 1940-1990. New York: Pantheon Books, 1992.
Choice, Jul./Aug. 1992, identifies the author as a "human rights monitor" who "contends that the US has waged 'dirty war'... around the world since the end of WW II." McGehee, from <cloaks-and-daggers@sjuvm.stjohns.edu>, 21 Jun. 1996, calls this an "overlooked book" that "is a finely researched examination of the use of the covert arms of the U.S. Government in subverting or sustaining foreign governments."
A Namebase reviewer comments that "McClintock's numerous quotes from military manuals and experts begin to drag after a few hundred pages, but his material on Edward Lansdale, and on President Kennedy's love affair with Special Forces, are almost worth the effort it takes to wade through them."
McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counterinsurgency. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1966.
Metz, Steven. "A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support after the Cold War." Parameters 25 (Autumn 1995): 31-41.
Metz, Steven. "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency." Parameters 37. no. 4 (Winter 2007-2008): 20-32.
Following the events of 9/11, "insurgency was again viewed as a strategic threat.... The global campaign against violent Islamic extremists forced the United States military to undertake counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.... The military services scrambled to develop new concepts and doctrine. [footnote omitted] Counterinsurgency ... became a centerpiece for Army and Marine Corps training.... There is a problem, however: As the American military relearned counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine, it may not have gotten them right."
Metz, Steven, and Raymond A. Millen. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response." Special Warfare 17 (Feb. 2005): 6-21.
Mockaitis, Thomas R. Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008.
Keiser, Proceedings 134.10 (Oct. 2008), notes that the author believes that behind the mistakes made in Iraq "are longer term structural deficiencies." Mockaitis' "recommendations regarding the absolute need for our Services to greatly strengthen COIN training and organization make good sense."
Nagl, John A. "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning during the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War." World Affairs 161 (Spring 1999): 193-199.
Nagl, John A. [LTCOL/USA] Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. [pb]
An advertisement for the 2005 paperback edition of this work notes that it includes "a new preface reflecting on the author's combat experience in Iraq."
According to Millen, Parameters 34.3, "this book compares ... the British approach to counterinsurgency in Malaya with the American approach in Vietnam.... Despite minor flaws, John Nagl's book is a valuable asset for identifying key aspects of a successful counterinsurgency strategy." Freedman, FA 83.6, says that "the point of Nagl's book is that the British managed to learn from early mistakes and adapt to the situation."
For Hoffman, Proceedings 132.3 (Mar. 2006), this work is "an extremely relevant text. Those interested in understanding the difficulties faced by Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, or who wnat to grasp the intricacies of the most likely form of conflict for the near future, will gain applicable lessons."
Newman, Bob. Guerrillas in the Mist: A Battlefield Guide to Clandestine Warfare. Boulder, CO: Paladin, 1997.
O'Neill, Bard E.
1. Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare. Washington, DC: Brasseys, 1990.
2. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. 2d ed. Washington, DC: Potomac, 2005.
O'Neill, Bard E, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts, eds. Insurgency in the Modern World. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980.
Osanka, Franklin Mark, ed. Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961. Intro., Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Free Press, 1962.
The thematic thrust of this work is made plain in the subtitle, in that the "major emphasis" ("Preface," p. xi) is on the use of guerrilla warfare by Communist groups and movements.
Oseth, John M. "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict." Naval War College Review 37 (Nov.-Dec. 1984): 19-36. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/since45.htm]
Petraeus, David H. [LTGEN/USA], and James F. Amos [LTGEN/USMC]. Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) No, 3-24, Dec. 2006; Washington, DC: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) No 3-33.5, Dec. 2006.
Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), find that the manual "provides a framework that draws on virtually all the key lessons that have been proposed by the wider literature on counterinsurgency.... What remains unanswered is how Counterinsurgency actually translates into practice on the ground in Iraq and elsewhere."
See also U.S. Army and Marine Corps, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual [COIN FM] (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
Polk, William R. A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.
Kahl, FA 86.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2007), notes that the author has found that "coercion has more often than not been ineffective -- or counterproductive" -- in insurgency situations. Polk "provides ample proof that occupying armies ... find it excruciatungly difficult to use legitimacy to defeat local insurgents and then exit gracefully."
Pustay, John. Counterinsurgency Warfare. New York: Free Press, 1965. [Wilcox]
Record, Jeffrey. Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2007.
Neiberg, Proceedings 133.9 (Sep. 2007), declares that this book's "brevity and clarity of writing make it accessible" to a wide audience. The author stresses the role of external assistance to the success of insurgencies. He attributes America's lack of success against insurgencies (indeed, lack of adeptness) to a failure to think beyond the use of force and adjust to this form of warfare.
For Markel, Parameters 38.3 (Autumn 2008), the author highlights the view that the major schools of thought on why insurgencies succeed or fail do not "accord the factor of external support its due weight.... He illustrates the importance of such help with brief but pithy analyses of prominent insurgent victories.... Unfortunately for Record, his analysis of the current war in Iraq is a 'snapshot in time' and no longer up to date."
Rich, Paul B., and Richard Stubbs, eds. The Counter-Insurgent State: Guerrilla Warfare and State Building in the Twentieth Century. New York: St. Martin's, 1997.
Robinson, Donald B. The Dirty Wars: Guerrilla Actions and Other Forms of Unconventional Warfare. New York: Delacorte, 1969.
Wilcox identifies this work as a "[g]eneral overview."
Rooney, David. Guerrilla: Insurgents, Patriots, and Terrorists from Sun Tzu to Bin Laden. London: Brassey's, 2004.
Rothstein, Hy S. Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.
Maitre, Air & Space Power Journal 21.3 (Fall 2007), notes that the author is "a retired career special-forces officer with 30 years’ active duty." His "concise, well-documented review of the literature, which defines the context of special operations and the arena of unconventional warfare, transforms several vague definitions into clear terminology." Rothstein "argues that despite significant investment in developing special operations, the military lacks the institutional capability of engaging opponents with irregular methods. Employing SOF in a mission does not automatically constitute a special operation."
For Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), "Rothstein does an excellent job of laying out the requirements for conducting unconventional warfare and uses his analysis of operations in Afghanistan to expose the failures of the US military, more specifically, of US special operations forces.... The only major shortcoming of the book is that it focuses primarily on the infrastructure requirements of an unconventional capability."
Russell, Charles A., and Robert E. Hildner. "Intelligence and Information Processing in Counterinsurgency." Air University Review 24 (Jul-Aug. 1973): 46-56. [Petersen]
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