MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Counterinsurgency

I - L

Irwin, Lew. "Filling Irregular Warfare's Interagency Gaps." Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009). [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/]

"The US government has consistently failed to apply the full weight of its instruments of power during irregular warfare conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, largely due to an inability or unwillingness of various agencies to agree upon the ends, ways, and means needed to prosecute those wars. When coupled with organizational structures that make disjointed visions and efforts the norm rather than the exception, this strategic failing has had dire consequences for US national security, thwarting the 'whole-of-government' approach needed to overcome irregular warfare's complex challenges. Accordingly, most participants and observers agree that the American government has to reorganize its interagency process to succeed in these wars and future national security challenges."

Jeffrey, James F. "Why Counterinsurgency Doesn't Work: The Problem Is the Strategy, Not the Execution." Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (Mer.-Apr. 2015): 178-180.

It is the "build" leg in the "clear, hold, and build" strategy that is the most ambitious. "[C]ritical reforms ... fail to survive without constant U.S. attention.... Once U.S. forces leave, a situation similar to that seen in Iraq after 2011 is all but inevitable.... Counterinsurgency was a recipe for defeat and retrenchment in the recent past, just as it was in the 1970s and will be again."

Joes, Anthony James. America and Guerrilla Warfare. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000.

Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), view this as "a straight-forward, chronological, country-by-country view of US involvement in counterinsurgency operations." Overall, the author's "historical examination of US 'small wars' is ponderous and provides no new insights."

Joes, Anthony James. Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.

Freedman, FA 83.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2004), comments that the author "has an irritating tendency to convey the size of all foreign countries as multiples of arbitrarily chosen U.S. states." Nevertheless, "there is a lot of knowledge packed into these pages, the detail on particular cases is often fascinating, and the lessons, in the end, are sensible and highly topical."

For Fellenz, Proceedings 131.1 (Jan. 2005), this work "is a comprehensive study of insurgency and the struggles nations have faced to contain them.... The inner workings of rebellion ... are exposed with a literary ease that will keep even the novice reader engaged." Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), find "little room" in the author's "analysis for the very different political forms that insurgencies take over time and space."

Thornton, I&NS 21.4 (Aug. 2006), calls this book "a solidly informative work using a wealth of sources." It is "well foot-noted," but "the indexing is very poor." In addition, the book has a "rushed quality" to it. Nevertheless, the author "brings together many campaigns and provides some commendable insights." To Manyx, JFQ 42 (3d Quarter 2006), this is "an intriguing contribution.... The multiple detailed examples Joes uses are a central strength." The book is "[t]horoughly researched and annotated"; in addition, it is "intelligently written and easily readable."

Joes, Anthony James. Urban Guerrilla Warfare. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2007.

For Brown, I&NS 26.4 (Aug. 2011), this "is an eminently readable and enlightening primer" on the urban combat phenomenon, "as well as a concise and valuable introduction to the subject of insurgency."

Kan, Paul Rexton. "Counternarcotics Operations within Counterinsurgency: The Pivotal Role of Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 586-599.

"Intelligence efforts against drug trafficking must adapt to anti-insurgency factors."

Kaplan, Fred.

1. "The End of the Age of Petraeus: The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency." Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2013): 75-90.

"The revival of COIN in the Age of Petraeus ... was in part the product of generational politics.... The 2007 turnaround in Iraq was remarkable, but it was also oversold. It was not due entirely to the surge or to COIN or to Petraeus personally.... Afghanistan was not susceptible to COIN. Eventually, Obama recognized this.... The hubbub over Petraeus and his COIN field manual was always overblown. Counterinsurgency is a technique, not a grand strategy."

2. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013.

Freedman, FA 92.3 (May-Jun. 2013), finds that the author "has a gift for bringing to life what might otherwise seem like arcane strategic debates by linking them to the personalities and biographies of the main participants." This is "a tale of hubris. Buoyed by their relative success in Iraq, Petraeus and his allies believed that the surge there offered a model for Afghanistan, despite being well aware that the two situations were very different."

Kausek, Jeffrey [Capt/USMC]. "Taking Counterinsurgency to the Countryside." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 11 (Nov. 2010): 34-37.

"The successful strategy used in Iraq will not work in Afghanistan, where winning over the resiliant rural populace is the answer to winning the war."

Kilcullen, David.

1. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Giustozzi, Perspectives on Politics 8.3 (Sep. 2010), notes that this book provides the author's "thinking on counterinsurgency up to 2008, with detailed case studies of his own experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as shorter discussions of a number of other cases such as East Timor and Indonesia.... The book is not strictly speaking an academic or scholarly text, as it is based to a great extent on the author's own experience. But it is sufficiently thoughful and informed by the literature to be relevant to political scientists."

For Lauterbach, A&SPJ 26.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2012), the author "offers an effective and relevant synthesis of theories of conflict in the contemporary security environment.... [O]ne best sees Kilcullen's work as an introduction to basic principles and a general guide to the conduct and implementation of a COIN strategy."

2. Counterinsurgency. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

From publisher: In this work, the author "brings together his most salient writings on this vitally important topic.... Filled with down-to-earth, common-sense insight, this book is the definitive account of counterinsurgency."

Klare, Michael T., and Peter Kornbluh. Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Anti-Terrorism in the Eighties. New York: Pantheon, 1988.

Krause, Lincoln B. "Insurgent Intelligence: The Guerrilla Grapevine." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 291-311.

The author examines the role and practice of intelligence in insurgency situations.

Lacquement, Richard A. [COL/USA] "Integrating Civilian and Military Activities." Parameters 40, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 20-33. [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/2010spring/40-1-2010_lacquement.pdf]

"The historical problem for the United States is the propensity to focus on counterinsurgency as a form of war and therefore to try to place it in the notionally discrete organizational inbox of our military establishment. But this is a mistake. Although all wars are complex political conflicts that defy exclusive reliance on any one element of national power, in countering an insurgency, the perils of over-reliance on the military instrument are particularly pronounced."

Ladwig, Walter C. "Managing Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Malaya." Military Review (May-Jun. 2007): 56-66.

"In the case of Malaya, maximum effectiveness was achieved when a single individual, Sir Gerald Templer, was empowered to coordinate all aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign. This model served the British well, and they replicated it in later counterinsurgency campaigns in Kenya and Cyprus."

Lindsay, Franklin A. "Unconventional Warfare." Foreign Affairs 40, no. 2 (Spring 1962): 264-274.

Linn, Brian M.

1. "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 90-114.

"It is not too harsh to conclude that for much of the Philippine War, American intelligence was as diffuse, unconnected and disorganized as the resistance the soldiers encountered in the field.... Only at the end of the war, and then only in an area close to the DMI's [Division of Military Information; created by MacArthur in December 1900] headquarters, was the army's official intelligence agency able to play a major role in ending Filipino resistance." What occurred instead was that the officers in the field developed and implemented their own localized intelligence methods.

2. The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

O'Toole, I&NS 6.1, calls Linn's work "the most authoritative study to date of this all-but-forgotten chapter of American military history.... Linn has selected four districts on ... Luzon for his study, and he concentrates on both the military and non-military aspects of the US Army's pacification program within each of them.... [A]s intelligence was an integral part of counter-insurgency operations, ... [the author] presents a far more detailed picture than has been published before."

Lomperis, Timothy. From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention and the Lessons of Vietnam. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Berger, et al, I&NS 22.6 (Dec. 2007), see the author sliding "too easily from one time in place in history to another." He "explains the Vietnam War as a crisis of political legitimacy," but his "argument lacks depth and the centrality of political legitimacy is hardly a new insight."  Overall, "Lomperis raises more questions than he answers."

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