MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Counterinsurgency

E - H

Ellis, John. From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary, and Counterinsurgency Warfare, from Romans to the Present. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995.

Etzioni, Amitai. "Whose COIN?" Joint Force Quarterly 60 (Jan. 2011). [http://www.ndu.edu]

"COIN is a complicated vessel that must be carefully guided through challenging terrain. It is often burdened by adding missions to its core task to end the insurgency and leave behind a legitimate and effective government. Some of these missions may be fully justified; however, those who pile them on should realize that they further burden COIN, and that it might be overloaded to a breaking point. They had best restrain their ambition as much as possible, which is the subtext of this whole article."

Fairbairn, Geoffrey. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version. Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1974. [pb]

Fall, Bernard B. "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." Naval War College Review 51 (Winter 1998): 46-57.

Reprinted from April 1965.

Finlan, Alastair. "Trapped in Dead Ground: U.S. Counter-insurgency Strategy in Iraq." Small Wars and Insurgencies 16, no. 1 (Mar. 2005): 1-21.

Fitzgerald, David. Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013.

From publisher: This work "analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan." Freedman, FA 92.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2013), finds that the author "is less concerned with the lessons of history than with the hostory of the lessons."

Galula, David. Counter-insurgency Warfare. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 2005. [pb]

From advertisement: The author served as a French military officer and attache in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria. In this work, he seeks to "define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics."

Gentile, Gian P. "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army." Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009). [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters]

"Population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) has become the American Army's new way of war. The principles and ideas that emerged out of the Army's counterinsurgency field manual (FM), FM 3-24 ... have become transcendent. The field manual has moved beyond simple Army doctrine for countering insurgencies to become the defining characteristic of the Army's new way of war. In the American Army today, everyone is a counterinsurgent.... Regrettably, the American Army's new way of war ... has become the only operational tool in the Army's repertoire to deal with problems of insurgency and instability throughout the world. Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable operational method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy. There are flaws and limitations that need to be exposed and considered."

Gompert, David C., et al. Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2009.

Cohen, Washington Post, 6 Dec. 2009, finds that this book "typifies much of the contemporary Rand product: brief, lots of bullets and diagrams, thumbnail sketches of conflicts, and a conclusion pleading for further research."

Gray, Colin S. "Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory." PRISM 3, no. 3 (Jun. 2012): 17-32. [http://www.ndu.edu/press]

"The dominant claim in th[is] article is that much of the debate of recent years among rival tribes of scholarly warriors over COIN and counterinsurgency doctrine could be rendered more coherent and useful if it were conducted in the intellectual context of strategy's general theory. When COIN is placed properly in its conceptual setting as a thought and activity set necessarily housed under the big tent of the general theory of strategy, truly helpful perspective and discipline apply."

Greentree, Todd. Crossroads of Intervention: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008.

Keiser, Proceedings 134.8 (Aug. 2008), notes the author's view that "U.S. involvement in Central America during the 1980s clearly demonstrated the limits of intervention and use of force in internal conflicts." This work shows that Greentree's "experience as a U.S. foreign service officer in Central America and his professorship at the Naval War College have served him well."

For Cohen, Washington Post, 6 Dec. 2009, this "book weaves together personal knowledge and scholarly study and reminds us of forgotten conflicts in Central America that still have much teach us about small wars. As miserably unpopular as the Salvadoran conflict was,... it succeeded in defeating a communist insurgency that once stood on the verge of success."

Gregg, Heather S. "Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding Counterinsurgency." Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009). [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/]

"The short-term goals of COIN are now fairly well understood: engage the population and win their support. Whichever side wins the support of the population ... wins the battle. The battle is not the war, however. The long-term goal of a counterinsurgency campaign requires the creation of a functioning state, a government that can stand on its own, provide for its citizens, and promote regional and international stability; this achievement is victory in a counterinsurgency. Transitioning from the short-term success of population engagement to long-term viability of the host nation is far more difficult and less understood."

Hammes, Thomas X. "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation." Strategic Forum (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University) 214 (Jan. 2005): 1-7.

"Fourth-generation warfare, which is now playing out in Afghanistan and Iraq, is a modern form of insurgency. Its practitioners seek to convince enemy political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.... Because it is organized to ensure political rather than military success, this type of warfare is difficult to defeat."

Hammes, Thomas X. [COL/USMC] The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Osceola, WI: Zenith, 2004.

From advertisement: The author shows "how war is evolution, not revolution, and that a 'weaker' opponent will continually evolve to use ways to avoid direct military engagement. Instead of winning militarily, an insurgency will work to test the political will of a more powerful nation to stay the course during a war.... He also examines in detail 'transnational' enemies like Al Qaeda, and how the U.S. military's focus on high-tech weapons designed to overpower an enemy in a short amount of time means little when the enemy has a different concept of the time the conflict will last."

Hoffman, Frank G. "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?" Parameters 37, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 71-87.

"The newly issued Army/Marine counterinsurgency (COIN) manual ... is a product of our collective understanding of insurgency and ongoing experiences in Iraq. It is also the product of various schools of thought about modern insurgencies, including what can be called the classical school, based on the concepts of Mao and revolutionary warfare." This article seeks "to capture the impact and implications of the classical school on the new doctrine, as well as evaluate the final product."

Huntington, Samuel P. Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961. New York: Glencoe, 1962.

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