Cable, Larry E.
1. "Piercing the Mists: Limited and Ambiguous Conflicts." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 59-76.
Cable's article examines "the significant and qualitative alteration that might occur in both the formulation and execution of policy in situations involving actual or imminent insurgency, partisan guerrilla conflict, terrorism, and strategic special operations."
2. Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War. New York: New York University Press, 1986.
Gibson, Library Journal (1986) (via Amazon.com), believes that the author "succeeds in showing that America's failure in Vietnam was the result of faulty military doctrine, not a loss of will." lesson from the past were too often "invalid, leading to an almost total misunderstanding of the struggle in Vietnam." This work is "well researched and well written," and it "strongly challenges the idea that the United States could have won in Vietnam."
Campbell, Arthur. Guerrillas: A History and Analysis. New York: John Day, 1968.
Cann, John P. Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-74. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1997.
Campbell, IJI&C 11.4, notes that this book "covers Portugal's counterinsurgency campaigns ... in three of its colonies: Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea." The author depends heavily on interviews with participants. "On the whole, Portuguese forces were seldom caught by surprise, suggesting that their intelligence system functioned efficiently."
Carter, Marshall N. "To Kill or Capture." Marine Corps Gazette 57 (Jun. 1973): 31-35.
Petersen: "Counter-guerrilla operations based on intelligence."
Caslen, Robert L., Jr., and Bradley S. Loudon. "Forging a Comprehensive Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations." PRISM 2, no. 3 (Jun. 2011). [http://www.ndu.edu/press]
"The single most important prerequisite to success in future counterinsurgency operations is the establishment of conditions that facilitate and enable a whole-of-government approach forged from a unity of effort and purpose. To realize this, key governmental stakeholders must foster permissive rather than restrictive organizational environments where cooperation and coordination are the standard rather than the exception."
Cassidy, Robert M.
1. "Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars." Parameters 36, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 73-83.
"[T]his article aims to distill some of the more relevant counterinsurgency lessons from the American military's experiences during Vietnam and before.... This analysis also offers a brief explanation of US military culture and the hitherto embedded cultural obstacles to learning how to fight guerrillas."
2. Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.
Corum, JFQ 44 (1st quarter 2007), notes that the author "examines the problems that major powers face in dealing with modern counterinsurgency." He "provides three case studies as a base of analysis: the United States, Britain, and Russia." The reviewer finds that "Cassidy is on solid ground in his highly critical analysis of the U.S. military in its understanding of modern counterinsurgency." However, when he discusses "the cultures of militaries with which he does not have personal experience, the author is much weaker."
According to Flavin, Parameters 37.4 (Winter 2007-08), the author provides "the key historical studies, research papers, and policy initiatives that have shaped the United States and United Kingdom militaries' approach to counterinsurgency and stability operations, many of which have not been previously collected in a single source." Cassidy "emphasizes that the majority of successful operations have employed indigenous forces."
Chaliand, Gérard, ed. Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982.
Cimbala, Stephen J. "Amorphous Wars." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 73-89.
"This study concerns the relationship between intelligence and amorphous wars."
Collins, John M. America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1991.
Corum, James S. [LTCOL/USAR (Ret.)]
1. Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy. St. Paul, MN: Zenith, 2007.
Longino, Proceedings 133.7 (Jul. 2007), says that the author "presents a well-researched and thought-provoking analysis of what must be done to respond and why" to a type of warfare in Iraq "that arguably took many military professionals by surprise."
2. "On Airpower, Land Power, and Counterinsurgency: Getting Doctrine Right." Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 93-97.
FM 324 keeps "the discussion of the various aspects of military operations in counterinsurgency ... to basic theory and guidelines. The doctrine was addressed to the strategic planner and operator and was not intended as a guide to the employment of specific technologies and tactics.... What the doctrine does stress is the need to understand the context of counterinsurgency and how airpower fits into that context."
Cross, James Eliot. Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963.
Wilcox: "Basic overview of the topic."
Deady, Timothy K. "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902." Parameters 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 53-68.
The author provides a "brief review" of the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902, examines "the strategic and operational lessons of America's successful campaign," considers "the belligerents' policy goals, strategies, and their centers of gravity," and identifies "lessons applicable for winning today's counterinsurgencies."
Downs, Michael L. [LTCOL/USAF] "Rethinking the Combined Force Air Component: Commander's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Approach to Counterinsurgency." Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 3 (Fall 2008). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/downs.html]
From abstract: In Iraq and Afghanistan, the "air component finds itself ill equipped to handle" the "unique and complex intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements" of counterinsurgency operations "since it still adheres to a doctrine of major theater war. The author provides historical context, offers an alternative approach to managing ISR, and recommends changes to doctrine."
Steven Maceda [MAJ/USAF], "Control of Theater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Ground Commander," Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 4 (Winter 2008), disagrees with Downs' "proposal to use the close air support request process for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)." This process "still does not allow the flexibility in execution required by the ground commander.... The combined air operations center (CAOC) must allow decentralized execution of ISR assets -- particularly full-motion-video platforms -- by delegating tactical control of platforms apportioned to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) during execution."
Dunlap, Charles J., Jr. [MGEN/USAF]
1. "Air-Minded Considerations for Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine." Air & Space Power Journal 21, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 63-74.
Abstract: "[P]ublication of Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, reflects a distinctly 'surface-minded' perspective. Since airpower possesses unique capabilities, such as speed, range, flexibility, and persistence, [Dunlap] proposes exploiting these 'air-minded' viewpoints to enlarge and enhance what is currently a service-centric doctrine. [He] suggests that doing so would produce a much-improved and well-rounded joint approach."
2. "Developing Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine: An Airman's Perspective." Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 86-92.
The Army's new Field Manual (FM) 324 (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 333.5), Counterinsurgency, "superbly articulate[s] a thoughtful landpower [emphasis in original] perspective on the complicated challenge of counterinsurgency (COIN). It does not purport to be, however, a full-dimensional joint approach.... [T]he various groundcentric COIN strategies attempted in Iraq over the years may have proven costly and time-consuming. Exploiting the full capabilities of the whole joint team would seem the wiser course given the complexities of COIN.
3. "Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today." Parameters 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 52-66.
The author describes the revised Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency (COIN) manual -- Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2 -- as "airpower 'lite.'" The manual's "examination of airpower is confined to a brief, five-page annex that essentially conceives airpower as aerial artillery.... In perhaps no other area has the manual been proven more wrong by the events of 2007. As this article will outline, the profound changes in airpower's capabilities have so increased its utility that it is now often the weapon of first recourse in COIN operations, even in urban environments."
Duyvesteyn, Isabelle. "Hearts and Minds. Cultural Awareness and Good Intelligence: The Blueprint for Successful Counter-Insurgency?" Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 4 (Aug. 2011): 445-459.
The author "argues that the hearts and minds ideas, the emphasis on intelligence and cultural awareness[,] are often problematic both for their methodological foundation and empirical weight."
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