MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Overviews

A - G

Adiseshiah, W.T. "The Role of Intelligence in War Strategy." Military Review 34, no. 12 (Dec. 1954): 83-87. [Petersen]

Arkin, William M. Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs and Operations in the 9/11 World. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005.

From http://www.codenames.org: "From 'Able Ally' to 'Zodiac Beauchamp,' this book identifies more than 3,000 code names and details the plans and missions for which they stand.... The emphasis [is] on names that are current since the end of the Cold War, are of historical importance, and are not otherwise in the public domain."

According to Dana Priest, "Book of U.S. Code Names Challenges Secrecy: Author Hopes to Undermine Agencies' Ability to Make Decisions in the Dark," Washington Post, 23 Jan. 2005, A7, "Arkin gleaned his list of code names from Pentagon and intelligence agency documents he has obtained, and from similar briefings he has read and copied, or discussed with longtime sources."

Eric Schmitt, "Commandos Get Duty on U.S. Soil," New York Times, 23 Jan. 2005, finds that the Web site for Arkin's book mentions publicly for the first time the existence of "a small group of super-secret commandos" standing "ready with state-of-the-art weaponry to swing into action to protect the presidency" during Inauguration week.... These commandos, operating under a secret counterterrorism program code-named Power Geyser,... belong to the Joint Special Operations Command."

Killebrew, Parameters 36 (Summer 2006), comments that "[w]hether the reader agrees with Arkin's motives or not, the information contained inside Code Names makes for a fascinating read for any national security specialist. So far as can be ascertained, the data are correct and detailed.... Code Names is a valuable reference for military planners and for US (or foreign) security professionals."

For Donnini, Air & Space Power Journal 22.4 (Winter 2008), this is not a book to sit down and read cover to cover. It is in essence "a gigantic index.... Dedicated readers, including students of national security policies, will look for specific topics in small doses or cover sections of interest in a measured, incremental approach."

Armstrong, Peter F. "Capabilities and Intentions." Marine Corps Gazette 70 (Sep. 1986): 38-47. [Petersen]

Baggett, Lee, Jr. "C3I Requirements within the Atlantic Command." Signal 42 (Jun. 1988): 31-32.

Billigmeier, Scott D., and Edmund M. Glabus. "From World War II to Desert Storm:  Perspectives on Military Intelligence."  Officer Review, Jun. 1998, 2-5.

Carroll, James. House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006.

Peake, Studies 50.4 (2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), notes that the author is the anti-war activist son of the DIA's first director, Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll. This is an "often spiteful book" that does, however, provide "unique insight into the life of the father and the origins of DIA." Nevertheless, the author's "focus is on blaming the Pentagon and its culture of power" for most of the evils of the world. "Carroll attempts to buttress [many of] his assertions with references to intelligence," but his sources (where they are given) do not support his assessments.

For Record, Parameters 36.4 (Winter 2006-2007), this "polemic against American might and those who have served it ... is as much about [Lt. Gen.] Joseph F. Carroll and his estranged son as it is about war and US foreign policy." This book "is a failed ... attempt to exorcize the Pentagon of what Carroll believes to be the inherent evil of US military power. It deserves no place in the libraries of serious students of American defense policy."

Deacon, Richard [Donald McCormick]. The Silent War: A History of Western Naval Intelligence. Newton Abbot, UK: David & Charles, 1978. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1978.

Sexton notes that The Silent War is a "[s]urvey history of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the British Naval Intelligence Division (NID) from their inception[s] to the 1980s." To Constantinides, the book is "[e]asy to read," but "must be approached with caution because it is a mixture of good sections ... and weak ones, with debatable and (at times) sweeping conclusions." The World War I and World War II sections are the strongest parts of the book; earlier and later coverage is weak.

Defense Analysis. Editors. "Intelligence." 3 (Jun. 1987): Entire issue.

DeLanda, Manuel. War in the Age of Intelligence Machines. Boston: MIT Press, 1991.

Surveillant 2.1: This is a "history of high technology focusing on the role of the military in generating and using that technology." The author also "examines the interaction between machine intelligence and such paramilitary institutions as the CIA and the NSA."

Dreisziger, N.F., ed. Mobilization for Total War. Waterloo, Ontario: University of Waterloo, 1981.

Dunnigan, James F., and Albert A. Nofi. Dirty Little Secrets: Military Information You're Not Supposed to Know. New York: Quill, 1992. [pb]

Surveillant 2.2: "Includes descriptions of military intelligence failures 'they' would prefer you not hear about."

Dycus, Stephen. "The Role of Military Intelligence in Homeland Security." Louisiana Law Review 64 (Summer 2004): 779-807.

Elder, Gregory. "Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive." Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 (2006): 13-25. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Intelligence_War_2.htm]

This article explores "the role of tactical and operational intelligence in dictating force employment schemes and as a decisive element in five strategically significant battles -- the First Battle of Bull Run (1861), Tannenberg (1914), Midway (1942), Inchon (1950), and the Israeli air strike initiating the Six-Day War in 1967." The author argues that "it was neither technology nor material superiority that won the day, but accurate, timely, actionable intelligence, combined with leaders willing to treat intelligence as a primary factor in deciding outcomes."

Evans, Geraint. "Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure -- Putting the Wheels Back on the Intelligence Cycle." Defence Studies 9, no. 1 (Mar. 2009): 22-46.

The author examines "elementary misconceptions which surround the intelligence mechanism supporting the [military] command process, both in peacetime and on operations. Particular attention [is] paid to the orthodox function of the Intelligence Cycle [footnote omitted] as it is applied in a military context, as well as the relationship which exists between the intelligence staff and the chain of command."

Evans, Rob, Nicola Butler, and Eddie Goncalves. The Campus Connection: Military Research on Campus. London: Student CND, 1991.

Surveillant 2.5: "An anti-university/military alliance tract."

Faint, Donald R. [COL/USA] "Contingency Intelligence." Military Review 94, no. 7 (Jul. 1994): 59-63.

Ferris, John, and Michael I. Handel. "Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in Military Operations." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 1 (Jan. 1995): 1-58.

This article explores (1) "the connections between intelligence, the conduct of military operations and the art of command" as reflected in the arguments of Clausewitz; (2) in the modern era, using Drea's MacArthur's Ultra as a case study of the use and misuse of intelligence; and (3) in the future. The authors suggest that intelligence can be used to reduce uncertainty and thereby affect the actions of generals. The article also contains a detailed "review" of the merits of Drea's work.

Finnegan, John Patrick. Lineages comp., Romana Danysh. Military Intelligence. Army Lineage Series. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998. [http://www.history.army.mil/books/Lineage/mi/mi-fm.htm]

From the "Preface": "This book attempts to present an organizational history of Military Intelligence" in the U.S. Army "from its beginnings to the present. It makes no pretense at discussing the operational aspects of intelligence in detail.... [T]he book focuses its attention on the Army and necessarily slights the complex interrelationships between Army intelligence and other organizations in the intelligence community." Kruh, Cryptologia 26.2, calls this a "superb volume" that combines a narrative history of U.S. military intelligence with "lineages and heraldic data for 108 military intelligence units.... It is a unique history that belongs in your personal library."

Finnegan, John P. Military Intelligence: A Picture History. Arlington, VA: History Office, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, 1985. 2d. ed. Washington, DC: GPO, 1992.

Petersen says that Finnegan's work "contains valuable narrative description of military intelligence developments." To Sexton, the work is a "balanced overview." [Pages 26-32 cover OSS operations; pp. 116-127 are devoted to the Korean War.] FILS 12.4 calls the book a "valuable introductory study of the subject."

Fitzgerald, John M. The Impact of Modern Information Technology on the Structure of Military Intelligence at the Tactical Level. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. [Petersen]

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