Materials arranged chronologically.
Nolte, William. "Keeping Pace with the Revolution in Military Affairs: Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Challenge to Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 1 (2004): 1-10.
Building on the RMA, Operation Iraqi Freedom was an "organizational and operation success, enabled by technology." DoD and the military services "demonstrated an extraordinary ability to function in ways that should lead to a significant rethinking of many stereotypes." Other components of U.S. national security, including intelligence, either "must develop apace with the RMA" or "suffer the risk" that they "will be unable to contribute to -- or even compete with -- defense organizations in the making of national security decisions."
Wong, Edward. "New Iraq Agency to Hunt Rebels." New York Times, 31 Jan. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Iraqi and American officials said on 30 January 2004 that "[t]he Iraqi authorities, with the help of American intelligence agencies, are creating an intelligence service that will focus on rooting out guerrilla fighters," especially those from outside Iraq. "The service will employ some former agents of Saddam Hussein's security apparatus and will probably receive financing from the American government, the officials said." The CIA "is taking the lead in helping put together the new service, American officials said."
Scarborough, Rowan. "U.S. Search for bin Laden Intensifies." Washington Times, 23 Feb. 2004. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]
"The Pentagon is moving elements of a supersecret commando unit from Iraq to the Afghanistan theater to step up the hunt for Osama bin Laden. A Defense Department official said there are two reasons for repositioning parts of Task Force 121: First, most high-value human targets in Iraq, including Saddam Hussein, have been caught or killed. Second, intelligence reports are increasing on the whereabouts of bin Laden, the terror leader behind the September 11 attacks."
Paschall, Joseph F. "Tactical Information Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom." Marine Corps Gazette 88 (Mar. 2004): 56-59.
Priest, Dana. "Violence, Turnover Blunt CIA Effort in Iraq." Washington Post, 4 Mar. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The CIA station in Iraq "has grown to more than 300 full-time case officers and close to 500 personnel in total, including contractors and people on temporary assignment.... Despite the size of the contingent, the agency's efforts to penetrate Iraq's ethnic factions and gain intelligence about the insurgency have been hampered by continued violence, the use of temporary and short-term personnel, and the pressing demands of military commanders for tactical intelligence they can use in daily confrontations with armed insurgents."
Gellman, Brian. "Lessons Learned from OIF: An SF [Special Forces] Battalion S2's Perspective." Military Intelligence 30 (Apr.-Jun. 2004): 35-42.
The author provides an overview of networking by intelligence officers in Operation Iraqi Freedom and deals with other intelligence-related matters.
Emery, Norman. "Information Operations in Iraq." Military Review 84 (May-Jun. 2004):11-14.
Pincus, Walter, and Thomas E. Ricks. "Focus Shifts From Military Police to Intelligence." Washington Post, 11 May 2004, A15. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 11 May 2004, "[a] Senate hearing on the ... Iraq prison abuse scandal will swing the spotlight ... from the military police who committed the alleged offenses to the military intelligence community that oversaw them. In making that shift, senators said, they are likely to begin asking about the multiple chains of command that have blurred lines of responsibility in the U.S. effort in Iraq." According to a report by Army Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, a November 2003 order put the Abu Ghraib prison effectively under the control of military intelligence.
Wilson, Scott. "Chalabi Aides Suspected of Spying for Iran; Raid at Leader's Home Targeted His Associates." Washington Post, 22 May 2004, A20. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Members of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the political organization headed by Ahmed Chalabi, "are suspected of providing information to Iran on U.S. troop positions in Iraq..., according to U.S. and Iraqi officials familiar with three investigations" into the group. On 20 May 2004, "Iraqi police, backed by U.S. soldiers, raided Chalabi's home" and the offices of the INC. "Until recently, the group received $335,000 a month from the Pentagon for help in gathering prewar intelligence about Hussein's government and in finding his top lieutenants after the invasion."
Fulghum, David A. "Shooting Images." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 23 May 2005, 53-54.
U.S. Air Force F-15Es in the Gulf region are flying non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. The aircraft's sensors are being used to track insurgent gunmen and messengers or those who plant bombs and plan ambushes.
Filkins, Dexter. "Exile With Ties to C.I.A. Is Named Premier of Iraq." New York Times, 29 May 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Iyad Alawi, head of the Iraqi National Accord, an umbrella organization he set up in 1991 with the help of the U.S. government, was chosen on 28 May 2004 to be Iraq's "interim prime minister when the Americans transfer sovereignty ... on June 30.... As an exile, a member of the American-appointed Iraqi Governing Council and a longstanding recipient of C.I.A. financing, Dr. Alawi is likely to face sharp challenges to his credibility among the Iraqi people."
Brinkley, Joel. "Ex-C.I.A. Aides Say Iraq Leader Helped Agency in 90's Attacks." New York Times, 9 Jun. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to "several former intelligence officials," Iraqi prime minister-designate Iyad Alawi "ran an exile organization [the Iraqi National Accord] intent on deposing Saddam Hussein that sent agents into Baghdad in the early 1990's to plant bombs and sabotage government facilities under the direction of the C.I.A."
Ferris, John. "Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Toward a Revolution in Military Intelligence?" Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 199-225.
"Operation Iraqi Freedom provides.the first serious test" of the ideas associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). "C4ISR multiplied some forms of power more than others.... Little, however, seems to have changed below the corps level in land warfare." The RMA "has multiplied American strengths but not reduced American weaknesses."
Freedman, Lawrence. "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat." Survival 46, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 7-50.
Pound, Edward T. "The Iran Connection." U.S. News & World Report, 22 Nov. 2004, 32-48.
"A trove of secret intelligence reports spells out in chilling detail how Iraq's dangerous next-door neighbor is aiding the anti-U.S. insurgency."
Drechsler, Donald R. "Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq." Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 3-30.
From abstract: "Cultural, structural and bureaucratic barriers between the Department of State and the Department of Defense prevented effective integration, particularly in the postwar planning phase of Operation 'Iraqi Freedom'. In contrast, the postwar planning in Kosovo, under the PDD 56 interagency coordination process, could have served as a useful template for the political-military planning process.... Iraq demonstrated that partial State-Defense integration ... was insufficient for an undertaking of this magnitude."
Finlan, Alastair. "Trapped in Dead Ground: U.S. Counter-insurgency Strategy in Iraq." Small Wars and Insurgencies 16, no. 1 (Mar. 2005): 1-21.
Waller, Douglas, and Sally B. Donnelly. "Still Short in Iraq." Time, 14 Mar. 2005, 13.
This article explores the shortcomings of the U.S. Army's civil-affairs and psychological-operations units, including a shortfall of qualified reservists.
Schmitt, Eric. "U.S. Drones Crowding the Skies to Fight Insurgents in Iraq." New York Times, 5 Apr. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Military officials say that "the number of remotely piloted aircraft -- increasingly crucial tools in tracking insurgents, foiling roadside bombings, protecting convoys and launching missile attacks" -- has increased in the skies over Iraq "to more than 700 now from just a handful four years ago."
Hastedt, Glenn. "Public Intelligence: Leaks as Policy Instruments -- The Case of the Iraq War." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 419-439.
The author defines public intelligence as "secret intelligence that has become part of the societal debate over the conduct of American foreign policy." As Hastedt notes "[i]t is not enough to simply refer" to public intelligence as "leaked intelligence." He presents a "case study of orchestrated intelligence in the lead-up to the Iraq War," which makes interesting reading.
Gerth, Jeff. "Military's Information War Is Vast and Often Secretive." New York Times, 11 Dec. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to "documents and interviews with contractors, government officials and military personnel," the U.S. government "has been conducting an information war that is extensive, costly and often hidden." The goal is "to counter anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world." The 1,200-strong Fourth Psychological Operations Group based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, "turns out what its officers call 'truthful messages' to support" the government's objectives.
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