Calabresi, Massimo. "The Bin Laden Capture that Never Was." Time, 20 Mar. 2000, 24.Materials arranged chronologially.
Calabresi, Massimo. "The Bin Laden Capture that Never Was." Time, 20 Mar. 2000, 24.
A Presidentially approved plan for the CIA to help Pakistan organize a unit to slip into Afghanistan and capture Osama Bin Laden never got off the ground because of Pakistani footdragging.
Fenton, Ben. "CIA Tries to Bribe Taliban to Swap Sides." Electronic Telegraph, 11 Oct. 2001. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
"CIA agents were reported [on 10 October 2001] to be trying to bribe and cajole Taliban commanders to turn against the regime in the south and east of Afghanistan."
Ackerman, Robert K. "Commercial Imagery Aids Afghanistan Operations." Signal, Dec. 2001, 16 ff. [http://www.afcea.org/signal/]
Cloud, David S. "CIA Supplies Anti-Taliban Forces in South." Wall Street Journal, 7 Dec. 2001, A4.
Goodman, Glenn W. "The Power of the Word: U.S. Special Operations Forces Used Leaflets and Radio Broadcasts to Sway Afghans." Armed Forces Journal International 139 (February 2002): 30-31.
Ackerman, Robert K. "Technology Empowers Information Operations in Afghanistan." Signal, Mar. 2002, 17 ff. [http://www.afcea.org/signal/]
Newman, Richard J. "The Little Predator that Could." Air Force Magazine, Mar. 2002, 48-53.
Use of the Predator UAV in Afghanistan.
O'Hanlon, Michael E. "A Flawed Masterpiece." Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2002): 47-63.
"Operation Enduring Freedom has been, for the most part, a masterpiece of military creativity and finesse.... [However,] it has apparently failed to achieve a key war goal: capturing or killing Osama bin Laden and other top enemy leaders.... [T]he prospects for success ... were reduced considerably by U.S. reliance on Pakistan forces and Afghan militias for sealing off enemy escape routes.... [Nevertheless, o]n the whole, Operation Enduring Freedom has been masterful in both design and execution."
Moore, J. Daniel. "CIA Support to Operation Enduring Freedom" Military Intelligence (Jul.-Sep. 2002).
Jones, Frank L. "Army SOF in Afghanistan: Learning the Right Lessons." Joint Forces Quarterly 33 (Winter 2002-03): 16-22.
"The successes of military operations in Afghanistan are being jeopardized by misreading them. Although Special Operations Forces are credited with defeating Taliban and al Qaeda foces, too much emphasis can be put on coordinating ground and air attacks while recruiting anti-Taliban fighters is underestimated. The latter capacity resulted from employing SOF assets in unconventional warfare.... The rise of insurgent and irredentist movements..., coupled with asymmetric threats, demands a strategic vision for unconventional warfare."
McInnes, Colin. "A Different Kind of War? September 11 and the United States' Afghan War." Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 165-184.
Stallings, Ron and Michael Foley. "CI and HUMINT Operations in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom." Military Intelligence 29 (Oct.-Dec. 2003): 43-46.
The authors discuss the value of counterintelligence and human intelligence operations (including interrogation) in Afghanistan in 2003.
Jehl, Dounglas. "Two C.I.A. Operatives Killed in an Ambush in Afghanistan." New York Times, 29 Oct. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]
The CIA announced on 28 October 2003 that William Carlson and Christopher Glenn Mueller, former Special Forces officers and CIA contract employees, were killed near Shkin, in southeastern Afghanistan, on 25 October 2003.
Pincus, Walter. "2 CIA Employees Killed in Ambush: Ex-Special Forces Officers Worked in Eastern Afghanistan." Washington Post, 29 Oct. 2003, A20. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
William Carlson and Christopher Glenn Mueller, "former Special Forces officers working as contract employees in counterterrorism for the CIA[,] were killed in an ambush in eastern Afghanistan" on 25 October 2003. "The two were involved in what became a six-hour firefight between Taliban rebels and U.S.-led coalition and Afghan forces."
Coll, Steve.
This series of articles is based on Coll's Ghost Wars (2004).
1. "A Secret Hunt Unravels in Afghanistan: Mission to Capture or Kill al Qaeda Leader Frustrated by Near Misses, Political Disputes." Part 1 of 2. Washington Post, 22 Feb. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"In the years before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the CIA carried out a secret but ultimately unsuccessful manhunt for [Osama] bin Laden. It was based at first on [a] band of Afghan tribal agents, and later expanded to include other agents and allies.... But the search became mired in mutual frustrations, near misses and increasingly bitter policy disputes in Washington between the Clinton White House and the CIA."
2. "Flawed Ally Was Hunt's Best Hope: Afghan Guerrilla, U.S. Shared Enemy." Part 2 of 2. Washington Post, 23 Feb. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
In October 1999, the CIA plan was to initiate "secret intelligence and combat operations against bin Laden in partnership with guerrilla commander Ahmed Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance."
However, "Massoud was seen by some at the Pentagon and inside the Clinton Cabinet as a spent force commanding bands of thugs.... Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Henry H. 'Hugh' Shelton ... argued that Massoud's alliance was tainted and in decline. But at the CIA,... career officers passionately described Massoud ... as the United States' last, best hope to capture or kill bin Laden in Afghanistan before his al Qaeda network claimed more American lives."
Massoud was assassinated on 9 September 2001.
Scarborough, Rowan. "U.S. Search for bin Laden Intensifies." Washington Times, 23 Feb. 2004. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]
"The Pentagon is moving elements of a supersecret commando unit from Iraq to the Afghanistan theater to step up the hunt for Osama bin Laden. A Defense Department official said there are two reasons for repositioning parts of Task Force 121: First, most high-value human targets in Iraq, including Saddam Hussein, have been caught or killed. Second, intelligence reports are increasing on the whereabouts of bin Laden, the terror leader behind the September 11 attacks."
Priest, Dana, and Kamran Khan. "Al Qaeda Leaders May Be Cornered: Pakistani Forces Wage Battle on Afghan Border." Washington Post, 19 Mar. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to senior Pakistani and U.S. officials on 18 March 2004, "Pakistani security forces backed by U.S. spy planes were engaged in a pitched battle with tribal fighters and Islamic militants who were believed to be protecting key members of al Qaeda.... Hundreds of Pakistani troops backed by artillery and helicopter gunships were on the attack around the villages of Azam Warsak, Kaloosha and Shin Warsak in remote southern Waziristan province, officials said....
"As part of the coordinated spring offensive, U.S. troops are working the other side of the border in Afghanistan. The forces include the clandestine Task Force 121, a recently reconstituted Special Operations and CIA unit, other Special Forces teams and 11,000 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, said several U.S. defense officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Small CIA paramilitary teams are also active in the region, several counterterrorism officials said.
"Supporting the U.S. and Pakistani troops is a newly refined technology that allows for the quick processing and analysis of images and communications intercepts from U.S. Air Force spy planes, CIA drones and National Security Agency satellites. New techniques allow for speedy transfer of the information to commanders in the field, said counterterrorism officials."
Schmidt, Susan, and Dana Priest. "Civilian Charged In Beating of Afghan Detainee." Washington Post, 18 Jun. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 17 June 2004, a grand jury in North Carolina indicted David A. Passaro, "[a] former Army Special Forces soldier working as a contractor for the CIA in Afghanistan," on charges of "brutally assaulting a prisoner during three days of interrogations that ended in the Afghan man's death" on 21 June 2003. A U.S. official said that "Passaro was part of a clandestine paramilitary team made up of U.S. Special Forces and CIA personnel who capture and interrogate Taliban and al Qaeda members."
Wright, Robin. "In From the Cold and Able to Take the Heat." Washington Post, 12 Sep. 2005, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"[A]fter almost a quarter-century as a spy or station chief on at least four continents, [Henry 'Hank'] Crumpton has emerged from undercover to take the job as State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism -- with the very public rank of ambassador."
Crumpton "is the mysterious 'Henry' in the Sept. 11 commission report, which notes he persistently pressed the CIA to do more in Afghanistan before Osama bin Laden's terrorist spectaculars.... Tapped to head the CIA's Afghan campaign after the attacks, Crumpton is 'Hank' in Gary C. Schroen's 'First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan' and Bob Woodward's 'Bush at War.' Both books recount how Crumpton crafted a strategy partnering elite intelligence and military officers in teams that worked with the Afghan opposition.... The novel and initially controversial approach worked at limited cost in human life and materiel -- and avoided the kind of protracted U.S. ground war that the Soviet Union lost."
Wright, Robin. "State Dept. Losing a Top Figure in Terror War." Washington Post, 19 Dec. 2006, A5. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to a senior official on 18 December 2006, State Department counterterrorism chief Henry A. "Hank" Crumpton will leave the government in the new year. Crumpton, a career CIA covert officer, took over the State Department job in August 2005. The mysterious "Henry" in the 9/11 commission report, Crumpton "gained almost mythical fame after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks when he headed the CIA's campaign in Afghanistan, crafting a strategy that partnered elite intelligence and military officers in teams that worked with Afghan opposition to oust the Taliban."
Harding, Thomas. "Exclusive: SAS Chief Quits Over 'Negligence That Killed His Troops.'" Daily Telegraph (London), 1 Nov. 2008. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
Maj. Sebastian Morley, commander of D Squadron, 23 SAS, in Afghanistan, "has resigned..., accusing the Government of 'gross negligence' over the deaths of four of his soldiers.... Morley claims that Whitehall officials and military commanders repeatedly ignored his warnings that people would be killed if they continued to allow troops to be transported in the vulnerable Snatch Land Rovers."
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