Military Operations


Desert Shield/Storm

G - Z

Goodman, Sue, comp. Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991: Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Library, Sep. 1994. []

Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor [LTGEN/USMC (Ret.)]. The Generals' War. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995.

Gregory, Shaun. Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence in the Gulf War. Working Paper No. 238. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991.

Hammer, Joshua, and Douglas Waller. "Special Ops: The Top-Secret War." Newsweek, 18 Mar. 1991, 32.

Haselkorn, Avigdor. The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.

Hansen, IJI&C 13.3, finds that two of the author's basic theses -- "that there may have been an unprecedented intelligence failure in Iraq" and that "President Bush ... stopped the war because he feared that Saddam Hussein would use biological weapons if coalition forces pushed on to Baghdad" -- are "just plain wrong."

Hoffman, Daniel M. "A Beltway Warrior Looks at Gulf War Intelligence." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 119.1 (Jan. 1993): 86-89.

Johnson, Richard D.

1. PSYOP, the Gulf Paper War: Psychological Warfare Operations against the Iraqi Military and Civilian Establishments between November 1990 and February 1991. Titusville, FL: R.D. Johnson, 1992. [Gibish]

2. Seeds of Victory: Psychological Warfare and Propaganda. Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2004.

This is primarily a reference work. According to the publisher, it documents, "Psychological Warfare campaign methodologies and strategies used in Iraq." It has been "officially adapted" by the U.S. Army's Psychological Warfare Group Command "as an instructional and reference work for use within their company-level units."

Jones, Jeffrey B. "Psychological Operations in Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Urban Freedom." Special Warfare 7, no. 3 (Jul. 1994): 22-29. [Gibish]

Leadbetter, Wyland F., Jr., and Stephen J. Bury. "Prelude to Desert Storm: The Politicization of Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 43-54.

Nash, Douglas E. "Civil Affairs in the Gulf War: Administration of an Occupied Town." Special Warfare 7 (Oct. 1994): 18-27. [Gibish]

Rip, Michael Russell, and David P. Lusch.

1. "The Precision Revolution: The Navstar Global Positioning System in the Second Gulf War." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1994): 167-241.

"[T]he Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) [footnote omitted] and thermal night vision devices ... enabled Coalition forces to exploit the desert terrain with 24-hour-a-day freedom of maneuverability in all weather conditions, regardless of the lack of distinctive features and good roads." The article includes technical details of the system (pp. 179-194), and looks at use in aerial operations (fixed-wing and helicopter) (pp. 195- 201), air-breathing missiles (cruise and air-to-surface) (pp. 201-206), ground forces (pp. 206-216), and maritime operations (p. 216), as well as future military and civilian uses.

2. "The Navstar Global Positioning System in Operation Desert Storm." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 2 (Apr. 1995): 327-335.

This is a follow-up article, drawing on additional information. The authors conclude: "In the future, with the rapid reliance on GPS-guided precision weaponry, the efficacy of the US military's precision strike capability could well be dependent on the integrity of the 24-satellite Navstar Global Positioning System."

Russell, Richard L. "CIA's Strategic Intelligence in Iraq." Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 191-207.

This article "traces the uses and limitations of strategic intelligence in major dimensions of the Gulf War to include the warning and waging of war. The article concludes with an assessment or balance sheet of the strengths and weaknesses of strategic intelligence during the Gulf crisis. It draws insights from this case study to inform the future evolution of American intelligence and its support of statecraft, particularly in situations where policy makers face dilemmas posed by the use of armed force."

Smith, Bruce A. "U-2/TR-1s Provided Critical Data to Theater Commanders." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 Aug. 1991, 60-61.

Summe, Jack N. "PSYOP Support to Operation Desert Storm." Special Warfare 5 (Oct. 1992): 6-9. [Gibish]

Tanner, Marisa A. "U.S. Psychological Operations in the 1991 Gulf War." Defense Intelligence Journal 12 (2003): 41-65.

Towell, Pat. "Schwarzkopf Points Out Flaws in Wartime Intelligence." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 15 Jun. 1991, 1603.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA Support to the US Military During the Persian Gulf War. Washington, DC: 16 Jun. 1997. []

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield. 103d Cong., 1st Sess., August 1993. Supplement to Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War, published April 1992 by the House Armed Services Committee via Committee on Armed Services. []

Waller, Douglas. "Exclusive -- Behind Enemy Lines: The First Combat Photos of Green Beret Commandos on a Secret Mission Deep Inside Iraq." Newsweek, 28 Oct. 1991, 34.

Wickham, John A., Jr. [GEN/USA (Ret.)] "The Intelligence Role in Desert Storm." Signal, Apr. 1991, 12 ff. []

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