MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Military Operations

1990s

Desert Shield/Storm

A - F

Anderson, G.S. Charting the Storm: DMA's Role in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Final Report 10 Feb 92 - 21 Feb 93. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993.

Surveillant 3.4/5 finds that Charting the Storm illustrates "the impact that the availability or non-availability of cartographic support plays in modern military operations.... The increased dependency on these products was directly related to the increased sophistication of modern weapons systems."

Armstrong, Douglas G. "The Gulf War's Patched-Together Air Intelligence." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 118, no. 11 (Nov. 1992): 109-11.

Aviation Week & Space Technology. Editors. "Spacecraft Played Vital Role in Gulf War Victory." 22 Apr. 1991, 91.

The focus here is more on problems and lessons learned than on accomplishments. Among the issues mentioned are a backup of satellite imagery at processing facilities, "connectivity" problems, a lack of mapping information for the Gulf area, and insufficient communications satellite capability. The article calls the Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) a "technological hero of the war."

Ball, Desmond J. Intelligence in the Gulf War. Canberra: Australian National University, 1991.

Campen, Alan D., ed. The First Information War. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992.

According to Newman, AIJ 15.1, this monograph about Desert Shield/Desert Storm has "insights and details" that "are invaluable for the future." The book includes "many cogent references and endnotes."

Centner, Christopher M. "Intelligence, Gulf War Illnesses and Public Perceptions of Conspiracies." American Intelligence Journal 21, nos. 1 & 2 (Spring 2002): 37-45.

"Gulf War Syndrome has now blossomed as a locus for conspiracy theories rivaling Roswell.... Many veterans have been sold the idea that there is a conspiracy run by the government that threatens their very lives.... The health threats of Gulf War Illnesses are real, but the risk factors are suspicion and ignorance, not CW."

Clapper, James R., Jr. [MGEN/USAF] "Desert War Was Crucible for Intelligence Systems." Signal, Sep. 1991, 77 ff. [http://www.us.net/signal]

Covault, Craig. "Recon Satellites Lead Allied Intelligence Effort." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 4 Feb. 1991, 25-26.

U.S. reconnaissance satellite imaging is "the allied forces' primary source of information for bomb damage assessment and attack mission planning" in the Gulf War. The author also reviews the number and kinds of imaging spacecraft involved in this reconnaissance effort.

Drachman, Edward R., and Alan Shank. Presidents and Foreign Policy: Countdown to Ten Controversial Decisions. Ithaca, NY: SUNY Press, 1997.

The authors offer a case study of one major decision for each president from Truman to Clinton. It is possible to argue that there are better potential cases for each president than the ones selected for study, but those chosen are interestingly fitted into the authors' novel countdown approach. Chapter 9 considers President Bush's decision to end the Gulf War.

Larson, APSR 92.1, appreciates the authors' efforts to "present more objective criteria" than is normally the case in decision-making evaluation. Their evaluation scheme "seems plausible and reasonable on the face," but "it does not always work well when applied to specific cases." Nevertheless, "the case studies are well researched, concise, and provocative."

Estavanik, R.D. Intelligence and the Commander: Desert Shield/Storm Case Study. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1992.

Surveillant 3.2/3: "[N]either the CINC and his staff, nor the intelligence community anticipated or initially understood the problems of supporting a unified commander in a mid to high intensity conflict."

Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene. Editors. "Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm." 12, no. 5: 1-3.

This is a review of a 45-page document with this title issued by U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, 103rd Congress, 1st session, August 1993. It is "one of the most important critiques yet written by a congressional committee."

Francona, Rick. Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1999.

From advertisement: The author is "a Gulf war veteran and retired intelligence officer. The book provides an insider's perspective of the foreign policy implications of our cooperative relationship with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and how that relationship later deteriorated into Desert Storm. The author traveled extensively through Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, later served as Gen. Schwarzkopf's Arabic interpreter during Desert Shield/Storm, and then became a principal author for DoD's after-action report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf war."

According to Loeb, "Back Channels," Washington Post, 13 Nov. 2000, 25, Francona was a member of the CIA team that rescued the family of former Iraqi nuclear weapons scientist Khidhir Hamza from northern Iraq in 1995.

Jonkers, AFIO WIN 34-99, 27 Aug. 1999, comments that Francona writes in a forthright and very readable fashion, weaving in anecdotes with policy perspectives and situation descriptions. His book contributes to understanding a recent past that is relevant to the present and future. Highly recommended reading."

Francona has a Website at http://www.francona.com.

Fredericks, Brian, and Richard Wiersema. "Battlefield TECHINT: Support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM." Military Intelligence 18, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 1992): 13-19.

Fulghum, David A. "Key Military Officials Criticize Intelligence Handling in Gulf War." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 Jun. 1991, 83.

Schwarzkopf and other top military commanders are criticizing aspects of intelligence support furing the Gulf War.

Return to MI Ops 1990s Table of Contents