MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Military Operations

1990s

Bosnia (Operation Joint Endeavor)

N - Z

Newman, Richard J. "Hunting War Criminals: The First Account of Secret U.S. Missions in Bosnia." U.S. News & World Report, 6 Jul. 2000. [http://www.usnews.com]

Report on efforts to use special operations forces to capture "persons indicted for war crimes" (PIFWCs) in Bosnia. "[F]or at least the past year, a U.S. special operations task force has been conducting one of the broadest covert operations since the Vietnam War, gathering intelligence on PIFWCs and helping to seize them in a series of raids."

Niedrauer, Bruce A. "Joint STARS Support to Special Operations Command." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 15-17.

In Operation Joint Endeavor, a Ground Station Module (GSM) was deployed to the Special Operations Command Implementation Force (SOCIFOR) to provide "near-real-time access via satellite communications (SATCOMs) to Joint STARS imagery."

Perkins, David D. [LTC/USA] "Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Operations in Bosnia." Defense Intelligence Journal 6, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 33-61. Ed. version. American Intelligence Journal 18, no. 1/2 (1998): 33-42.

This article is heavy on organizational detail and light on supporting examples for field activities. Nonetheless, it succeeds in giving a taste of how military CI and HUMINT activities are proceeding in the field in contingency operations. The author stresses the increasing importance to commanders of hand-held digital imagery, but notes that "database storage and retrieval of this information is still an unfulfillable requirement."

Shortsleeve, Brian J. [1LT/USMC] "Realtime Imagery for Ground Commanders in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Marine Corps Gazette, Apr. 1998, 34-35.

Discusses the use of mobile remote receive stations (RRSs) to downlink live imagery from Navy P-3C Orions to remotely situated troops, and suggests that the same configuration would be an asset to Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) operations in littoral areas where P-3Cs are operating.

Villeneuve, Daniel, in collaboration with Marc-André Lefebvre. "Intelligence and the United Nations: Lessons from Bosnia -- A Canadian Experience." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 22-25.

The primary author was the intelligence officer for the 3d Battalion, Royal 22d Regiment, deployed in Bosnia 30 April-30 October 1995.

Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Cancels Plans for Raid on Bosnia to Capture 2 Serbs." New York Times, 26 Jul. 1998. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"After spending more than two years and tens of millions of dollars preparing missions, training commandos and gathering intelligence, the United States has dropped its secret plans to arrest Bosnia's two most wanted men accused of war crimes.... Plans for clandestine missions to seize the men ... have been scuttled by U.S. commanders who fear a blood bath, by French officers who are reluctant to act and by U.S. government officials who share a growing sense that the mission could rekindle Serbian aggression."

Wiebes, Cees. Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992-1995. Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, 2002. Hamburg and London: LIT Verlag, 2003. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction, 2003.

The author provides the following: This work "includes chapters on sharing of intelligence with the UN, plus US, British, Canadian and European Intelligence operations in Bosnia and Croatia, Human Intelligence, Imint, Sigint (2 chapters including NSA operations} and Covert Operations. It is based on top secret Dutch intel. archives plus (de)classified US, UK, Canadian, Bosnian and UN documents."

According to Jonkers, AFIO WIN 26-02 (1 Jul. 2002), Wiebes had "unrestricted access to the Dutch intelligence community to prepare an intelligence report as an Annex to the overall Dutch after-action report" regarding the participation of a Dutch Air Mobile Battalion in the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia. The report provides "a different perspective on the interplay of foreign attitudes and capabilities with US intelligence and policy."

Peake, Studies 48.1, says that "[t]his book is not easy reading. The names are strange, the acronyms profuse, the political alignments complex, and the geography often confusing.... These shortcomings notwithstanding, it is an important work -- the most thorough treatment of the topic to date."

To Martyn, IJI&C 18.1 (Spring 2005), the author "is quite harsh in his indictment of the political leadership which sent the Dutch Battalion (DutchBat) into harm's way with inadequate intelligence support." In the telling of his story, "Wiebes gets maximum utility out of disparate, incomplete details." This work "is a thoroughly researched and thoughtful examination of this dark period in the history of multinational peacekeeping."

See also, Brendan O'Neill, "You are only allowed to see Bosnia in black and white," 23 Jan. 2004 at http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA374.htm.

 

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