Ackerman, Robert K. "Balkans Serve as Proving Ground for Operational Imagery Support." Signal, Oct. 1999, 17 ff. [http://www.afcea.org/signal/]
Agee, Collin A. "Joint STARS in Bosnia: Too Much Data, Too Little Intel?" Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 6-10, 40-41.
The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) deployed in Bosnia in December 1995 faced a very different situation than the one that had been dealt with so successfully by its predecessor system in Operation Desert Storm. The system was not a tactical success in the Bosnian environment, but it did serve as a deterrent to combatants' freedom to violate the Dayton Accord.
Allard, Kenneth. "Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary Assessment." American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 3/4 (1997): 55-58.
"While its effects are often overstated, an unprecedented amount of information flows from Washington to European headquarters and intermediate staging bases.... But elaborate information flows between higher command levels do not always translate into better support for the warfighter. In fact, life in Bosnia has not changed very much for the American soldier, because the information revolution largely stops at Division level."
Ash, Lawrence N. "Wilderness Guide: Intelligence for the Commander in Bosnia." Naval War College Review (Summer 1996): 30-41.
Aviation Week & Space Technology. Editors. "U-2s Deployed to French Base." 15 Jan. 1996, 61.
Three U-2Rs have been deployed to the Istres air force base in southern France, from where they will fly NATO missions over Bosnia. They moved there from RAF Fairford, thus reducing roundtrip air time by about two hours. Two additional U-2s may be added later.
Baker, Kristin M. "Operation Joint Endeavor: Joint Stars in the Balkans." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 27-29.
The terrain in Bosnia-Herzegovina presents particular challenges to the Joint STARS collection system. Nevertheless, the system allowed its users to track the absence of gross violations of the Dayton Peace Accord.
Bert, Wayne. The Reluctant Superpower: United States Policy in Bosnia, 1991-1995. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997.
From publisher: "This book examines the nature of the war in the former Yugoslavia, US interests there and US perceptions of the conflict. The policies of the Bush and Clinton administrations toward the war and the factors discouraging US intervention are examined and evaluated in the context of a post-Cold War international system."
Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
Prochazka, Balkan Academic Book Review (2000), finds that the authors have produced "a very well balanced and thorough piece abundant with a great variety of information covering historical, cultural, political, and military dimensions of the conflict in Bosnia as well as different international peace efforts to resolve it. Furthermore, Burg and Shoup offer detailed analysis of behaviour and motivation of various domestic and international actors throughout the crisis.... The strength of this work is that it strives to be fair to all sides."
Collins, Steven. "Army PSYOP in Bosnia: Capabilities and Constraints." Parameters, Summer 1999, 57-73. [http://www.carlisle.army.mil]
"The principal tool available for the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) to influence attitudes in Bosnia has been military psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, and most of the PSYOP forces accessible to NATO are in the US Army. The contribution of these forces has been laudable, but there have been many missed opportunities as well as misunderstandings over the last three and a half years regarding what PSYOP can and cannot do. This article examines the performance of PSYOP forces in Bosnia, offering recommendations on how to improve this vital part of the US contribution." (Footnotes omitted)
Covault, Craig. "USAF U-2 Satcom Link Employed in Bosnia Operation." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 26 Feb. 1996, 26.
USAF U-2 reconnaissance aircraft are relaying imaging radar data via satellite link back to Beale Air Force Base for processing. Beale then relays the processed intelligence back to theater commanders.
Davis, Robert N. "A Report of Document Exploitation in Bosnia and NATO's Stabilization Force." National Security Law Report, Nov. 1999, 1, 4-6.
The author is a naval reservist deployed to Bosnia from January to October 1999. He served as Officer in Charge of the document exploitation mission of NATO's stabilization force.
Gentry, John A. [LTC/USAR] "Knowledge-Based 'Warfare': Lessons from Bosnia." American Intelligence Journal 18, no. 1/2 (1998): 73-80.
"We delude ourselves if we think that technology designed to assist commanders and soldiers during the conduct of comparatively simple high-intensity warfare will be of major use in peace operations."
Gramer, George K., Jr. "Operation Joint Endeavor: Combined-Joint Intelligence in Peace Enforcement Operations." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 11-14.
"Contributing to the intelligence frustration in the theater was the proliferation of intelligence entities by nations and agencies.... In Sarajevo, there were at least ten national intelligence centers primarily dedicated to providing intelligence releasable only to their own nations.... Human intelligence (HUMINT) was clearly the number one collector in theater.... NATO-releasable SIGINT reporting consistently was a day late and a dollar short.... Imagery intelligence (IMINT) ... was [generally] sufficient and satisfactory." However, an excess of tactical reconnaissance assets were deployed in theater, and "the resultant products were often less than satisfactory."
Harvey, Donald [RADM/USN (Ret.)]. "Intelligence Notes." American Intelligence Journal 16, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1995): 94.
"The U.S. deployed the newly tested unmanned aerial vehicle, Predator, to Albania for reconnaissance work over Bosnia. The UAV can operate by day or night, giving it an edge over recon satellites, and provides both still and video images. The UAV has a range of 500 miles and can remain airborne for 40 hours. At 10,000 feet, it cannot be heard and is virtually invisible. The Predator completed a successful test in a June  exercise to locate mobile missile launchers."
Harvey reports in his "Intelligence Notebook," Periscope 20.7 (1995), p. 6: "Two of the four experimental Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) deployed to Bosnia ... have been reported by the Department of Defense to have been operationally lost.... Investigations have been undertaken to try to determine if the losses were related at least in part to ground fire.... The lack of media and public outcry over the losses illustrates one big advantage of the UAV for surveillance over hostile areas."
Hicks, D. Bruce. "Lifting the Arms Embargo on the Bosnian Muslims: Secret Diplomacy or Covert Action?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 246-261.
The author concludes that "[t]he activities of U.S. officials [in 1994] toward the arms pipeline came perilously close to constituting illegal covert actions."
Hintz, James V., III, and Lester W. Pinkney. "Operation Joint Endeavor: Logistics Supporting the GSM [Ground Station Module] Task Force." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 18-21, 41.
Marshall, Roger D., BEM, "Operation Grapple: British Armed Forces in United Nations Protection Force." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 25-26, 57-58.
The British force first deployed to Croatia and Bosnia in October 1992 with the task of escorting United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) humanitarian convoys. Other tasks would follow.
Military Intelligence. "MI in Bosnia: Support to 'Joint Endeavor.'" 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): Entire issue.
Click for the individual ARTICLES in this issue.
Mills, John. "PSYOP Radio Operations in Bosnia: A Steady, Positive Drumbeat." Special Warfare 14 (Fall 2001): 30-39.
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