Packard, Wyman H. "Intelligence and the Navy." Naval Review (1968): 201-217. Packard, Wyman H. "Intelligence and the Navy." Naval Review (1968): 201-217.
Calder: "Argues that the Navy has the leading intelligence service among alll the armed services."
Packard, Wyman H. "The Naval Attaché." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 91, no. 4 (1965): 130-133.
Packard,
Wyman. "The Origins of Naval Intelligence Professionals." Naval
Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 5, no. 3 (1989): 17-18.
Polmar, Norman. "American Spy Ships." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 129, no. 10 (Oct. 2003): 117-118.
This is an excellent quick look at specialized U.S. intelligence ships, utilized by both NSA and the Navy from 1961 until after the Pueblo incident in 1968.
Rectanus, Earl F. ("Rex") [VADM/USN (Ret.)] "The Naval Intelligence Organization Vietnam (NAVINTFOV)." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2008): 10-12.
The "architect of the intelligence strategy to support Operation SEALORDS" reviews the changes in Naval Intelligence in Vietnam in 1968-1970.
Richelson,
Jeffrey T. "Task Force 157: The US Navy's Secret Intelligence Service,
1966-77." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 1 (Jan.
1996): 106-145.
In a exquisitely detailed article, Richelson tells the story of "Task Force 157's origins, activities, and demise" as the U.S. Navy's clandestine human intelligence collection organization. Richelson notes the expansion of the Task Force's charter into technical collection operations and "centralized operation of a variety of overt human intelligence activities." The reasons for the Task Force's disestablishment lay in a combination of Bobby Inman's antipathy for the unit and budget cuts in defense expenditures coming out of Congress. It was only later that the connections between it and the unsavory Edwin Wilson were made public.
See also, Don Nielson, "Task Force 157: Born Twenty Years Too Soon," American Intelligence Journal 14, no 1 (Autumn/Winter 1993): 23-27.
Rindskopf, "Mike" [RADM/USN (Ret.)]. "Reflections of a URL Intelligence Subspecialist." Naval Intelligence Professional
Quarterly 20, no. 4 (Dec. 2004): 12-14.
Schindler, John R. A Dangerous Business: The U.S. Navy and National Reconnaissance during the Cold War. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2004. [PDF version available through http://www.nsa.gov/history/histo00007.cfm]
This brochure was "published by the National Security Agency to celebrate the dedication of the U.S. Navy memorial at National Vigilance Park.... [It] outlines the history of Naval aerial reconnaissance during the Cold War, and commemorates the many veterans of that long, secret struggle, especially the sailors ... who gave their lives."
Smith,
Esmond D. "The Security Dilemma." Naval Intelligence Professional
Quarterly 5, no. 3 (1989): 13-16.
Sontag, Sherry,
and Christopher Drew, with Annette Lawrence Drew. Blind Man's Bluff:
The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage. New York: Public Affairs,
1998.
Broad, NYT, 8 Nov. 1998, says that this book "recounts in rich detail, going far beyond earlier sketchy accounts," one of the Cold War's most successful spying operations. "Ingenious cable taps," placed in such places as the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea, "produced a torrent of intelligence data."
According to Bates, NIPQ 14.4, the authors of this book use the type of documentation ("Anonymous") favored by investigative journalists, which "allows them to weave fact, speculation, and fiction into a story that then takes on an aura of authenticity, but is next to impossible to verify."
Jonkers, AFIO WIN 39 (14 Oct. 1998), sees this as "an early-Tom Clancy-like adventure novel masquerading as history,... with the line between fact and fiction, truth and speculation, exaggeration or deception, unrecognizable and unknown.... [Nevertheless,] read it as a superb historical novel and a monument to courage. Highly recommended."
For Raviv, Washington Post, 30 Nov. 1998, this book "is filled with specifics, notably new details of incidents previously leaked, but thankfully not presented in the dry techno-speak of many military histories. This one is very human and easy to read."
Friedman, Proceedings, Feb. 1999, finds the book a "somewhat unsatisfactory" product that "cannot be considered complete," given that the documentation remains classified. Many of its "details are often thin, and the book is padded with irrelevancies." Nonetheless, Blind Man's Bluff shows that the submarine service "did something important and worthwhile during the Cold War." Sontag and Drew respond to Friedman's comments in "Comment and Discussion," Proceedings, Jun. 1999, 24.
The book is both "boosted and panned" by Anderson, Intelligencer 10.1. He finds "the style, the florid writing, the exaggeration, and poor choice of words objectionable.... Nevertheless, it is a readable, lively book and puts a lot of new information in the public domain" about sensitive operations.
Warren, CIRA Newsletter 23.5, notes that the telling of the "Soviet side of the story is not as exhaustive as that of the Americans, but it is almost as compelling." Carpenter, IJI&C 12.2, says that Blind Man's Bluff is "a unique story" that makes for "fascinating reading." See also, Richard J. Newman, "Tales from the Sea Floor," U.S. News & World Report, 23 Nov. 1998, 44.
Taylor, Rufus L. "Command and the Intelligence Process." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 86, no. 8 (Aug. 1960): 27-39.
Taylor, Rufus L. "The Importance of Intelligence to the Nation and the Navy." Navy 9 (Sep. 1966): 18-23. [Calder]
Thamm, Gerhardt.
1. "It Was All About ALFA." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 18, no. 4 (Oct. 2002): 9-12.
The author discusses the years-long effort by Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) analysts (aided by CIA analysts) to piece together the enigma of the Soviet ALFA class SSN -- and to get that analysis accepted.
2. "Unraveling a Cold War Mystery -- The ALFA SSN: Challenging Paradigms, Finding New Truths, 1969-79." Studies in Intelligence 52, no. 3 (Sep. 2008): 17-24. [Originally published in a classified Studies in Intelligence 37, no. 3 (Fall 1993). Declassified "with slight redactions in 2007.]
The author describes the long road to acceptance that the Soviets had broken the mold with their ALFA class submarine.
Tuthill,
Don. "Operational Planning, Pre-Pueblo." Naval Intelligence
Professionals Quarterly 10, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 9-10.
"Re-edited" reprint of article from NIPQ (Fall 1988).
Vyborny, Lee, and Don Davis. Dark Waters: An Insider’s Account of the NR-1, the Cold War’s Undercover Nuclear Sub. New York: New American Library, 2003.
Murray, NWCR 56.4, notes that "Vyborny was a new-construction plank-owner and member of the first commissioning crew of the U.S. Navy’s small nuclear-powered submarine NR-1.... Overall, the book well rewards its readers, but unevenly." The authors’ depiction of the routine when operating NR-1 is "masterful." But, "[a]s good as their depictions of the ordinary are, Vyborny and David convey the dangers of NR-1’s unusual and exceptional missions and experiences in a less forceful and riveting manner." Nonetheless, this "insider account of how NR-1’s first crews built and operated their ship fully pays back the reader’s investment."
Wilhelm, Peter G. "Cutting Edge Work at the Naval Research Laboratory." In Beyond Expectations -- Building an American National Reconnaissance Capability: Recollections of the Pioneers and Founders of National Reconnaissance, ed. Robert A. McDonald, 155-161. Bethesda, MD: American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 2002.
Woodward,
Bob. "Pentagon to Abolish Secret Spy Unit." Washington Post,18
May 1977, A1, A5.
On Navy's Task Force 157. See Don Nielson, "Task Force 157: Born Twenty Years Too Soon," American Intelligence Journal 14, no 1 (Autumn/Winter 1993): 23-27; and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Task Force 157: The US Navy's Secret Intelligence Service, 1966-77," Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 106-145.
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